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The aim of this thesis is to investigate the application of the UK Financial Reporting Council’s 
Stewardship Code and evaluate the outcomes reported by signatories, thus providing 
evidence to determine whether the Code has been successful in delivering its proposed 
aims. The UK Stewardship Code (2012) was published to enhance the quality of engagement 
between investors and companies. The FRC proposed that effective stewardship would 
benefit companies, investors and the economy as a whole.  
A mixed methods approach has been adopted, initially collecting quantitative data to 
explore the statistical relationship between stewardship activities (e.g. exercising voting 
rights, monitoring the investee corporates) and the financial performance of asset 
managers. Interviews with UK asset managers explored the non-financial benefits observed 
from applying the Code.  
The quantitative and qualitative results provide a thorough understanding of the application 
of the Code, illustrating that the implementation of the Code has not influenced the 
financial performance of asset managers significantly. Furthermore, applying the Code has 
not enhanced the quality of engagement between signatories of the Code and their investee 
corporates. Overall, this study concludes that while the Stewardship Code has been 
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The first version of the UK Corporate Governance Code defined Corporate Governance 
(called CG for here on in) as “the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. Shareholders’ role 
in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an 
appropriate governance structure is in place” (Cadbury, 1992, p.5). According to the latest 
version of the CG Code (2018), companies need to promote a high standard of CG to achieve 
long-term and sustainable success. A central issue that can lead to weak CG in companies 
relates to agency problems, indicating a distance between managers (i.e. agents), who act 
as stewards over the investments of the owners, and shareholders (i.e. principals) or owners 
of the assets under the agent’s stewardship (Smith et al., 1976). This distance may make 
directors act against the best interest of the shareholders. The agency problem is central to 
the reformation of CG in the UK and other countries, explained in the next section. 
1.1. Reformation of Corporate Governance 
In modern times, CG reform started in the UK with the formation of the Cadbury Committee 
in 1991. The aim of this committee was to address three main concerns that were negatively 
affecting the CG of UK companies during the 1990s. The first was related to the application 
of creative accounting that could mislead the audience about corporate performance or the 
true shareholder value of the companies (Vladu and Matis, 2010; Whittington, 1993). The 
second related to autocratic CEOs who were able to hide financial weaknesses of 
companies, leading to corporate failures. The final was over the rapid growth of executives’ 
remuneration, which was not correlated to the financial performance of companies. To 
address these concerns, the Cadbury Report was published in 1992. It aimed to enhance the 
accountability of executives, specifically towards shareholders and encouraged shareholders 
to play an active role in the organisations in which they invested (called investee corporates 




“Shareholders have delegated many of their responsibilities as owners to the directors who 
act as their stewards. It is for the shareholders to call the directors to book if they appear to 
be failing in their stewardship, and they should use this power. While they cannot be 
involved in the direction and management of their company, they can insist on a high 
standard of corporate governance and good governance is an essential test of the directors’ 
stewardship”. 
1.2 Shareholder Engagement 
Historically, active engagement in the decisions of investee corporates has not been a 
primary concern of UK shareholders. An indication of poor engagement levels is the very 
limited extent to which shareholders have historically voted at annual general meetings 
(AGMs). In fact, voting levels of shareholders in their investee corporates was as low as 11% 
during the 1970s (Midgley, 1974). When the Cadbury Report was published, institutional 
investors were recognised as dominant shareholders in the UK, holding the majority of UK-
listed company shares. According to the Office for National Statistics, share ownership of UK 
financial institutions, including pension funds, insurance companies, unit trusts and other 
financial institutions increased from 29% in 1963 to 60.4% in 1992, at the time of the 
Cadbury Report. Unsurprisingly, institutional investors were asked by the Cadbury 
Committee to use their voting rights to influence the standards of CG in their investee 
corporates (i.e. adopt an active holding strategy), rather than selling their shares (i.e. 
adopting a passive exit strategy). The Cadbury Report’s recommendations for institutional 
investors were not new. Instead, they were a restatement of the guidelines that were 
already published by the Institutional Shareholder Committee (ISC) on the responsibilities of 
Institutional Shareholders in the UK (1991).  
In addition to the Cadbury Committee, other associations formed to discourage passive 
ownership behaviour among institutional shareholders, including the National Association 
of Pension Funds (NAPF), which represents the largest group of UK institutional investors. In 
line with the Cadbury Committee, this association recommended that all institutional 
investors should exercise their voting rights at the AGMs of their investee companies as well 




1.2.1 Lack of Shareholder Engagement 
After the modern CG reform and, despite the call from Cadbury committees (1992) and 
other associations (e.g. ISC and NAPF), engagement levels among investors did not change 
considerably.  ISC (1993) reported that among the 20 large UK listed companies, on average, 
only 34% of all voting rights were exercised. In addition, the Hampel Report (1998) found 
that there was no significant increase in the proportion of shareholders who voted after the 
Cadbury Report, which remained below 40%. Hampel added that most of the votes were in 
favour of resolutions proposed by the Board. On the other hand, Hampel did report that 
several institutional shareholders published their voting policies, indicating that investors 
partially followed Cadbury's recommendations. 
A number of different reasons were proposed for the low level of shareholder engagement 
during the 1990s. Short and Keasey (1997), who investigated institutional investors’ voting 
in the UK, argued that voting could be costly and time consuming. Supporting this view, 
Çelik and Isaksson (2014) proposed that the low level of voting activities could be due to 
monitoring costs, specifically for shareholders with a highly diversified equity portfolio. 
While emphasising on the low level of institutional voting, Short and Keasey (1997) 
explained that some external fund managers might have to consult pension fund trustees 
before voting. This might make voting a complicated procedure for shareholders. According 
to Short and Keasey (1997) the minimum notice period for an AGM is 21 days. This notice 
period would make it difficult for an external fund manager with many clients to attend 
AGMs and vote on all matters for each company in their portfolio. Moreover, Coffee and 
Black (1994) found that institutional investors might follow other strategies to influence the 
CG of their investee corporates, such as private intervention. Therefore, the low level of 
voting does not necessarily indicate that the investors are not interested in the CG of their 
companies but that the cost of doing so, or the complexities of procedures may be 
prohibitive.  
Crespi and Renneboog (2010) suggested a lack of monitoring expertise and the fear of being 
considered an insider (and therefore in breach of insider trading regulations) as the reasons 
behind passive ownership behaviour among UK shareholders. Reisberg (2015) identified the 




the benefits as a reason for passive ownership behaviour. They added that uncertainty over 
the outcome of engagement as well as difficulty in measuring the return on engagement, 
were factors that could discourage active engagement between shareholders and their 
investee corporates.  
Share ownership of UK institutional investors decreased to around 39% of UK listed 
companies shares by 2006. By this time, UK institutional investors were the second largest 
group of shareholders after foreign investors. As a result, there were high expectations 
among academics and policymakers that institutional investors would actively engage in 
their investee corporates to protect the value of their investment (Roach, 2011).  Such 
expectations did not materialise as shortly after the financial crisis of 2008, institutional 
investors were partially blamed for the failure of companies and financial institutions for not 
playing an active and informed ownership role in their investee corporates before the crisis  
(OECD,  2009). The OECD Report (2009, p.47) asked the audience “if boards have not 
functioned well in overseeing risk management and remuneration systems, and have neither 
been objective nor independent, then isn’t the shareholder at the end of the day at fault?”. 
Hence, the OECD accused shareholders of failing to call Boards to account properly for 
actions. 
The OECD provided limited evidence from the Investment Managers Association (IMA) that 
some shareholders have played an active role in their investee corporates. According to the 
IMA (Investment Management Association) (cited in OECD, 2009), institutional investors (i.e. 
their members) began to exit the banking sector in 2005 because of concerns about 
strategic direction. The IMA claimed that their members engaged effectively with the 
financial institutions which went bankrupt after the financial crisis, including Bradford and 
Bingley and the Royal Bank of Scotland. In more detail, the IMA stated that 11 of their 
members had a total of 55 meetings with the Board of Bradford and Bingley (since 
nationalised), and 18 firms collectively had 59 meetings with the Royal Bank of Scotland. 
Although these members of IMA appeared to undertake effective engagement, this cannot 
be generalised to all institutional investors given that membership of the IMA is voluntary 
and the membership are more likely to consist of those investors with a commitment to 




institutional investors played an active role in their investee corporates before the financial 
crisis. The OECD proposed that the level of engagements was too low to make a difference 
and stop failures of financial institutions. In line with this, Manifest (2009) could not find any 
evidence of shareholders questioning banks over risk management until 2008, when the 
damage had already occurred. During 2008, the level of submitted resolutions against the 
banks was as low as 10 per cent (Manifest, 2009).  In addition to the OECD, a review 
published by Walker (2009), which examined CG in UK banks and other financial entities 
post-financial crisis, concluded that failures of the Boards of Directors might have been 
addressed effectively if major investors had acted as responsible owners and had been 
engaged in their investee corporates.  
The financial crisis led to an intensified scrutiny of the role of investors in the banking crisis.  
This led to a realisation that institutional investors, specifically fund management groups 
(pension funds, insurance companies and mutual fund groups), were in part to blame for 
not holding Boards to be more accountable (Masters & Burgess, 2010). Consequently 
regulators and politicians raised concerns over whether institutional investors were 
exercising their voting rights and engaging with their investee corporates effectively (Mallin, 
2010; Myners, 2009; Reisberg, 2011; Walker, 2010). This passive investment strategy led to 
institutional investors being described as absentee landlords. Notably, the blame was not 
focussed on institutional investors alone: CG guidelines were also criticised for their failure 
to familiarise investors with their ownership responsibilities, particularly failure to 
encourage an active engagement role in their investee corporates (Tilba & McNulty, 2013; 
Walker, 2009). 
1.3 UK Stewardship Code 
The lack of engagement by institutional investors in their investee corporates during the 
financial crisis combined with the ineffectiveness of CG guidelines stimulated the publication 
of the UK Stewardship Code by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). The origin of the 
Stewardship Code goes back to a statement called the “Responsibilities of Institutional 
Shareholders and Agents: Statement of Principles”, which was first published by the 
Institutional Shareholders Committee (ISC) in 2002. Largely as a result of the financial crisis, 




Walker Review (2009), the FRC was asked to take responsibility for the ISC Code. The FRC is 
responsible for regulating auditors, accountants and actuaries, and setting the UK’s 
Corporate Governance Code (call CG Code from here on in).  
The general aim of the FRC is to promote transparency and integrity in business. The FRC, as 
the responsible policymaker published the first version of the Stewardship Code in 2010. 
The first revisions were published by the FRC in 2012, although this did not change the spirit 
of the 2010 version. It should be noted that the latest version of the Code was published in 
January 2020, which occurred after the data collection for this PhD research. The FRC 
encourages all institutional investors, including asset managers, asset owners and service 
providers to follow the guidelines of the Stewardship Code and publish a stewardship 
statement on both the FRC and their institution website. According to the FRC, reporting of 
stewardship activities is beneficial for three groups: 
1. Companies which are trying to understand the expectations of their major 
shareholders. 
2. Those providing mandates to asset managers to make a better decision. 
3. Asset managers who are trying to understand the expectations of their clients. 
The FRC website informs readers that the “UK Stewardship Code aims to enhance the quality 
of engagement between investors and companies to help improve long-term risk-adjusted 
returns to shareholders” (FRC, 2019, para.4). The 2012 Stewardship Code contains seven 
principles asking institutional investors to “publicly disclose their policy on how they will 
discharge their stewardship responsibilities, have a robust policy on managing conflicts of 
interest in relation to stewardship which should be publicly disclosed, monitor their investee 
corporates, establish clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate their stewardship 
activities, be willing to act collectively with other investors where appropriate, have a clear 
policy on voting and disclosure of voting activity, report periodically on their stewardship and 
voting activities” (FRC, 2012, p.5). These principles should be applied based on a comply or 
explain basis. Comply or explain approach allows “those signatories that choose not to 
comply with one of the principles, or not to follow the guidance, should deliver meaningful 
explanations that enable the reader to understand their approach to stewardship” (FRC, 




perform their stewardship activities, including exercising their voting rights, monitoring, 
and, having a purposeful dialogue with their investee corporates. 
According to the FRC website, “since December 2010 all UK-authorised Asset Managers are 
required under the FCA’s Conduct of Business Rules to produce a statement of commitment 
to the UK Stewardship Code or explain why it is not appropriate to their business model” 
(FRC, 2019, para.7). At the time of this research the number of signatories of the 
Stewardship Code reached 282 institutional investors.  As a signatory asset managers are 
required to publish their stewardship statements on the FRC website, to review their 
stewardship policies annually and update their statements when necessary to reflect any 
changes. In addition, the FRC as the responsible regulator reviews the application of the 
Stewardship Code regularly through examining a sample of signatories’ statements.  
The Stewardship Code is the first in the world that principally focuses on institutional 
investors, encouraging them to act as responsible owners in their investee corporates 
(Micheler, 2013). Other countries such as Malaysia, Japan, Canada and South Korea have 
since been inspired to publish similar guidance for their investors. 
According to the FRC, effective stewardship, through following the principles of Stewardship 
Code benefits companies, investors and the economy as a whole. It should be noted that 
the FRC’s proposition that effective stewardship will benefit investors and companies is 
more assumed than proved by previous studies as academic evidence has not reached a 
consensus about the real outcome from the ownership role of institutional investors. For 
example, some studies found positive impacts on corporate governance and financial 
performance from shareholder activism on their investee corporates (Bebchuk, 2005, 2007; 
Becht et al., 2009; Brav et al., 2008; Dimitrov & Jain, 2011; Greenwood & Schor, 2009; Klein 
& Zur, 2009, 2011). Other studies found no link between shareholder activism and 
performance (Black, 1998; Carleton et al., 1998; Gillan & Starks, 2007; Karpoff, 2001; Karpoff 
et al., 1996; Prevost & Rao, 2000; Smith, 1996; Wahal, 1996; Welker et al., 2011). A detailed 




1.4 The Aim of the Study 
At the time of writing nine years have passed since a significant number of institutional 
investors signed up to apply the Stewardship Code, with associated commitment to  
contributing resources and publishing their stewardship statements. Now, it is the right time 
to determine the success or failure of this guideline in reaching its proposed aims. There are 
two primary resources to review for this purpose. The first resource relates to the reviews 
conducted by FRC. Since 2011, the FRC has published six reviews on the application of the 
Stewardship Code, available on the FRC website (FRC, 2019). These reviews mainly report on 
the quality of stewardship statements published by institutional investors. However, the 
success of the Stewardship Code in reaching the proposed aims (i.e. to enhance the quality 
of engagement of the investors as well as improving their financial performance) has not 
been explored in the FRC reviews. 
The second set of resources available to evaluate the success of the Stewardship Code in 
reaching its proposed objectives are existing academic studies. A small number of studies 
were found which investigated the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code (e.g. Çelik and 
Isaksson, 2014; Cheffins, 2010; Micheler, 2013; Reisberg, 2015; Tilba & McNulty, 2013,). All 
of these studies questioned the success of the Stewardship Code in enhancing the quality of 
engagement between investors and companies. For example, Reisberge (2015) 
benchmarked the achievements of the Stewardship Code against arguments which were 
advanced before this guideline was published, as well as an assessment of implementation 
issues.  Reisberg (2015) concluded that the Stewardship Code was unsuccessful in achieving 
its proposed objectives. In addition, Cheffin (2010) examined the potential impact of the 
Stewardship Code by reviewing the existing resources including reports by relevant 
associations such as NAPF (National Association of Pension Funds) (2009), IMA (2009), the 
ISC (2009) and the FRC (2010). In line with Reisberge (2015), Cheffin (2010) doubted any 
significant transformation in the engagement behaviour of institutional investors through 
the application of the Stewardship Code. In conclusion, these studies could not find 
adequate evidence that the application of the Stewardship Code had enhanced engagement 
between signatories and their investee corporates. Despite providing informative outcomes 




guideline for its signatories is still not very clear. Furthermore, these studies explored the 
Stewardship Code without applying primary data. Namely, the sources of information used 
in these studies were generated either by FRC or other institutions, not representing an 
independent point of view on the application of the Stewardship Code. This might affect the 
reliability of the findings by these studies. 
To address the issues detailed above, the main aim of this study is: 
 To investigate the application of the Stewardship Code to determine its outcome for the 
signatories of this guideline (i.e. institutional investors), both financially and non-
financially.  
Being the first study to investigate the proposed subject there is a lack of research data to 
enable the specification of detailed research hypotheses. Instead, answering the following 
exploratory research questions will help to reach the main research aim: 
1. To what extent has applying the Stewardship Code provided financial benefits to its 
signatories? 
2. To what extent has applying the Stewardship Code provided non-financial benefits to 
its signatories? 
3. To what extent has the Stewardship Code been successful in enhancing the quality of 
engagement between investors and their investee corporates? 
4. To what extent has the Stewardship Code been successful in achieving the aims that 
are proposed by FRC? 
To study the Stewardship Code, a mixed methods approach is followed. First, the financial 
benefit of applying the Stewardship Code will be investigated quantitatively through 
regression analysis. This is then followed by a qualitative approach in which interviews with 
signatories of the Stewardship Code will be undertaken to investigate the non-financial 
benefits of applying the Stewardship Code and the quality of engagement between 
investors and their investee corporates. Interviews will provide in-depth understanding of 




The findings from this study will contribute to knowledge in a number of ways.  Firstly by 
informing understanding of the role of the Stewardship Code in changing the financial 
performance of UK asset managers and in improving the behaviour of institutional investors 
in their corporations. Secondly, the finding of this study will add to the existing knowledge 
around the outcome of shareholder engagement by determining the impact of effective 
engagement for the investors themselves, given that existing studies which investigated 
shareholder engagement mainly focused on the outcome of engagement for the investee 
corporates.  Thirdly, the researcher is not aware of any empirical research which has applied 
mixed methods to investigate shareholder engagement.  The use of a mixed method 
approach enables a more thorough, in-depth understanding of shareholder engagement. 
Fourthly,  given that agency theory has been a popular theory adopted by scholars that have 
investigated shareholder engagement, this study will provide a theoretical contribution by 
exploring whether agency theory can adequately explain the relationship between 
shareholders and their investee corporates. Fifthly, the finding of this study contributes to 
the existing literature by illustrating the impact of voluntary guidelines on the behaviour of 
signatories. Finally, the results of this study would be valuable for policymakers, including 
the FRC, who are responsible for developing and reviewing the CG guidelines.  
1.5 Outline of the Study 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: The second chapter presents the reviewed 
literature on CG, shareholder engagement, and the Stewardship Code. The third chapter 
explains the research methodology of this study. The findings are presented in the fourth 
chapter, with the results discussed in more detail in the fifth chapter. The sixth chapter 
presents the conclusion along with the limitations faced in this study as well as providing 





2.1 The Development of Corporate Governance 
The CG can be broadly defined as “ the institutional structures, legal rules, and best practices 
that determine which body within the corporation is empowered to make particular 
decisions, how the members of that body are chosen, and the norms that should guide 
decision making” (Bainbridge, 2012, p.2). Since the 1990s, CG has become a popular subject 
among social science researchers as an important emerging discipline. After the financial 
crisis and failure of some well- known companies, such as Lehman Brothers and Royal Bank 
of Scotland, policymakers and academics emphasised the need to implement high quality 
CG to prevent such failures. According to the Walker Review (2009, p.23), “the role of 
corporate governance is to protect and advance the interests of shareholders through 
setting the strategic direction of a company and appointing and monitoring capable 
management to achieve this”.  The financial crisis revealed widespread CG system failures in 
which shareholder interests were not adequately protected.  After the crisis, a number of 
reviews were conducted to investigate the reasons behind these CG failures (e.g. OECD, 
2009; Walker Review, 2009), which suggested a combination of factors. These included the 
existence of an unskilled Board of Directors, inappropriate (excessive) remuneration 
systems, ineffective risk management, and low quality shareholder engagement.  After the 
financial crisis, the existing CG guidelines were reviewed to address inherent CG 
weaknesses. This resulted in the publication of a revised version of UK CG Code and the UK 
Stewardship Code in 2010.  It sought to provide a framework through which to better 
engage institutional investors in the decision-making processes of their investee corporates.  
 
In this chapter, CG is defined and discussed in more detail before a summary of the 
development of CG in the UK is presented, from the formation of the Cadbury Committee in 




2.1.1 Definition of Corporate Governance 
CG has existed as long as trade has existed. The phrase “Corporate Governance” came to 
use in the 1980s, at which point it referred to the process of exercising power over a 
company. There are a range of definitions of CG and the way in which it is interpreted varies 
according to the values, institutions, culture and objectives of the organisation (Clarke & 
Branson, 2012). Definitions can be classified according to whether a narrow or broad 
perspective is taken. Studies that define CG using a narrow view restrict CG to the 
relationship between a company and its shareholders to the exclusion of other stakeholders 
(Solomon, 2013) . One example of a narrow definition can be found in Bainbridge (2012, 
p.2), who considered CG as a system which “consists of the legal rules that both create and 
seek to constrain the principal-agent problem inherent in the public corporation’s structure”.   
Likewise, Denis and McConnell (2003, p.2) defined CG narrowly as “the set of mechanisms - 
both institutional and market-based - that induce the self-interested controllers of a 
company (those that make decisions regarding how the company will be operated) to make 
decisions that maximise the value of the company to its owners (suppliers of capital)”.  The 
purpose of CG mechanisms according to the narrow view  is to align the interests of agents 
(i.e. managers) and principals (i.e. shareholders) in order to protect and enhance the value 
for shareholders (Donaldson, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  
Within the broad view, CG is understood to include the web of relationships that exist 
between a company and all of its stakeholders (Solomon, 2013), not just shareholders. 
Perhaps the most influential broad definition can be found in Blair (1995), who defined CG 
as the whole set of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements that determine what 
corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised and how the risks and 
returns are allocated. Based on this definition, Blair concluded that the purpose of CG is to 
determine “how decisions are made about spending resources on building organisational 
capabilities, and how management and employees are evaluated and compensated” (Blair, 
1995, p.17). A broad perspective was also incorporated in the OECD report (2004, p.24) 
which defined the CG as “a set of relationships between a company’s management, its 
Board, its shareholders and other stakeholders”. This perspective aligns with “Stakeholder 




stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, 
communities near the company’s operations and the general public (Freeman, 1984).  
According to Solomon (2013), there is no consensus about an appropriate definition of CG 
among researchers. This is in part a result of the recent studies in this field. As more 
research is conducted, more issues and opinions emerged and academics formed different 
interpretations of the data and opinions. Despite these differences, Solomon (2013) argues 
that generally, CG definitions share the same characteristics. One of those characteristics is 
“accountability”.  Solomon (2013, p.14) defined CG as “the system of checks and balances, 
both internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies discharge their 
accountability to all their shareholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of 
their business activity”. Solomon emphasised that accountability to all stakeholders is the 
only way of meeting the shareholder interests and achieving long-term corporate success.  
2.1.2 UK ‘s Corporate Governance Model 
According to Solomon (2013) each country has a unique CG system, which is determined by 
internal (or domestic) and external factors. The internal factors include ownership structure, 
economy, the legal system, government policies, culture and history. External factors 
include the global economic climate, cross-border institutional investment and capital 
inflows from abroad. Among these factors, Solomon proposed that the way companies 
finance themselves and corporate ownership structures prevalent within an economy are 
the main determinants of a country’s CG system.  
A popular broad categorisations of CG system, developed and discussed by Mayer (1994) 
and Short et al. (1998), categorises the CG system of countries according to the 
“insider/outsider” model. It should be noted, however, that whilst these authors delineated 
“insider” and “outsider” forms of CG, in reality, most CG systems fit in between these two 







Table 2.1 Characteristics of Insider-Outsider Model 
Characteristics Insider Model Outsider Model 
Ownership Owned mainly by insider shareholders 
with control over the management 
system. 
Owned predominantly by outside 
shareholders.   
Concentration of Ownership Concentrated ownership Dispersed ownership 
Agency Problem Rare as there is little separation of 
ownership and control 
Significant due to separation of ownership 
and control 
Control on Management Excessive control by a small group of 
‘insider’ shareholders 
Moderate control by a large range of 
shareholders 
Investor Protection Weak investor protection in company law Strong investor protection in company law 
Shareholder Engagement Majority shareholders tend to have more 
‘voice’ in their investee companies 
Shareholding characterized more by ‘exit’ 
rather than by ‘voice’ 
 
Countries with “insider-dominated” systems have publicly listed companies that are owned 
and controlled by a small number of major shareholders. These models are common in East 
Asian as well as some European countries, where the companies are mostly run and owned 
by families. Italy represents a good example of the insider CG system, where the corporate 
is family-owned with the extremely concentrated ownership structure. The relationship 
between shareholders and managers is very close in the insider CG system, making it easier 
to align the interests of managers and shareholders in the corporation. This close 
relationship, however, leads to little separation of ownership and control, which creates a 
major problem in companies with insider-dominated CG systems. According to Solomon 
(2013), a lack of separation between ownership and control could encourage managers to 
abuse their power against minority shareholders. In addition, in such companies, minority 
shareholders do not have access to the company’s operational information, and misuse of 
funds by managers happens frequently (Solomon, 2013). These issues were found to have 
weakened the CG system of Asian companies, compounding in the 1997-1998 Asian 
financial crisis (Claessens & Fan, 2002; Johnson et al., 2000; Mitton, 2002; Rajan & Zingales, 
1998). For example, Mitton (2002) investigated the stock performance of East Asian 




the CG system on their performance. The author found that companies which protected 
minority shareholder rights by offering high-quality disclosure and better transparency had 
better stock performance during the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998). To resolve the 
problems related to insider CG systems, Tricker (2015) suggested that the directors of 
insider-dominated companies need to follow the interest of the dominant shareholders 
while protecting the rights of the minority shareholders. 
 
In contrast to the “insider-dominated” system, the “outsider-dominated” system refers to 
CG systems that are commonly observed in large multinational companies. In these systems, 
the actions of companies are controlled by managers, but the companies themselves are 
owned by shareholders, many of whom are dispersed globally.  The Anglo-American system, 
predominant in the UK and USA, represents an outsider-dominated model in which large 
firms are mostly controlled by managers, but owned by outside shareholders (e.g. financial 
institutions or individual shareholders).  This divorce of ownership and control may lead to 
agency problems (Berle & Means, 1932) stemming from the conflict of interest, whereby 
shareholders find it difficult to monitor and align the interests of managers with their own. 
Consequently, agency problems can lead to high agency costs, including monitoring costs, 
bonding expenditures and residual losses (Hill & Jones, 1992). Monitoring costs are the 
expenditures incurred by shareholders to monitor managers’ actions, such as the cost of 
having a Board of Directors, publication of financial reports and independent audit. Bonding 
costs are incurred by managers and include budget controls, covenants and performance 
related pay, to align the interests of shareholders with their own.  Finally, residual losses are 
any costs incurred from conflicts of interest that arise despite the use of monitoring and 
bonding. Agency costs can negatively affect corporate performance (Solomon, 2013). To 
reduce agency problems, directors of companies that operate outsider-dominated CG 
systems need to meet the conflicting expectations of shareholders, whilst also considering 
that shareholders can act collectively (Tricker, 2015).  
Solomon (2013) proposed that outside shareholders can reduce agency problems by 
exercising their powers, such as voting rights, to influence management teams and to align 
interests. Hence, in countries with outside CG systems, the role of major shareholders, such 




problem and enhance the quality of CG (Solomon, 2013).  Moreover, outsider-dominated 
CG systems have been criticised for encouraging companies to only consider shareholder 
interests (Keasey et al., 2005). This encourages managers to seek risk to increase 
shareholder value, which might not be in the best interest of all stakeholder groups (e.g. 
suppliers, employees).  
An alternative to Anglo-American CG system is the CG model of the Continental European 
countries such as Germany.   According to Kreijger (2018), the CG system in Germany has 
developed in a different way to English-speaking countries. Figure 2.1. summarises the 
German CG system.  
Figure 2.1 German’s Corporate Governance System 
 
 
Kreijger (2018) emphasised Board structure and the impact of workers in corporate 
decision-making as the main differences between the UK and German CG models. In 
contrast to the German CG system in which employees can influence the strategy through 
labour and supervisory board, Anglo-American systems minimise employee influence on 
corporate decision making. Moreover, in Anglo-American CG systems, the corporate’s 
primary aim is to meet the interests of the main stakeholders (i.e. the shareholders). 




as employees, creditors, suppliers, and local governments. Considering the difference in CG 
systems among the countries, Solomon (2013) proposed that instead of applying one 
specific model to categorise CG systems, researchers should consider a broad model, 
helping them to discuss and analyse CG systems in different countries.  
In summary, the UK CG system comes with its own weaknesses and critics. To address these 
weaknesses, various guidelines and policies have been introduced which are explained in 
the next section.   
2.1.3 Corporate Governance Guidelines 
In the UK, CG reform formally began in 1992, after the publication of the Cadbury Report. 
Following the Cadbury Report, a series of guidelines and codes were published, highlighting 
the importance of CG in the success of corporates and the economy as a whole. These 
guidelines are explained in more detail in the following section. 
The Cadbury Report was predicated on the back of a number of the failures of well-known 
corporates (e.g. BCCI, PollyPeck, Maxwell Communications).  It aimed to enhance CG by 
addressing the weaknesses of these failed companies and to prevent future failures. One of 
the best-known corporate failures of the time was Maxwell Communications. Robert 
Maxwell was the founder of Maxwell Communication Corporation and Mirror Group 
Newspapers, as well as a large number of private companies. Shortly after the death of 
Maxwell in 1990 it was revealed that he raided £727 million from the pension funds of his 
public companies to finance other activities. The group was placed into insolvency, with an 
estimated loss of £1 billion in shareholder value. Stiles & Taylor (1993) considered this to be 
the biggest fraud of the 20th Century. A number of CG issues were identified that enabled 
Maxwell to misuse his power. The first was the lack of separation of key Board Level roles, 
as Maxwell held positions of both CEO and Chairman at Maxwell Communication 
Corporation from 1981 to 1991 and within Macmillan Publishers from 1988 to 1991. The 
absence of a separation of the CEO and Chair roles is considered an indication of weak CG, 
as it enables managers to follow their own interests without being called to account. In 




Chair effectively, as indicated by the lack of transparency around Maxwell’s financial 
activities. The lack of sufficient audit functions was another CG mechanism that was 
criticised, particularly with regards to pension fund accounting. Moreover, the pension 
funds trustees, as the body responsible for the control of pension fund monies, were 
blamed for a lack of monitoring of the financial activities. The pension funds trustees should 
have been directly in control of the transfer of money from the funds to other parts of the 
company, so their action to allow such a transaction was questionable.  Solomon (2013) also 
cited the unethical behaviour of Maxwell as implicit in this scandal (Solomon, 2013). In 
1969, Maxwell agreed a takeover bid for Pergamon Press from Leasco, an American financial 
and data processing group.  Leasco questioned Pergamon profits, prompting an 
investigation by the Department of Trade and Industry. The inspectors found that 
Pergamon's profits depended on transactions with Maxwell family private companies and 
concluded that Robert Maxwell was unfit to run a public company since he did not 
distinguish between his own funds and those of his shareholders. Notwithstanding this 
report, Maxwell took positions on a number of corporate Boards.  
Businesses and policymakers did not learn from this scandal.  There have been numerous CG 
scandals since, the most famous being Enron, one of the largest companies in America that 
collapsed in 2001, notoriously bringing down the accountants, Arthur Andersen, with them.  
Corporate scandals such as these encouraged policymakers and businesses to be more 
aware of weakness in their companies.  
The changes in Anglo-American CG systems has been accompanied by reforms in ownership 
structures. During the 19th Century, a small amount of the shares of large public companies 
were in the hands of professional investors, but by the early years of the 20th Century, the 
number of institutional investors increased exponentially, with a concurrent decline in the 
number of individual shareholders. The increase in concentration in ownership created high 
expectations among policymakers, the general public and others who believed that 
institutional investors would act as responsible shareholders and play an active role in the 
governance of their investee companies (Roach, 2011). The evolution of CG guidelines is 




i) The Cadbury Report (1992) 
After several financial scandals (e.g. Polly Peck and BCCI) underpinned by a lack of 
transparency in annual reports and misuse of powers by directors, confidence in corporate 
reporting declined. In response, the FRC, London Stock Exchange and the accountancy 
profession, established the Cadbury Committee in 1991. The foundation of this committee 
could be considered as reactive rather than proactive (Solomon, 2013). The remit of the 
Cadbury Committee was to review the financial aspect of CG in UK companies, specifically 
financial reporting and accountability. The outcome of the committee’s deliberations was 
the Cadbury Report (1992). The report was the first CG guidelines that recognised not only 
the importance of shareholder rights but also discussed shareholder responsibilities, 
defining the role that should be played by responsible shareholders and especially by the 
very large institutional investors that account for a significant proportion of all 
shareholdings in UK companies. The Cadbury Code that emerged recommended that all 
registered companies should comply with this Code and prepare an annual report on their 
compliance for shareholders. The specific recommendations of the Cadbury report focussed 
on the need to: improve accountability by enhancing information disclosure to 
shareholders; appoint more independent directors, and; ensure that auditing companies are 
genuinely independent of the business that they are auditing (Keasey et al., 2005).  
The immediate aftermath of the Cadbury Report was a change in directors’ attitudes 
towards CG issues combined with initiatives to improve shareholder communication 
(Solomon, 2013). The Cadbury Report emphasised that, due to the number of votes that 
institutional investors have, they should actively use their power to influence CG because 
such institutional investors should not be seen as passive holders of shares who only 
consider the financial benefit of holdings when buying and selling shares. The Cadbury 
Report encouraged institutional investors to have regular one-to-one meetings with 
directors of their investee companies, to make positive use of their voting rights and to pay 
attention to the structure of the Board of Directors in investee corporates. Consequently, by 
the second half of the 1990s, the instances of institutional investors exercising their voting 
rights began to rise, indicating a positive impact of the report (Solomon, 2013). In addition 




Chair remuneration and their highest-paid director. A remuneration committee including 
wholly or mainly non-executive directors (NEDs) was also recommended to control 
executive directors’ remuneration, which had been highlighted as an area subject to abuse. 
While some companies immediately sought to implement the Cadbury recommendations, 
its findings were not without criticism. Solomon (2013) emphasised that although 
implementing the Cadbury Code is a positive development, it does not guarantee that the 
ambitions of the committee developing this Code would be met. That said, the Cadbury 
Committee stated that by following the recommendations of its report companies would 
strike the right balance between meeting the standards of CG and keeping to the spirit of 
the guidelines. On the other hand, Keasey et al. (2005) argued that the recommendations of 
the Cadbury Report were considered as a disruption to the management of companies. Lord 
Young (1995) recognised that improving accountability and transparency was essential for 
companies but concluded that the additional rules developed by Cadbury could result in a 
box-ticking exercise rather than genuine commitment to implement the spirit of the 
Cadbury Code. It is notable that the box-ticking approach is still an issue linked to the most 
recent CG guidelines (e.g. CG Code). The Cadbury Report assumed that accountability to 
shareholders was the primary objective of CG (Ezzamel & Watson, 1997). Solomon (2013), 
however, believed that too much accountability could discourage enterprise activity. On the 
other hand, although Cadbury emphasised the role of institutional investors in their 
investee corporates, it did not explain how institutional investors should perform their 
duties and, therefore, practical application of the Cadbury Code was limited (Arsalidou, 
2012). Keasey et al. (2005) also identified that focusing on the financial aspects of the CG 
while ignoring non-financial accountability was another weakness of the Cadbury Code. 
They also noted that the Cadbury Code did not make any recommendations about the 
application of ethics and responsibility in the Boardroom, despite the fact that this issue was 
highlighted after the Zeebrugge ferry disaster (1987) and the King’s Cross London 
Underground fire (1987).  
ii) Greenbury Report (1995) 
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To address the weaknesses found in the recommendations of the Cadbury Report, 
specifically those concerning the director’s remuneration, the Greenbury Committee was 
established by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in 1995. Director compensation 
was highlighted as a major CG issue at the time. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the exponential 
rise in CEO pay compared to American workers.  This rise is not related to corporate 
performance. The ratio of CEO to worker compensation in 1995 was 123:1, considerably 
higher than the 1989 ratio of 59:1 (Mishel & Schieder, 2017). 
Figure 2.2. Growth of CEO Pay in America 
Source: Economic Policy Institute, 2011 
The Greenbury Committee was asked by the government to identify good practice in 
determining the appropriate level of directors’ remuneration to enhance the accountability 
and performance of UK companies. According to Solomon (2013), the aim of this committee 
was not to decrease directors’ salary, instead to make a balance between their salary and 
performance. Keasey et al. (2005) believed that despite focusing on one aspect of the CG 
system (i.e. directors’ remuneration), the findings of the Greenbury Report (1995) 
contributed greatly towards the development of UK CG systems overall. According to Keasey 
et al. (2005) the Greenbury Report was successful in raising the importance of NEDs in the 
governance system of their companies. While the Cadbury Report asked the remuneration 
committee to include NEDs, the Greenbury Report required only independent NEDs to form 
this committee to advise the Board on remuneration. The intention of this remuneration 
committee was to prevent directors from creating their own remuneration (Solomon, 2013). 
Like the Cadbury Code, the Greenbury Report authors proposed that all registered 
Figure 2.2 has been removed from this 





companies should comply with its recommendations and prepare an annual report on their 
compliance for shareholders. 
Furthermore, the Greenbury Report was successful in increasing the quantity and quality of 
remuneration disclosure by companies. The Greenbury Report (1995) recommended 
companies to provide a full report on all the elements of their remuneration package 
including basic salary, benefits, annual bonuses, long-term incentive schemes such as share 
option as well as pension entitlements of their individual directors. Notably, this 
recommendation led to the criticism of this Report for requiring too much disclosure, 
leading to a decrease in effective communication within companies (Ernst & Young, 1996). 
In line with the criticism of the Cadbury Report, the Greenbury Report was also accused of 
increasing corporate bureaucracy without benefiting shareholders (Keasey et al., 2005). 
iii) Hampel Report (1998) 
The Hampel Committee was set up in 1995 to address the criticisms of both the Cadbury 
and Greenbury Reports, notably increased bureaucracy and unnecessary disclosure that 
distracted Boards from their main responsibility, which is to enhance the long-term value of 
their companies. This resulted in the Hampel Report (1998) which aimed to create a balance 
between accountability and corporate success. The Hampel Report supported the 
accountability of directors to shareholders but rejected the requirement for a wide 
responsibility towards other stakeholder groups (Tricker, 2015). Hampel emphasised that 
companies and shareholders needed to avoid the “box-ticking” approach, synonymous with 
the Cadbury and Greenbury Codes, when performing their responsibilities and suggested 
the avoidance of prescriptive guidelines by recommending a principle-based approach.  
According to Solomon (2013) in the area of the role of institutional investors in CG, the 
Hampel Report had been less demanding compared to Cadbury. It also represented the 
interest of directors over shareholders which weakened the positive impact from the 
Cadbury Report. While the Hampel Report (1998, p.7) was enthusiastic about the level of 




“We strongly endorse this accountability and we recognise the contribution made by the 
Cadbury and Greenbury committees. But the emphasis on accountability has tended to 
obscure a Board’s first responsibility —to enhance the prosperity of the business over time”. 
Solomon (2013) questioned the approach of the Hampel Report towards accountability and 
criticised it for placing less emphasis on this issue. Solomon proposed that while more 
evidence was emerging on the link between accountability and performance, the emphasis 
of the Hampel Report on the prosperity of organisations over accountability was outdated.  
iv) Combined Code (1998) 
The Hampel Committee produced the Combined Code in June 1998, embracing all the 
recommendations of the Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel reports.  The Combined Code 
advocated a “comply or explain” approach: recommendations are voluntary but instances of 
non-compliance must be explained in the annual reports of corporates. The Combined Code 
consisted of two sections, one for companies and one for institutional investors. An 
important contribution of the Combined Code was related to pension fund trustees, the 
largest group of investors, who were identified as needing to take their CG responsibilities 
more seriously. In this regard the Combined Code encouraged pension funds to follow a 
long-term approach and to avoid short-termism when it came to investment decisions.  
v) Turnbull Report (1999) 
The Combined Code recommended that directors review the effectiveness of their internal 
control and report this information to shareholders (Provisions D.2.1. and D.2.2.) The 
Turnbull report, published in September 1999, outlined these obligations of directors with 
regard to maintaining good internal controls such as having effective audits and checks to 
ensure the quality of financial reporting.  This was intended to prevent fraud. The Turnbull 
Report maintained the comply or explain basis. The aim of Turnbull was to provide general 
overview guidelines needed to develop and maintain internal control systems without 
specifying the details of an ideal system. It also specified recommendations for 




specify any certain risks but instead left it up to companies to evaluate individual risk 
environments. Solomon (2013) proposed that disclosing corporate risk would help to 
improve the information flow to shareholders, helping to reduce information asymmetry 
and consequently reducing agency problems. Hence, Solomon (2013) concluded that the 
Turnbull Report had an extensive impact on corporate risk disclosure since the signatories of 
this report subsequently provided detailed risk reports.   
vi) Myners Report (2001) 
The Myners Review was conducted in 2000 by HM Treasury to investigate institutional 
investors’ behaviour, knowledge and incentives. The review found that pension fund 
managers were unenthusiastic about taking action and challenging underperformed 
companies. The Myners Report followed in 2001.  This drew attention to the role and 
responsibilities of institutional investors in the UK and recognised the importance of 
monitoring by investors. It proposed that fund managers have the obligation of monitoring 
the Board, and that this would enhance the value of their portfolio. The Myners report 
argued that sometimes, shareholder intervention is the “right action to take” if fund 
managers truly judge that the interests of shareholders are above those of other 
stakeholders. 
vii) Higgs Report (2003) 
The Enron scandal in 2001 attracted international attention towards corporate failures and 
the importance of a high-quality CG to prevent such failures. Enron, which appeared to 
conform to CG guidelines, including separation of the chairman and CEO functions, the 
establishment of an independent audit committee and the appointment of an appropriate 
number of independent non-executive directors, proved that those guidelines were 
ineffective in practice. Therefore, the UK and other countries examined their CG systems to 
find potential weaknesses and prevent future failures. The Higgs report (2003) was the 
result of that action, specifically highlighting the role and effectiveness of NEDs. The report 




Boards, applying appropriate remuneration for NEDs and creating a stronger relationship 
between NEDs and major shareholders.  
viii) Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors (2009)  
In addition to the above CG guidelines, the ISC undertook a study in 1993, which found that 
only 24% of voting rights were exercised by investors in the top UK companies. The ISC was 
established in April 1973 after the recommendations of the Bank of England to examine and 
report a structure through which institutional investors could take actions to improve the 
efficiency of companies. Ultimately, ISC published “The Responsibilities of Institutional 
Shareholders and Agents” in 2002, which was an important initiative in the area of 
shareholder activism to improve CG standards in the UK. The ISC statement converted to a 
voluntary code in 2009, entitled “Code on the Responsibilities of Institutional Investors”. This 
provided guidance on the development of a responsible ownership policy, monitoring of 
performance, voting and engagement, the escalation of intervention, and evaluation and 
reporting of activities.  
As explained above, policymakers have only recognised the importance of shareholder 
action in improving the CG of corporates in the last ten years.  Hence the process of 
encouraging shareholders to exercise their ownership rights, including voting rights, is 
relatively recent. Despite the action by policy makers, various studies have found that 
shareholders demonstrate passive ownership behaviour (Faccio & Lasfer, 2000; Robert & 
Monks, 2011; Sun et al., 2011). The financial crisis resulted in considerable criticism of 
shareholders who failed to prevent corporate failures by taking an active ownership role in 
investee corporates. After the financial crisis, the Stewardship Code was published in 2010 
to enhance the quality of engagement between investors and companies. This is detailed in 
the next section. 
2.2 UK Stewardship Code (2012) 
According to Tomorrow’s Company Report (2009, p.3): “stewardship is the active and 




on in better condition”.  According to this report, the aim of stewardship in business is to 
create long-term value for shareholders, involving thoughtful judgement between the 
immediate interest of beneficiaries and long-term consequences. Following the banking 
crisis in 2008, Tomorrow’s Company identified the need for stronger investor stewardship, 
which was supported by Sir David Walker, a key player in developing the Stewardship Code. 
As a response to the financial crisis, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) produced the UK 
Stewardship Code in 2010. The main objective of the Stewardship Code was to promote 
shareholder engagement and create a long-term investment culture on behalf of 
institutional investors (Arsalidou, 2012).   According to the FRC website, the Stewardship 
Code provides the principles of effective stewardship statement by the investors, and its 
application would help to enhance the quality of engagement between investors and their 
investee corporates.  
2.2.1 Principles of the Stewardship Code  
The Stewardship Code consists of seven principles and is similar to the ISC Code (2009). 
Institutional investors should:  
1. publicly disclose their policy for discharging their responsibilities;  
2. have a strict policy on managing conflicts of interest in relation to stewardship 
that should be publicly disclosed;  
3. monitor their investee companies;  
4. have clear guidelines on when and how they will escalate their activities as a way 
to protect and enhance shareholder value;  
5. be prepared to act together with other investors where necessary;  
6. have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of voting activity;  
7. report periodically on their stewardship and voting activities.  
These are discussed in turn below: 





Stewardship activities include “monitoring and engaging with companies on matters such as 
strategy, performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate governance, including culture 
and remuneration” (FRC, 2012, p.6). Engagement is defined as “purposeful dialogue with 
companies on those matters as well as on issues that are the immediate subject of votes at 
general meetings” (FRC, 2012, p.6). The FRC asked institutional investors to disclose their 
stewardship policy to reflect on their activities within the investment chain as well as the 
responsibilities that emerge from those activities. If stewardship activities are delegated to a 
third party, investors are asked to explain how the proper exercise of their stewardship 
responsibilities is assured.  
ii)  Institutional investors should have a robust policy on managing conflicts of interest in 
relation to stewardship, which should be publicly disclosed. 
Conflict of interest is inevitable among institutional investors who manage assets on behalf 
of a wide range of clients. Hence the FRC asked its signatories to develop a policy for 
identifying and managing conflict of interest, helping them to better address this issue. This 
policy should be publicly disclosed and explains how institutional investors deal with any 
conflicts of interest.  
iii) Institutional investors should monitor their investee companies. 
Compared to other policies, the FRC provided more details for its signatories on how to 
monitor investee corporate. In addition, the FRC emphasised monitoring as “an essential 
component of stewardship” (FRC, 2012, p. 7). The Stewardship Code included six steps that 
institutional investors need to consider when monitoring:  
1. Keep abreast of the company’s performance.   
2. Keep abreast of developments, both internal and external to the company, that drive 
the company’s value and risks. 




4. Satisfy themselves that the company’s board and committees adhere to the spirit of 
the UK Corporate Governance Code, including through meetings with the chairman 
and other Board members. 
5. Consider the quality of the company’s reporting. 
6. Attend the AGMs of companies in which they have a major holding, where 
appropriate and practicable.  
In addition, the Stewardship Code asked institutional investors to closely monitor any 
departure from the UK CG Code and to enter into a dialogue with investee corporates to 
communicate their disapproval if they are not happy with any non-compliance.  
Furthermore, the FRC asked its signatories to try to identify the issues at an early stage to 
prevent any significant loss in their investment, and, to make members of their investee 
corporates aware of their concerns. This last recommendation suggested that the emphasis 
on monitoring by FRC is to aid corporate performance and to protect investor investment.  
iv)  Institutional investors should establish clear guidelines on when and how they will 
escalate their stewardship activities. 
The FRC has encouraged all institutional investors, regardless of size, to intervene in 
investee corporates. According to the Stewardship Code the circumstances under which the 
investors should consider intervention include “when they have concerns about the 
company’s strategy, performance, governance, remuneration or approach to risks, including 
those that may arise from social and environmental matters” (FRC 2012, p.8). Under the 
fourth principle, the Stewardship Code explains that if the companies did not respond to 
investors’ concerns, they should escalate their activities. The examples of the activities that 
can be followed by the investors to escalate their engagement are provided below: 
1. Holding additional meetings with management specifically to discuss concerns. 
2. Expressing concerns through the company’s advisers. 
3. Meeting with the chairman or other Board members. 
4. Intervening jointly with other institutions on particular issues. 
5. Making a public statement in advance of General Meetings. 
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6. Submitting resolutions and speaking at General Meetings.
7. Requisitioning a General Meeting, in some cases proposing to change Board
membership.
v) Institutional investors should be willing to act collectively with other investors where
appropriate.
The Stewardship Code proposed that at times of “significant corporate or wider economic 
stress, or when the risks posed threaten to destroy significant value”, collaboration with 
other investors is appropriate and significant (FRC, 2012, p.8). Hence, investors should 
develop a principle to explain when they would consider collaborative engagement to 
achieve their objectives and to provide examples of the circumstances under which they are 
ready to work with other investors.  
vi) Institutional investors should have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of voting
activity.
The sixth principle asks the investors to vote on all the shares they hold. More importantly, 
the Stewardship Code asked investors to refrain from automatically supporting the Board. 
For example, if the investors could not reach an agreement with the investee corporates 
through a dialogue, they should register an abstention or vote against the resolution. Also, 
the Stewardship Code provides some guidelines for publicly reporting the voting activities, 
including disclosing the use of proxy services and the extent to which they follow the 
recommendations of those services.  
vii) Institutional investors should report periodically on their stewardship and voting
activities.
Finally, asset managers were asked to report their stewardship activities regularly to their 
clients and explain how they discharged their responsibilities. Asset managers should 
include both quantitative and qualitative data in their reports, which were recommended to 




obtain an independent opinion on their engagement and voting process, which should be 
accessible for their clients, if requested.  
Since December 2010, all UK-authorised asset managers are required under the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) rules to produce a statement of commitment to the Stewardship 
Code or explain why it is not appropriate to their business model (i.e. a ‘comply or explain’ 
basis). Stewardship reporting is intended to enhance readers’ understanding of the 
stewardship approach adopted by institutional investors.  Although asset managers are the 
main audience of the Stewardship Code, the FRC emphasised that the responsibility of 
monitoring is not just for asset managers, as the asset owners can also monitor the 
company directly, or indirectly, through orders given to the fund managers. The background 
of the Stewardship Code is presented in more detail in the next section. 
2.2.2 Background of the UK Stewardship Code 
2.2.2.1 Financial Crisis (2008) 
Before the financial crisis in 2008, for a decade lax monetary policies, cheap money and 
tremendous liquidity led to the formation of an asset bubble in western countries. Falling 
house prices in the US triggered the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007. Sun et al. (2011) 
described this as a mortgage crisis indicating that the house prices became lower than the 
value of the mortgage loans, leaving the owners in negative equity. Many of these loans 
were given to people with bad credit risk, making the existing situation worse. House prices 
reduced further because of foreclosures. According to Tricker (2015) this chaos resulted 
from financial engineering whereby financial institutions bundled up loan assets as 
‘securities’, which consequently were sold to other financial institutions. This expanded the 
risk around, and lowered the confidence in the financial system that the credit would be 
available when required, and that the debt would be paid on time (Tricker, 2015). Banks 
subsequently limited their loan offerings, leading to insufficient funds in the debt market. 
Facing this situation, the central banks had to provide money for some institutions’ 
liabilities. The Northern Rock Bank was the first bank in the UK to fail as a result of the 




financial institutions faced problems in the US, such as Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and the 
American International Group (AIG). After the failure of financial institutions, respective 
governments tried to improve the lack of confidence by offering financial assistance. For 
example, in 2008, the US Federal Reserve and the US Treasury proposed to take on the bad 
debts of certain banks with underlying collateral security, with corresponding plans to take 
$700 billion in equity stakes. The financial crisis which originated in the housing market in 
the US spread quickly to other sectors and countries, due to globalisation of the industry,  
causing a series of financial and economic failures: the collapse of US and EU housing 
markets; collapse of global stock markets, and; the collapse of many large banks and 
financial institutions. For example, in the UK, three banks faced insolvency including Royal 
Bank of Scotland, HBOS and Lloyds TSB, which was subsequently nationalised. According to 
Sun et al. (2011) finding the reasons behind the financial crisis is not easy, due to the 
complexity of the industry and associated systems.  Shortly after the financial crisis, in 
November 2008, the G20 summit on financial markets and the world economy took place in 
Washington DC, US.  The leaders of the G20 concluded that the financial crisis of 2008 
occurred as a result of: 
1) Market participants demanded higher yields without an adequate appreciation of 
the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. 
2) Weak underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly 
complex and opaque financial products, and consequent excessive leverage 
combined to create vulnerabilities in the system. 
3) Policymakers, regulators and supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not 
adequately appreciate and address the risks building up in financial markets, keep 
pace with financial innovation, or take into account the systemic ramifications of 
domestic regulatory actions. 
 
Finally, the summit agreed that to stabilise the financial markets and support economic 
growth, a broader policy response was required. As aforementioned, the financial crisis led 
to failures of many financial institutions and public companies in the US and elsewhere in 
the world. This stimulated debate among academics as to the extent to which CG practices 




debate. The first school of thought purported that CG did not have a role in the financial 
crisis (e.g. Adamas, 2009; Cheffins, 2009) i.e. there is no correlation between the CG and the 
financial crisis. According to Cheffins (2009) the CG practices of publicly held companies 
were appropriate before and during the crisis.  Cheffins used a sample of 37 firms which 
were removed from the S&P 500 index during 2008. Reviewing the CG mechanisms revealed 
that shareholder activism among the hedge funds was acceptable as they could make a 
change in a number of underperforming firms. In addition, Cheffin did not identify fraud or 
inappropriate remuneration among the companies that were delisted. Furthermore, Board 
performance was found tolerable due to the absence of public criticism among these 
companies.  
 
The second school of thought identified by Sun et al. (2011) indicated that while the content 
of the current CG framework is not wrong, application of CG guidelines was insufficient 
during the financial crisis. This view is also reflected in the OECD report (2009), proposing 
that the principles of CG which were developed many years before the financial crisis, 
addressed all of the key CG concerns (i.e. executive remuneration, risk management, Board 
practices and exercise of shareholder rights) which contributed to the financial crisis. 
Despite this, the implementation of these CG policies was insufficient to prevent corporate 
collapse during the crisis. In line with this report, the FRC (2010) proposed that there were 
not any problems in the CG Codes developed before the financial crisis. Instead, the 
problem was the lack of compliance with those guidelines. It is notable that the OECD 
emphasis on voluntary based guidelines fell short of encouraging implementation.  
The third perspective is that the financial crisis was due, in part, to the systematic failure of 
CG systems. Sun et al. (2011) proposed that although the CG weaknesses that were found in 
the OECD report are correct, the failure of CG was not only due to lack of implementation of 
the guidelines, but also a failure of institutional arrangements based on inconsistent 
assumptions such as priority of shareholders, profit maximisation, rational self-interested 
human behaviour and acceptance of agency problems. According to Sun et al. (2011, 
although the CG reforms have brought some positive changes for corporates such as 
independence of the Board and shareholder activism, it also encouraged companies to take 




American CG model has external and internal governing forces. The external governing 
forces include regulatory governance, market governance and stakeholder governance. The 
internal governing forces include the AGM and the Board of Directors and management, as 
recommended by corporate law. Based on Sun et al. (2011), the internal governance forces 
failed systematically as shareholders followed passive ownership behaviour and failed to 
monitor their investee corporates or to highlight the Board’s lack of independence or the 
abuse of power by management. In line with this, Monks and Minow (2011) who 
emphasised that the passive behaviour of shareholders (both institutional and individual) 
was the key problem with the Anglo-American CG system. The following section further 
investigates shareholder engagement during the financial crisis. 
2.2.2.2 Shareholder Engagement During the Financial Crisis 
Directors’ Remuneration Report (DRR) regulation provided investors with clear information 
about executive pay (Conyon & Sadler, 2010). The new rules made it mandatory for all the 
public companies with a financial year ending on or after December 31, 2002, to seek 
approval of the DRR at their AGM. The DRR regulations were developed after the revision of 
the Companies Act of 1985 and subsequently were included in the Companies Act of 2006. 
According to the Companies Act (2006), section 172, it is the primary duty of directors to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of their shareholders. It is also widely 
expected that shareholders would monitor the performance of their investee corporates 
and intervene when necessary to protect and enhance the value of their investments. To 
enable shareholders in performing this role, the Companies Act (2006) granted all the 
shareholders certain rights, such as voting rights. According to section 284, shareholders’ 
rights depend on the size of their ownership. For example, when shareholders hold at least 
5% of voting rights, they can request the directors of the company to call a general meeting 
(Companies Act, section 303, 2006).1  
 
1 A summary of the rights given to shareholders by Companies Act (2006) is summarised below: 
1. To be included in the company’s Register as a member (section 113). 
2. Right to inspect the Register of Members (shareholders) for free and be given a copy of them for a fee 
(section 116). 




Despite the above regulations, institutional investors (i.e. the major shareholders) did not 
systematically take action in their investee financial institutions against weak risk 
management systems and inappropriate remuneration policy which failed to reflect 
managerial performance. In line with this Manifest (2009) found that leading up to the 
financial crisis, only 9% of shareholders voted against the remuneration of banks between 
2002 and 2007, which was the same as other sectors. Ineffective shareholder engagement 
was particularly evident in the example of ABN Amro, in 2007, which was taken over by a 
consortium of European banks led by Royal Bank of Scotland and Fortis. Despite all the 
concerns over the cost of the deal and the capital position of the acquiring banks, a 
significant number of shareholders (95%) voted in favour of the transaction. It is notable 
that shareholder participation in two general meetings organised by Fortis to get approval 
for the deal was very low (36%). Consequently, the acquisition of ABN, the biggest bank 
takeover on record, caused problems for the acquiring banks, resulting in their 
nationalisation in 2008 by UK and Belgium governments respectively. Based on this 
evidence, Robert and Monks (2009) concluded that prior to the financial crisis, institutional 
investors failed to perform their CG responsibilities in banks and other financial institutions. 
Policymakers recognised this as a weakness of the internal CG system and addressed this 
issue in various reports. For example, Sants (2009), Chief Executive of the FSA, proposed 
that investors, despite having rights to influence the governance of their investee 
corporates were unchallenging and merely relied on the information provided by 
companies. Likewise, Myners (2009) criticised shareholders for acting as absentee landlords 
and asked them to get more involved in the matters of their investee corporates. Following 
the financial crisis, governments and policymakers began to review the CG of the finance 
sector to find the reasons behind their failures and develop new regulations in response.  
Another reason behind the low level of shareholder engagement is a lack of incentive to 
engage in active ownership. According to Monks (2010), UK and US shareholders mainly 
 
4. Right to vote at a AGM – the voting power depends on the proportion of shares you have (section 284). 
5. Right to receive a notice of any AGM (section 310). 
6. Right to have access to a record of resolutions and general meetings for free and be given a copy of them for 
a fee (section 358). 





make their investment decisions using brokers or mechanistic formulas. Therefore, they are 
not interested in long-term investment, demotivating them from engaging in their investee 
corporates.  Monks (2010) suggested that only 20% of outstanding shares are considered as 
long-term investments in which shareholders are willing to engage with investee corporates 
to monitor decision-making and the quality of CG systems. Monks (2010) argued that even 
among these investors conflict of interests might affect the level of their engagement.  
According to Bainbridge (2012) since the financial crisis of 2008, there has been a rapid 
change in the CG legal system compared to any period in history. Policymakers and 
regulators believed that poor CG implementation was one of the main factors behind 
failures of corporate during the financial crisis (Bainbridge, 2012). Tricker (2015), who 
investigated CG issues that were emphasised due to the financial crisis, found the role of 
directors in failed financial institutions was a fundamental issue. Tricker questioned the 
efficiency of the role of the director, especially independent outside directors. He argued 
that they did not monitor managers nor understand the risks affecting their business. The 
role of auditors and credit rating agencies were also questioned, with respect to the 
verification of risk reporting (auditors) and through the awarding of high ratings to 
companies that faced significant risk (credit rating agencies). Further, he asked whether 
excessive bonuses and share options caused excessive risk-taking and short-termism within 
financial institutions. The following are important reports published to explore shareholders 
engagement during the financial crisis, including IMA, the Walker Review and the OECD 
report.   
i) IMA 
The Investment Management Association (IMA)2 is the trade body representing the UK asset 
management industry. Its members include independent fund managers, the asset 
management arms of banks, life insurers, investment banks and occupational pension 
schemes. IMA (2009) expected its members to engage in companies in which they are 
 
2 In 2014, the IMA merged with the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and was renamed to the Investment 
Association (IA). The IA now covers the entire range of investment issues for investment managers and clients. 
The aim of the IA is to help its members to comply with law and the best industry practice. 
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considered ‘major’ shareholders, by having active dialogue and exercising voting rights on 
behalf of clients. The aim of IMA was to measure fund managers’ engagement with investee 
companies two years before the 2008 financial crisis. The IMA’s report was based on the 
interviews which were conducted with the representatives from 32 firms, including 
corporate governance or environmental and social investment specialists, a portfolio 
manager and the Chief Investment Officer. The IMA report explored the compliance of 
IMA’s members towards the ISC statement, specifically monitoring and voting activities in 
their investee corporates. Table 2.2 and 2.3 show the response of IMA’s members towards 
the application of the ISC statement. 
Table 2.2 Availability of policy statements 
Table 2.3 Contents of policy statements 
These tables show that the number of firms publicly publishing their ISC statement 
increased significantly from 9 in 2003 to 28 in 2008. In addition, IMA stated that since 2003 
the content of ISC statements of its members has been enhanced as more firms addressed 
all the matters raised in the ISC principles.    
IMA’s findings also drew upon a questionnaire in which firms were asked for details of their 
engagement in the two years leading up to the end of June 2008. The report included fund 
managers’ engagement at seven companies, including Bradford and Bingley (B&B), a large 
mortgage and buy-to-let lender which ran into financing difficulties after the 2008 financial 




through a rights issue of £300 million at 82p per share. Less than three weeks later, after the 
downgrade in B&B’s credit rating, the underwriters, including Texas Pacific Group (TPG), 
withdrew their agreement to take up the company’s shares. In September 2008, although 
key shareholders still supported the rights issue, the share price plummeted to 30p, causing 
the FSA to step in and secure the future of the company.  B&B’s UK and Isle of Man retail 
deposit business along with its branch network was transferred to Santander and the 
remainder of the business taken into public ownership. Among the participants of the IMA 
survey, 28 of them provided details of their interaction with B&B on financing issues. The 
survey found that among the 28 fund managers, 14 had in aggregate 28 meetings with the 
company, including 9 firms that had 17 meetings with the Chairman. A number of these 
meetings were around May and June 2008 when there were concerns about the financing of 
B&B. According to the IMA survey (2009, p. 16) “One firm that met with the Senior 
Independent Director was concerned that B&B had given assurances that no additional 
financing would be required. In addition to the above, four firms met/spoke with Texas 
Pacific Group at the time of its offer, and one met with Resolution”.  
In addition to monitoring, the survey provided some details of shareholder voting activities. 
Twenty-five firms provided details on exercising their voting rights in respect of UK 
companies in the years ended 30 June 2008 and 2007. The IMA found that firms voted in 
around 95 per cent of resolutions (2008 (96.1%); 2007(94.7%); 2006 (96.1%); 2005 (98.3%); 
2004 (94.1%). Voting against the resolutions was 3.3% in 2008 and 3.8% in 2007, higher than 
previous years (2006 (1.8%); 2005 (1.8%); 2004 (3.0%). IMA concluded that this could be due 
to more controversial issues in 2007 and 2008 than in previous years, which shareholder 
engagement failed to resolve before the voting event. IMA argued that the low level of 
voting against management decisions did not help to resolve problems in companies during 
the financial crisis. For example, in 2008, Marks and Spencer decided to combine the 
chairman and chief executive roles, against the provisions of the Combined Code, yet only 4 
out of 26 firms which answered the IMA questionnaire voted against this resolution. It is 
notable that the majority of IMA members tend to use more than two agencies, helping 
them with voting decisions. Furthermore, the survey reported positively with respect to the 
reporting of fund managers’ engagement: “All the firms report to clients, mainly quarterly, 




prepare bespoke reports report more frequently if requested. All the firms provide some form 
of explanation, particularly in instances when they have voted against or consciously 
abstained” (IMA, 2009, p.4). IMA encouraged a voluntary approach as an appropriate way of 
disclosing engagement information of fund managers to their clients. According to IMA 
(2009, p. 15) “All the firms undertake the desk-based monitoring envisaged in the Statement 
of Principles and routinely meet with investee companies’ executive management, and the 
dedicated specialists meet with non-executive directors”.  The findings of this survey 
indicated that IMA’s members engaged at an acceptable level with companies which were 
facing problems during the financial crisis, through holding meetings as well as exercising 
their voting rights.  
ii) OECD 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) introduced itself as a 
“unique forum where the governments of 30 democracies work together to address the 
economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the 
forefront of efforts to understand and to help governments respond to new developments 
and concerns, such as corporate governance, the information economy and the challenges of 
an ageing population” (OECD, 2009, P. 2). In June 2009, the OECD published a report to 
reflect on the Corporate Governance lessons learned from the financial crisis published by 
the Steering Group (February 2009). The OECD report found the Steering Group’s conclusion 
convincing indicating that: 
1. Remuneration of the financial sector was little related to company performance.  
2. Risk management systems did not consider the firm as a whole and the risk inherent 
in compensation schemes. 
3. Boards were, in a number of cases, unaware of their company’s difficulties until too 
late.  
4. Shareholders generally acted as traders with short interest in their investee 





The Steering Group considered these four weaknesses in the CG closely linked to corporate 
failures during the financial crisis. In line with findings of the Steering Group, the OECD 
report addressed these four areas of corporate governance and emphasised that they are 
closely related. The OECD expressed the link by asking the following questions: if 
remuneration has been excessive and/or not structured properly, why have the Boards 
allowed this state of affairs to occur? If risk management has failed to manage risk-oriented 
remuneration systems, why have the Boards apparently stood back or are we expecting 
simply too much of boards in large complex companies which are to a great extent 
themselves a product of board and shareholder decisions? Why have shareholders not been 
able to ensure accountability?  
 
The OECD report allocated a section to investigate shareholders’ engagement during the 
financial crisis. The report found that shareholders failed to ensure accountability of Boards 
by not exercising their ownership rights properly, given that the Board is appointed on 
behalf of the shareholders, so it is the responsibility of the shareholders to monitor the 
Boards’ activity.  It concluded that shareholders were to blame for the failures of the Board 
due to their passive ownership behaviour.  The report explained that the reason behind 
passive ownership behaviour included the short-term focus of shareholders, high 
monitoring costs and conflicts of interest existing due to investors’ business models.  
 
It is notable that the OECD report evidenced some level of shareholder responsibilities 
towards investee corporates from the findings of the IMA survey (2009), including that 
institutional investors (i.e. their members) began to exit the banking sector in 2005 because 
of concerns about strategic direction.  Manifest (2009) suggested that shareholders ignored 
their responsibility, as the level of voting against the resolutions in banks was not significant, 
being only 9% in 2002. In line with this, in the case of ABN Amro’s takeover by the Royal 
Bank of Scotland and Fortis, only 5% of shareholders voted in against this controversial case, 
leading to nationalisation of these two banks.  Shortly after the financial crisis in 2008, the 
level of voting against bank resolutions reached 10%, which whilst very low was sufficient 
enough to make a statement.    
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The OECD principles of CG were originally developed in 1999 to use as a basis for CG 
initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD countries. According to the OECD report “The 
Principles are intended to assist OECD and non-OECD governments in their efforts to 
evaluate and improve the legal, institutional and regulatory framework for corporate 
governance in their countries, and to provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, 
investors, corporations, and other parties that have a role in the process of developing good 
corporate governance” (OECD, 2004, p.11). The OECD report agreed with all the weaknesses 
of CG which were addressed in the Steering Group report, including ineffective and 
inadequate shareholders engagement in their investee corporates. But the OECD proposed 
that there is no need for new guidelines and the existing OECD principles, which were 
reviewed in 2004, were appropriate to address the problems with the CG system. Instead, 
the members of the Steering Group should focus on effective implementation of the OECD 
principles.  
iii) Walker Review
In February 2009, David Walker reviewed CG in UK banks in the light of the banking system 
failures due to the financial crisis. Specifically, Walker was asked by the government to 
address the following areas: “the effectiveness of risk management at board level, including 
the incentives in remuneration policy to manage risk effectively; the balance of skills, 
experience and independence required on the Boards of UK banking institutions; the 
effectiveness of board practices and the performance of audit, risk, remuneration and 
nomination committees; the role of institutional shareholders in engaging effectively with 
companies and monitoring of boards; and whether the UK approach is consistent with 
international practice and how national and international best practice can be promulgated” 
(Walker, 2009, p.5). 
Examining the roles of institutional investors was one of the CG areas that this review 
focused on. This review was conducted based on the responses that Walker received from 
180 stakeholders as well as discussions with interested parties including Chairmen, Chief 
Executives, executive and non-executive Board members of banks and other corporates, the 




interests, both within the UK and internationally. One section of the Walker review 
investigated institutional investors and their role during the financial crisis. The review 
found that voting against bank resolution was as low as 10 per cent, indicating limited 
engagement by institutional investors who could not prevent the crisis. Therefore, the 
review concluded that shortcomings of the Board and managers would have been 
addressed more effectively if the major investors were engaged proactively in their investee 
corporates.  
After investigating the role of institutional investors, Walker (2009) suggested that the FRC’s 
regulations should be extended to develop principles of best practice in stewardship by 
institutional investors and fund managers, and that these principles should be separated 
from the Combined Code and called the Stewardship Code. The FRC, as an independent 
authority would give greater weight, credibility and authority to the Stewardship Code. 
Walker (2009, p. 18) recommended that: 
 
“FSA should require institutions that are authorised to manage assets for others to disclose 
clearly on their websites or in another accessible form the nature of their commitment to the 
Stewardship Code or their alternative business model”. 
In conclusion, Walker (2009) emphasised the need for better engagement between fund 
managers who should act on behalf of their clients, and the Boards of investee companies. 
The review proposed that while major shareholders had limited liability towards the failure 
of the banking system due to the financial crisis, it was the taxpayer who had effectively 
unlimited liability, hence, institutional shareholders were acknowledged as the true owners 
of companies to better perform their ownership responsibilities. The review did not ask all 
shareholders to follow active ownership behaviour, for example, hedge funds are exempt 
due to their business model based around short-term shareholding. On the other hand, 
pension funds are more likely to be interested in engagement with the companies in which 
they are considered as major shareholders to increase long-term absolute return. Therefore, 
Walker asked fund managers to disclose their business model so that the beneficial 
shareholder can make an informed choice about their investments. All the 
recommendations of this review are reflected in the Stewardship Code, published by the 




2.2.2.3 Publication of UK Stewardship Code 
Revealing the weaknesses of CG within financial institutions after the financial crisis led to 
action by regulators to prevent further problems. For example, in the US the SEC proposed a 
separation of the CEO and the Chairman, annual election of directors, creation of Board-level 
committees and voting on top executive remuneration by shareholders. In the UK the FRC 
acted to improve accountability to shareholders, improve Board performance and ensure that 
there is a well-balanced, diversified and challenging Board composition. 
Various bodies, including academics and policymakers, acknowledged that during the 2008 
financial crisis, institutional investors acted irresponsibly as absentee landlords who did not 
engage effectively in their investee corporates (Monks & Sykes, 2002; Myners Review, 2001). 
In January 2009, the IMA was questioned by the Treasury Select Committee. The IMA 
reported on a survey of shareholder engagement in 2005, some three years before the 
financial crisis, and stated that a number of active investors had concerns regarding risky 
business strategies pursued by some banks. These investors, however, lost their confidence 
in the banking sector, resulting in some divestment. For those investors who did not have a 
divestment option, directly engaging with management over the strategic concerns was 
pursued, but these attempts were held to be insufficient to prevent the crisis (IMA, 2005). 
According to the IMA’s survey, 11 of the institutional investors examined had shares in 
Bradford & Bingley, which was subsequently partially nationalised and split into two parts 
(mortgage and investment) in 2008 due to the financial crisis. This survey highlighted that 
despite 55 meetings between the investors and bank management before the nationalisation, 
the restructuring and bailout could not be averted, indicating the ineffectiveness of 
engagement.  
In contrast to this finding, as aforementioned, the Walker Review found that before the 
financial crisis, the voting level on bank resolutions rarely exceeded 10 per cent. Sir David 
Walker, who was appointed by the Prime Minister to review CG in UK banks and other 
financial entities, emphasised the role of institutional investors in the governance of issues 
such as selection, composition and performance of boards. This was to ensure that the Boards 
follow their agency role and are accountable to their principles. The Walker Review (2009) 




major investors had acted as responsible owners and had been engaged in their investee 
corporates. Notably, the blame was not focussed on institutional investors alone. The CG 
guidelines mentioned above such as Combined Code (1998) and Myners Review (2001) were 
also blamed for their failure to familiarise investors about their ownership responsibilities, 
thus encouraging them to play an active role in their investee corporates (Tilba & McNulty, 
2013; Walker, 2009).  
 
Following the Walker Review, and to address the inefficiency of the existing guidelines, in the 
UK it was decided to put stricter regulations in place and to guide institutional investors to act 
as stewards in their investee corporates. In line with the Walker Review recommendations, in 
July 2010, FRC as the responsible body, published the Stewardship Code based on the ISC 
statements. According to the FRC website, the Stewardship Code aims to: 
 
“enhance the quality of engagement between institutional investors and companies to help 
improve long-term returns to shareholders and the efficient exercise of governance 
responsibilities''.  
 
A revised version of the Stewardship Code was published in September 2012.  On 30 January 
2019, the FRC published a consultation on the draft 2019 UK Stewardship Code. A revised 
version of the Stewardship Code was published in January 2020. The signatures of the 
Stewardship Code (2020) should still follow an "apply or explain" approach. This version of 
the Code has taken into account the change in the investment market, including growth in 
investment in assets other than listed equities such as fixed income bonds, real estates etc. 
The FRC asked the signatories to perform effective stewardship activities considering their 
own circumstances. Finally, the FRC stated that it will evaluate the stewardship reports 
against its assessment framework. The signatories that meet the FRC's expectations will be 
considered as signatories to the Code.3  
 
3 The Stewardship Code (2020) consists of 12 Principles for asset managers and asset owners, and six Principles 
for service providers. Followings is a summary of these principles: 
1. Principles for Asset Owners and Asset Managers: 1.1 Signatories’ purpose, investment beliefs, strategy, and 
culture enable stewardship that creates long term value for clients and beneficiaries leading to sustainable 
benefits for the economy, the environment and society. 1.2 Signatories’ governance, resources and incentives 





3.1 Shareholder Engagement 
Shareholders, the Board of directors and the management have been widely recognised by 
academics and policymakers as the central players in CG (Tricker, 2015). In light of the 
financial crisis the link between weak CG systems and corporate failures has been widely 
debated (e.g. Bauer et al., 2004; Keasey et al., 2005; Solomon, 2013). Global corporate 
scandals such as WorldCom in the US, Marconi in the UK, Royal Ahold in Netherland and 
Parmalat in Italy all have been explained by their poor CG systems. Notably, one of the 
similarities between these scandals is the misuse of powers by CEOs and other senior 
managers who were able to influence the Board of directors to follow their own interests 
(Keasey et al., 2005). According to Cohen et al. (2002), to ensure that firms perform 
effectively and cope in times of change, such as during a crisis, member of Boards should 
play an active role in CG systems including the alignment of manager interest with 
shareholders, focus on monitoring, control and evaluating corporate performance, global 
risk management and management recruitment. In addition to the above responsibilities, 
Board members have other important roles in their companies including developing and 
implementing corporate strategy, disclosing information and financial reporting to external 
 
beneficiaries first. 1.4 Signatories identify and respond to market-wide and systemic risks to promote a well-
functioning financial system. 1.5 Signatories review their policies, assure their processes and assess the 
effectiveness of their activities. 1.6 Signatories take account of client and beneficiary needs and communicate 
the activities and outcomes of their stewardship and investment to them. 1.7 Signatories systematically 
integrate stewardship and investment, including material environmental, social and governance issues, and 
climate change, to fulfil their responsibilities. 1.8 Signatories monitor and hold to account managers and/or 
service providers. 1.9 Signatories engage with issuers to maintain or enhance the value of assets 1.10 
Signatories, where necessary, participate in collaborative engagement to influence issuers. 1.11 Signatories, 
where necessary, escalate stewardship activities to influence issuers. 1.12 Signatories actively exercise their 
rights and responsibilities.  
2. Principles for Service Providers: 2.1 Signatories’ purpose, strategy and culture enable them to promote 
effective stewardship. 2.2 Signatories’ governance, workforce, resources and incentives enable them to 
promote effective stewardship. 2.3 Signatories identify and manage conflicts of interest and put the best 
interests of clients first. 2.4 Signatories identify and respond to market-wide and systemic risks to promote a 
well-functioning financial system. 2.5 Signatories support clients’ integration of stewardship and investment, 
taking into account, material environmental, social and governance issues, and communicating what activities 




stakeholders, whilst ensuring independence of the executives. Notably, in the mentioned 
corporate scandals executives had control over the Board, making it easy for them to carry 
out fraud and hide them from external reviews (Keasey et al., 2005). 
To further investigate the importance of developing a strong CG system, Erkens et al. (2012) 
investigated the impact of CG on the financial performance of firms from 30 countries that 
were affected by the financial crisis. In contrast to the above arguments, their results 
showed that firms with independent Board members and concentrated ownership 
experienced worse stock returns during the crisis. They explained that firms with 
institutional ownership took more risk prior to the crisis, which leads to a larger shareholder 
loss during the crisis. Furthermore, firms with independent Board members raised more 
equity capital during the crisis, which in turn leads to a wealth transfer from existing 
shareholders to debt holders. Essen et al. (2013) found mixed results regarding the link 
between CG systems and financial performance of EU firms before and during the financial 
crisis. It was found that although some principles such as voting rights and creditor 
protection were beneficial for firm’s performance, others such as Board independence and 
the separation of the key role were harmful to performance during the crisis. 
In addition, Core et al. (2006) found that firms with weak shareholder rights exhibit 
significant underperformance. In line with this study, Gompers et al. (2003) suggested 
during the 1990s, firms with better CG had better performance, which resulted in higher 
firm value, profit, sales growth and lower capital expenditure compared to firms with weak 
CG. They analysed the relationship between the strength of shareholder rights and 
corporate performance during the 1990s, incorporating a comprehensive set of governance 
provisions into a proxy index for the strength of shareholder rights. Gompers et al. (2003) 
developed three hypotheses to find answers for different returns in companies with 
different shareholder right power, which are presented below: 
1. Weak shareholder rights caused agency cost. 
Based on this hypothesis, if the market underestimates the additional costs arising due to 




performance of firms would be worse than expected. Also, corporate value at the beginning 
of the period would be too high. If shareholders find it costly or difficult to replace 
management, managers can act in their own interests, which may conflict with the interest 
of shareholders, such as taking part in ineffective investment. Consequently, in this 
situation, if the capital expenditure (CE) increases following the adoption of new governance 
provision (takeover defence), it would be associated with a negative firm value. They tested 
the relationship between CE and governance and found that firms with higher governance 
provisions have higher CE. 
2. Managers predicted poor performance, but investors don’t. 
This hypothesis suggested that managers create governance provisions to protect their 
positions. It is accepted that insiders have access to more information and are able to 
predict returns. So, if insiders predict poor performance the expectation is that they create 
provisions to protect their jobs by reducing the power of shareholders to intervene. So, 
weak shareholder rights are a symptom of asymmetry of information between insiders and 
outsiders. Gompers et al. (2003) used net purchase to proxy for insider trading and G-index 
to proxy the power of shareholder rights. The G-index is a governance index in which one 
point was added for every provision that restricts shareholder rights and increases 
managerial power per firm.  They failed to find evidence to back this hypothesis, indicating 
shareholder rights did not lead to poor performance for firms. 
3. Poor performance is not due to governance provisions but are correlated with other 
factors associated with abnormal returns. 
Gompers et al. (2003), found some observable factors that explain one-third of the 
performance differences of firms within their sample. To test this hypothesis, they ran 
separate regressions for each component of governance to find an omitted variable bias. 
They argued that if governance provisions cause poor performance certain governance 
provisions would have important roles. Five categories of governance provisions were 
applied, including tactics for delaying hostile bidders (Delay); voting rights (Voting); 




(State) (Gompers et al., 2003, p.111). They found industry classification can explain between 
one-sixth and one-third of abnormal returns, but for the remaining provisions this argument 
could not be supported.  In summary, this study found that during the 1990s, firms with 
stronger shareholder rights had a higher return. They also found a correlation between 
shareholder rights and institutional ownership, training volume and past sales growth. They 
stated that despite finding a significant relationship, it is difficult to claim that this is a causal 
relationship as the obtained results could be due to unobservable firm characteristics.  
Caprio et al. (2007), Johnson et al. (2009) and Sierra et al. (2006) found a positive 
relationship between firm performance and CG mechanisms. 
Researchers tend to use one of two approaches to measuring mechanisms of CG systems. 
One approach includes applying CG rating systems, such as Deminor for European 
companies and Standard and Poor for emerging markets.  Deminor enables access to the CG 
practices of the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) and Eurotop 300 index companies, 
which covers 17 European countries. Deminor applies four main areas to measure CG 
practices, including the rights and duties of shareholders, absence of takeover defences, 
disclosure and Board structure, thereby permitting a relatively complete set of governance 
standards to be identified. Bauer et al. (2004) applied the Deminor rating system to measure 
CG as an independent variable to understand whether well-governed firms have better 
stock returns and higher corporate values compared to poorly governed firms.  Deminor’s 
categories have been used to identify the main determinants of CG.  For example, Tricker 
(2015), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1999) considered shareholders, the 
Board of directors and the audit committees as the central players in different parts of the 
CG system. According to Mallin (20101), the benefit of rating systems is not only for 
researchers but also, to help companies and shareholders explore CG further. Despite the 
advantages of Deminor, it only provided data for two years, 2000 and 2001, which is a major 
shortcoming.  
In addition to CG rating systems, researchers have considered a single or a mixture of the 
firm-level and country-level characteristics of companies to investigate CG systems. For 




ownership concentration and prior profitability) and found these to influence the likelihood 
of shareholder activism. 
Despite using different approaches, researchers have mainly focused on the same main 
factors when exploring CG systems (i.e. Board of directors, shareholders and auditors). The 
CG codes explained in the second chapter (e.g. Cadbury Code, Greenbury Report, Combined 
Code) all emphasised these as the central issues for CG. For example, the Cadbury Code 
highlighted the critical role of the Board and suggested separation of the leading roles at the 
head of the company. On the other hand, the Myners Report (2001) recognised the 
significance of the role of institutional investors in actively engaging with companies. Since 
the main audience of the Stewardship Code are institutional investors (i.e. shareholders), 
this study focuses on shareholders as one of the main elements of CG systems. The next 
section presents an investigation around shareholders and their responsibilities.  
3.1.1 Institutional Shareholders 
Mallin (2010) defined shareholders as the individuals, institutions, firms or other entities 
that provide corporate capital. Hence, public corporations need to keep their shareholders 
happy to operate and exist in the market. Mallin pointed out that, in the UK, corporations 
determine their objectives around the interests of their shareholders, and this should help 
to create an environment in which a clear set of corporate goals can be determined. This 
proposition emphasised the importance of shareholders for their investee corporations. 
Institutional investors are one of the largest groups of shareholders. They are recognised as 
major shareholders in their investee corporates, particularly in the UK, providing liquidity to 
short term money markets as well as making a long-term investment in primary and 
secondary capital markets. Major institutional investors include pension funds, life 
assurance companies and major fund managers. According to the Walker Review (Walker, 
2009), major institutional investors have the power to influence corporate performance by 
their decision to hold or sell shares.  
As aforementioned, the proportion of shareholding held by institutional investors has risen 




become more critical and is emphasised by policymakers. Since the creation of the Cadbury 
Committee (1991), it has been argued here that there has been greater emphasis on the 
need for institutional investors to play an active role in the governance of UK companies 
(Keasey et al., 2005).  The subsequent reports (i.e. Cadbury, Greenbury, Hampel and Higgs) 
all highlighted the importance of institutional investors in ensuring companies follow best 
practice in CG. In line with policymakers, academics have also been interested in 
institutional investors and the role they can play in the CG system of their investee 
corporates. The next section investigates shareholder engagement in their investee 
corporates and its impact on their investee corporates.   
3.1.2 Responsibilities of Shareholders 
UK institutional investors are now recognised as the second major group of shareholders in 
publicly listed companies. The importance of large shareholders in their investee corporates, 
however, was recognised as early as 1932 by Berle and Means. These authors identified the 
significance of separating ownership and control in large modern corporates, which enables 
executives to act in their own interests rather than those of shareholders. Berle and Means 
(1932) focussed on major shareholders who practised their ownership responsibilities to 
align the managers’ interest with themselves. Since this publication the ownership 
structure, which was described by them as dispersed, has changed considerably becoming 
more concentrated. According to the Office for National Statistics (2017), at the end of 2016 
insurance companies, pension funds, unit trusts, investment trusts, banks, other financial 
institutions and charities own over 30% of UK shares. On the other hand, overseas 
shareholders held around 54%, and individual shareholders held just 12% of UK shares. As 
the major owners, these institutional investors should have a duty of care to actively engage 
in their investee corporates to protect and enhance the value of their investments. The 
Walker Review argued that engagement by shareholders ensures that they are generating 
value from their shareholdings through “dealing effectively with concerns about under-
performance” (Walker, 2009, p.72).  
There are different ways in which institutional investors can engage in investee corporates. 





1. Monitoring investee companies; by arranging a meeting with a company’s Chairman, 
senior independent director or senior management.  
2. Developing a strategy for intervention where appropriate. 
3. Developing voting policy. 
4. Disclosing voting activities.  
 
The Walker review stated that shareholders could enhance their engagement by 
communicating their views and concerns to the Board of directors. This approach does not 
imply acquiring private information by shareholders and risk becoming insider in the 
investee corporates. Indeed, the review recommended that if the fund managers gained 
access to insider information, such as a change in the Board of directors or a change in the 
company's strategy, the fund managers should ensure that such information does not leak 
to the relevant trading desk. 
The appropriate role for institutional investors and the potential impact on investee 
corporates is a continuing debate in any economy (Gillan & Starks, 2003). Çelik and Isaksson 
(2014) are among the few studies that explore shareholder engagement. Their study 
suggested that shareholders could engage in their investee corporates and the market at 
two important stages. In the first stage, the investors are required to find the most 
prosperous corporate to invest their capital, and at the second stage, they should monitor 
their investee corporate to ensure it made the best use of their investments. Nevertheless, 
institutional investors, as the dominant shareholders, are at least expected to exercise their 
ownership rights and monitor their investee corporates to protect their investments and 
create wealth for their clients (Tricker, 2015). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), large 
shareholders, due to the size of their ownership, have enough incentive to monitor their 
investee corporates and consequently close the ownership-control gap within their investee 
corporates. Hendry et al. (2007) presented a list of factors that promote shareholder 
activism in the UK, which they called enabling factors and driving forces. Enabling factors 
included the size of shareholding, voting power and culture rather than compliance.  Voting 
was found to be mostly exercised on behalf of pension funds and life assurance companies 
whose beneficiaries had long-term interest. Hendry et al. (2007) argued that in contrast to 




reduces the pressure from businesses and enables them to make their own governance 
rules. Driving forces that encourage activism in the UK include the government pressure on 
pension funds to act as responsible owners through holding their investee corporates 
accountable for their performance and governance.  
Shareholders who actively engaged in investee corporates are known as activist 
shareholders, and their actions are referred to as “shareholder activism”. Notably, 
shareholder activism is not a new phenomenon, especially in the US where corporates were 
challenged on social and moral issues by individual activists such as Wilma Porter Soss, 
Evelyn Y. Davis and Gilbert Brothers, known as the corporate gadflies (Hendry et al., 2007), 
and credited with creating the field of shareholder activism (Monks & Minow, 2011). For 
example, in 1932, Lewis Gilbert attended the annual meeting of New York City’s 
Consolidated Gas Co., but he was unhappy about how the chairman refused to recognise 
the shareholder questions. He began to buy more stocks with his brother with the intention 
to attend AGMs to vote rather than to sell them for profit. In 1942, the Gilbert Brothers’ 
remarkable activities resulted in the SEC adoption rule 14a-8, which gave shareholders the 
right to include their proposals in company proxy statements (Reid & Toffel, 2009). By 1943, 
shareholders began to submit their proposals to improve CG and the performance of their 
investee corporates. This trend continued for the next three decades to enhance corporate 
performance and share values (Goranova & Ryan, 2014). Shareholder proposals which 
focused on social responsibility issues began to appear in 1970 after a federal court 
permitted the proposal to forbid the sale of napalm by Dow Chemical. It is notable that 
social issues started to be a popular subject of proposals which was also reflected by the 
American Society of Corporate Secretaries, claiming that from 790 proposals they received 
in 1979, 179 were related to social issues. More recently, a report by Climate Action 100+ 
(2019)4 illustrates some detailed evidence indicating growing concerns of active 
shareholders over the environmental issues in their investee corporates. For example, 
investor engagement led to a joint statement between Shell (an oil and gas company) and 
major institutional investors, setting a net carbon footprint ambition to reduce its emissions 
by 20% by 2035. This engagement was led by Robeco and the Church of England Pension 
 
4 Climate Action 100+ is an organisation, helping the investors to curb emission, improve governance and 




Board, supported by IIGCC (The Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change) and 
Eumedion. The signatories of Climate Action 100+ also reported successful engagement with 
Maersk, Volkswagen and the Duke Energy Corporation.  Such engagement, combined with 
an increasing number of signatories of Climate Action 100+, indicates the growing 
importance of climate change for institutional investors. 
Shareholder activism includes public and private activities to monitor and engage with 
investee corporates, more commonly nowadays to create value without trying to control 
companies (Ruggeri et al., 2019). Public activism includes submitting shareholder 
resolutions, votes at AGM or publishing letters, focus lists, and media campaigns (Brav et al., 
2008; Dimitrov & Jain, 2011; Hillman et al., 2011). On the other hand, private activism 
includes private negotiations, behind the scene consultations, letters, phone calls and 
dialogues, which are not observable for researchers (Becht et al., 2009; Brandes et al., 
2008).  As aforementioned levels of shareholder activism have historically been low, as 
investors have been criticised as being passive owners which avoid exercising their 
ownership rights (Cadbury, 1992; Hampel, 1998; Solomon, 2013), even when investee 
corporates are underperforming (Myners, 2001). This passive behaviour was considered a 
major shortcoming of the UK CG system (Goergen et al., 2008). After the financial crisis, 
fund managers were criticised for not acting fast enough when there were concerns in their 
investee corporates, and their limited engagement did not help to control management 
effectively (Walker, 2009).  
Shareholder activism has been a popular subject among academics who have investigated 
forms of activism, the determinants and barriers to activisms, as well as its outcome. In the 
following section, first different types of activism including voting, resolutions and dialogue 
that are employed by institutional investors to engage in their investee corporates are 
explained. Then, the determinants of investor engagement are discussed followed by the 
factors which prevent, or discourage, investors from engaging in investee corporates. 





3.1.2.1 Shareholder Voting 
In the UK all major CG guidelines, such as Cadbury Report and the Combined Code 
considered voting rights as a critical CG mechanism for institutional investors to discharge 
their ownership duties by encouraging investee corporates to follow best practice. Goergen 
et al. (2008) posited that if investors do not exercise their voting rights managers would 
have substantial freedom to run corporations, potentially permitting managerial 
compensation for weak performance. Institutional investors can attend AGMs and vote 
directly or use proxy voting through external advisors. Proxy voting is popular among many 
pension and mutual funds particularly in response to shareholder campaigns led by hedge 
funds or private equity funds (Gilson & Gordon, 2013). Outsourcing voting decisions to an 
external advisor reduces voting costs (Choi et al., 2011). Despite its popularity, proxy voting 
among the institutional investors is criticised for being a form of reactive engagement (Choi 
et al., 2009; Strine, 2006). Choi et al. (2009) raised concern over the extent to which mutual 
funds assign their voting judgement to proxy advisors. Exploring the factors affecting 
recommendations made by four major proxy advisory firms (Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS), Proxy Governance (PG), Glass Lewis (GL) and Egan-Jones Proxy (EJ)) with 
respect to director elections at Standard & Poor (S&P) 1500 companies for 2005 and 2006, 
they found each proxy advisor emphasised different factors in their final recommendation. 
For example, for the ISS, audit was considered the most critical indicator of good CG, 
whereas for PG, executive compensation was the most important factor. When investors 
are not aware of the different approaches among the proxy advisors, they are very likely to 
follow their recommendation without determining their relevance for their institution. In 
this case, Choi et al. (2009) concluded that using proxy advisors would lead to an 
uninformed voting decision. They proposed a number of factors that challenge the 
effectiveness of these proxy advisors’ recommendations: a lack of proper incentives; a lack 
of accountability; the ability to follow their own interests rather than investors, and; 
conflicts of interest. Strine (2006) also challenged the use of proxy advisors and accused 
institutional investors of following ISS advice without due consideration or analysis. There 
are limited papers that have explored the use of proxy advisors by UK shareholders.  
McCahery et al., (2016) included UK investors (16%) in their study to explore the role of 




advisors to vote, with half using more than one proxy advisor. McCahery et al., (2016) 
reported that institutional investors were aware of the conflict of interest arising from using 
proxy advisors but maintained that the information provided by proxy advisors improved, 
rather than substituted, their voting decisions. This finding is in contrast with Choi et al. 
(2009) and Strine (2006).  The findings of McCahery et al., (2016) may not be generalizable 
as participation in the study was voluntary, indicating a self-selection bias may be present. 
In 2019, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA, 2020) published the regulation ‘Shareholder 
Right Directives’ (SRD II), which aims to "improve the stewardship of companies based in the 
UK, elsewhere in the European Economic Area (EEA) and Gibraltar by increasing shareholder 
engagement".  SRD II recommended proxy advisors to disclose the following: 
1. The code of conduct which they apply, while following a comply or explain approach; 
2. Information on the preparation of research, advice and voting recommendations; 
3. Conflicts of interests or business relationships that may influence the operation of 
proxy advisors. 
This new regulation with detailed recommendations could be an answer to the criticisms 
raised above, helping to improve the quality of voting activities by proxy advisors. 
Although voting rights have always been a fundamental part of UK CG structure, the level of 
voting by institutional investors was quite low until the 1990s (Solomon, 2013). This could 
be due to monitoring costs, lack of monitoring expertise or fear of being heralded as an 
insider (Crespi & Renneboog, 2010). The publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 was the 
beginning of an increase in exercising voting rights by institutional investors, as prior to this 
voting was disorganised and infrequent due to lack of guidance. Stapledon (1996) focused 
on exercising voting rights by UK institutional investors through interviews with fund 
managers of 17 investment-management UK firms. He found that in the early 1990s there 
were three different attitudes towards exercising voting rights: 1. Institutional fund 
managers that always voted their shares, 2. Institutional fund managers that only voted on 
major issues, and 3. Institutional fund managers that started to vote on all matters post-
Cadbury, with associated improvement of voting policies.  NAPF (1995) encouraged its 




NAPF, and given that most institutional investors are pension funds, the NAPF report was a 
significant contributor to the change in the level of voting (NAPF, 2015). In addition to these 
guidelines, Institutional Voting Information Service (IVIS) provides CG research for 
shareholders by highlighting the issues, concerns and best practice for its subscribers to 
consider before voting.  These reports adopt a colour code to help users evaluate the 
severity of issues:  Red indicates a serious concern; Amber shows concern over a particular 
element of the report; Blue indicates no major issue, and; Green highlights a resolved issue. 
Despite the considerable number of guidelines that require institutional investors to 
improve engagement, in 1998, the Hampel Committee reported that the voting level was 
still as low as 40%. Rather than explaining this, recommendations were made to encourage 
institutional investors to vote all the shares that were under their control. 
Shareholder activism has been intensified in the 21st century. Since 2001 shareholders have 
been allowed to vote on remuneration policies, which has helped improve accountability of 
corporates to their shareholders and institutional investors to their clients (Solomon, 2013). 
In 2002, the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations required companies to produce a 
remuneration report that could be voted by shareholders at AGM. This has been referred to 
as the “say on pay” initiative (Conyon & Sadler, 2010). In 2003, the formation of Research, 
Recommendations and Electronic Voting, a joint venture between NAPF and Institutional 
Shareholder Service, also helped to increase shareholder activism. This move aimed to 
provide a basis for more active shareholding via exercising voting rights. In 2004 and 2005 
Myners published two reviews following the concerns that the votes were being lost due to 
the inefficiency of the voting system. The first Myners Report (2004) found that the use of 
electronic voting systems should be developed first, to improve the voting of UK shares, 
however, voting systems such as CRESTCo, which was introduced in 2003, has not been 
adopted widely.  In 2005, the Myners Report focused on how the recommendations of the 
previous year affected the shareholder community. It was found that a significant number 
of share issuers facilitated electronic voting. Secondly, the Myners Report (2005) 
emphasised the role of pension fund trustees to perform their responsibilities to their 
clients by ensuring the efficient voting of shares. Another contributor to the shareholder 
activism through exercising voting rights in the UK was the Shareholder Rights Directive 




ask questions at shareholder meetings. These independent initiatives, from a range of 
institutions, demonstrated a need for higher voting levels among investors, particularly 
institutional investors. This demand for increased voting levels was largely predicated on the 
basis that institutional investors have a duty of care to act proactively towards monitoring 
and ratifying management decisions on how corporates are run.  
i) Shareholder Voting after the Financial Crisis  
The financial crisis has highlighted the importance of institutional investor voting as a 
monitoring mechanism to improve CG. Following the financial crisis, the Walker Review 
suggested that institutional investors should actively look for opportunities of collective 
engagement to enhance their ownership influence, exercise their voting power and disclose 
their voting policies and records on their website. In line with this, the Stewardship Code 
(2010) included voting as a central issue and required investors to have a clear policy on 
voting and to disclose their voting activities regularly. 
Since the publication of CG guidelines and the Stewardship Code, a considerable number of 
academic studies have investigated shareholder voting activities. According to Solomon and 
Solomon (1999) the attitude of institutional investors towards voting rights have 
transformed considerably, as they found that 72% of UK unit trust managers had written a 
voting policy for their investee corporates. Likewise, Conyon and Sadler (2010) investigated 
shareholders voting behaviour at a large sample of UK public firms between 2002 and 2007, 
and concluded that shareholders have started to use voting rights to influence the executive 
payments in investee corporates, although only 10% of shareholders voted against the 
remuneration policies proposed by investee corporates. Although the authors did not find 
this voting level significant, they acknowledged that 10% represented an increase in 
exercising voting rights. Mallin (2012) investigated the voting policies and activities of the 
two largest UK institutional investors (Hermes and Aviva). They found that voting level at 
top 250 firms had increased significantly from 35% in 1994 to 65% in 2010. Based on this 
sample, Mallin (2012) found that the most controversial resolutions were related to 
appointment or re-election of directors, Board compositions, remuneration packages, 




investigated the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code, also announced a continued 
increase in voting activity of UK institutional investors. McCahery et al. (2016) reported that 
53% of investors reported voting against management as an engagement measure, 
suggesting the use of voting rights as an effective CG mechanism. More recently FRC (2018) 
summarised voting where shareholders raised significant opposition to resolution at FTSE 
350 AGMs from 2017 to 2018.  It reported that in 2018 the number of resolutions increased 
by 20%, with a significant minority voting against the recommendation of the Board. This 
indicates a positive move towards exercising effective shareholder engagement.  
Furthermore, major fund managers were found to take actions to control executive 
payments.  In 2018, the UK's fund management industry body wrote to FTSE 350 Boards 
warning of actions to vote against executive pay packages if the corporations failed to follow 
IA (investment association) new rules over remuneration (Jolly, 2018). IA rules aim to 
prevent companies from offering outsized pension contributions and instead to focus on 
linking payment to performance. 
Although industry reports and guidance and academic studies found improvements in 
voting levels and the establishment of voting policies by institutional investors, the quality 
and impact of such policies on the CG of investee corporates is not clear yet. Furthermore, 
institutional investors do not always find it easy to exercise the voting right due to the 
barriers that they face. To address these issues, it is important that companies try to 
improve voter information, registration and voting services, by providing timely and detailed 
information. They can seek to eliminate barriers to voting by simplifying the voting process, 
providing more opportunities to vote and increasing the awareness and effectiveness of all 
existing voting channels, including online voting and proxy voting. The barriers towards 
effective engagement are discussed in section 3.1.4. 
3.1.2.2 Shareholder Resolutions 
Institutional investors can also engage through the formation of representative groups in 
order to submit resolutions to company management. Shareholder resolutions were 
initiated by John and Lewis Gilbert, Wilma Soss, and James Peck in the 1940s and 1950s, 
through attempts to promote social responsibility and corporate governance reform 
(Logsdon & Van Buren, 2008). Notably, these individuals did not have formal power and 
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tried to use shareholding, networking and public attention to achieve success. During the 
1970s, social activism was developed through the formation of activist groups such as the 
Interfaith Centre on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), which used shareholder resolutions to 
make social change through changing business behaviour. Such groups could address a wide 
range of issues, such as environmental responsibility, human rights, diversity, tobacco, 
labour rights, the military, governance, corporate political action, and energy (Graves et al., 
2001; Logsdon & Van Buren, 2008; Rehbein et al., 2004). Submitting shareholder resolutions 
is an extreme form of activism which has become increasingly popular in the UK. According 
to the Investment Association (IA) the highest level of voting among asset managers in 2018 
was related to environmental and social issues (see Figure 3.1).   
Figure 3.1 Voting by Topic for UK Companies
“Aiming for A” is an example of a UK environmental shareholder resolution requesting Oil 
companies to act to address the threat of climate change. It was organised by a group of 
investors including the UK Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, several UK and international 
pension funds, members of the UK Church Investors Group, and the US and Canadian faith 
investors.  Shell, one of the targeted corporations, accepted the resolution and stated that it 
would provide additional reporting in 2015 as a response to the recommendations of the 
report.  According to figure 3.1 only 7% of asset managers have voted against corporation 
resolutions regarding director related topics, however, this represents a 100% increase from 




to the new IA’s public register which tracks shareholder dissents and includes FTSE All-Share 
companies that have either i) received votes of 20% or more against any resolution, or, ii) 
withdrew a resolution prior to their AGM.  
3.1.2.3 Shareholder Dialogue 
Having a purposeful dialogue between institutional investors and corporate management is 
a well-known type of private engagement which could be employed to exchange views and 
concerns on the governance of the investee corporate (Micheler, 2013b). The Stewardship 
Code (2010) stated that institutional investors should engage with investee corporates in a 
purposeful dialogue on matters such as strategy, performance and CG. Prior to the 
publication of the Stewardship Code, the importance of regular meetings between 
institutional investors and management of investee companies was raised by all important 
CG reports including Cadbury Report (1992), Myners Report (1995), Hampel Report (1998) 
and Higgs Report (2003). The Higgs Report (2003) noted that non-executive directors did not 
engage with their institutional investors, explaining that they rarely hear the view of major 
shareholders to discuss the company business with them. Furthermore, the ISC Code (2002) 
stressed the importance of active engagement between institutional investors and their 
investee companies. Based on the ISC Code, institutional investors could intervene in their 
investee corporates when necessary to discharge accountability to clients. Examples of 
intervention by investors include concerns over corporate strategy and performance, 
ineffective accountability controls from non-executive directors, inadequate internal 
control, inappropriate remuneration level, and failure to comply with the Combined Code. 
Shareholder dialogue mostly happens behind the scene, and consequently raise challenges 
for researchers to observe or measure. Nevertheless, Goranova and Ryan (2014) believed 
that this type of engagement is more powerful than public engagement as directors are 
more reactive to private shareholder requests to prevent public embarrassment and 
potential reputational damage. Carleton et al. (1998a) investigated the private negotiation 
between TIAA, the largest US pension fund, and its targeted corporates, found the same 
result: that financial institutions were generally successful in reaching an agreement with 




correspondence between TIAA and its corporates, in 71% of the cases, the institution could 
reach an agreement before the TIAA’s proxy resolutions. They found that insider-controlled 
firms were less likely to reach an agreement with TIAA before the proxy vote. It is notable 
that despite the emphasis on the importance of the private conversation, Carleton et al. 
(1998) could not confirm its effectiveness on the corporates’ value in the long-term. 
Furthermore, McCahery et al. (2016) found that discussion with management was the most 
popular engagement tool among 63% of the institutional investors surveyed. They 
supported the view that institutional investors choose public engagement, such as 
shareholder proposals if their private negotiation with the corporates was unsuccessful. On 
the other hand, Anabtawi and Stout (2008) argued that this type of engagement could 
encourage the asymmetry of information between active investors and other shareholders 
because it is not subject to shareholder approval. 
Shareholder activism has attracted academic attention since the activist shareholders have 
done much to challenge the corporate policies and practices. The existing empirical studies 
found that shareholder activism helped to reform the CG as well as promoting better 
performance for the firms (e.g. Brav et al., 2008; Hadani et al., 2011; Karpoff et al., 1996; 
Prevost & Rao, 2000; Ryan & Schneider, 2002; Smith, 1996; Strickland et al., 1996; Wahal, 
1996). The next section presents a summary of empirical results over the outcome of 
shareholder engagement.  
3.1.3 Outcome of Shareholder Engagement 
According to Çelik and Isaksson (2014), being recognised as an institutional investor does 
not imply high-quality engagement. They explored the character and degree for ownership 
engagement within OECD countries and found four different degrees of engagement among 
institutional investors: 
1. “No Engagement”: investors who did not monitor their investee corporates, did not 
exercise their voting rights and did not engage in any dialogue with the management 





2. “Reactive Engagement”: investors who exercised voting rights based on predefined 
criteria related to proposals before the AGM. An example of this category is buying 
advice and voting services from external advisers such as proxy advisors for this 
category.  
3. “Alpha Engagement”: activities to support short-term or long-term returns above the 
market benchmark. Hedge funds and private equity funds were given as examples. 
Hedge funds, holding relatively small investments, could influence their investee 
corporates by having the support of other investors (OECD, 2009). On the other 
hand, private equity firms, holding large controlling shares, could influence their 
investee corporates and improve their performance within a predefined period to 
sell their shares with profits.  
4. “Inside Engagement”: investors who have controlling power over, or a significant 
influence via large shareholdings in, investee corporates.  
One of the potential negative impacts from institutional investors, found by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), was that large shareholders tend to represent their own interests rather than 
the interests of all shareholders per se. An example of this problem is the case of British Gas, 
where a controversial chief executive, Cedric Brown, awarded himself excessive executive 
remuneration which did not reflect his performance, receiving a 75% increase in salary from 
£270,000 to £475,000, and an annual pension of £316,000, reflecting two-thirds of his final 
salary. This pension increase was so large that it could not have been met by his 
contribution to the fund (Solomon, 2013). The term ‘fat cats’ was used to describe this 
incident where the directors’ remuneration package has little connection to their 
performance (Solomon, 2013). This incident attracted shareholder attention, and 
specifically, raised concern among the smaller shareholders. Although many smaller 
shareholders attended the AGM on 30 May 1995 to show their views and vote against the 
Board, the institutional investors’ votes supported the Board through proxy votes. This was 
seen as unfair by many of the shareholders who attended the AGM. This caused an outcry at 
the time as the view of the individual shareholder was overruled by proxy votes from 
institutional investors. In line with Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Solomon (2013) stated that in 
some countries, large shareholders use their control rights to redistribute wealth from other 




countries where large shareholdings are related to funding families, rather than in the UK, 
where large shareholdings are held by institutional investors who follow ethical codes of 
practices and go through substantial financial market regulations.  As the awareness of the 
role of institutional investors in their investee corporates has been heightened and 
understanding their characters and responsibilities has become more important.  
3.1.3.1 Agency Problems of Engagement 
Agency theory is covered in detail in section 3.3. This section explores the agency problems 
associated with engagement. The agency problem is the result of separation of shareholders 
(principal) as the true owners of the business and managers (agent) who are directly 
involved in running the business.  This agent-principal relationship can cause potential 
problems including the agent not acting in the best interest of the principal, the agent 
misusing his power or the agent taking inappropriate decisions as he has a different attitude 
to risk.  The monitoring role of large shareholders is believed to limit these agency problems 
(see Admati et al., 1994; Huddart, 1993; Maug, 1998; Noe, 1997, 2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Gilson and Gordon (2013), who investigated the free-
rider problem, suggested that due to the size of their ownership, large shareholders have 
sufficient incentive to monitor their investee corporates. Institutional investors have 
sufficient power and influence to ensure that managers align their interests with 
shareholders, thereby reducing agency costs. Crespi-Cladera and Renneboog (2003) and 
Goergen et al. (2008), however, did not find any evidence to support the impact of 
institutional investors in reducing agency problems. Goergen et al. (2008) rejected the 
hypothesis that due to the monitoring of institutional shareholders, directors’ trades would 
transfer less information to the market, resulting in a weaker reaction to the stock price, as 
they found that institutional investors did not monitor the management of investee 
corporates effectively and could not reduce information asymmetry between management 
and the market. Gilson and Gordon (2013) also found that large institutional investors, such 
as mutual funds, are no longer able to reduce agency problems through monitoring their 
investee corporates as the business model of institutional investors have created new 
agency problems arising from the separation of the intermediary institutions (e.g. pension 
funds and mutual funds) and their clients (i.e. beneficial owners). According to Gilson and 
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Gordon (2013), the ownership model of US public companies (agency capitalism) has 
changed considerably from the model discussed by Berle and Means, i.e. “an ownership 
structure in which agents hold shares for beneficial owners” which resulted in a “double set 
of agency relationships: between shareholders and managers and between beneficial 
owners and record-holders” (Berle & Means, 1932, p. 865). The following figure illustrates 
the changes from the ownership model proposed by Berle-Means to the current ownership 
model (i.e. agency capitalism).  
Figure 3.2 Transformation of the Ownership Model 
Gilson and Gordon (2013) argued that institutional investors with a complex business model 
are not motivated enough, nor have the right capacity to monitor investee corporates 
closely and concluded that limited incentives, combined with limited capacity, prevent 
investors from governance intervention. Instead, investors prefer to sell underperforming 
shares, thereby preventing institutional investors the ability to reduce agency problems 
through engagement. Although the main focus of Gilson and Gordon (2013) was on the US 
market, they believed that other countries, including the UK, could benefit from their 
findings in developing their CG system. In this regard, Gilson and Gordon demonstrated that 
regulations in some countries, including the UK, which has ignored agency capitalism, make 




3.1.3.2 Asymmetry of Information 
Asymmetry of information is a common agency theory problem. This occurs when insiders 
(managers and Board members) have privileged access to corporate information compared 
to shareholders (Goergen et al., 2008). Fidrmuc et al. (2006) proposed that insider share 
purchase conveys positive information about the business to the market, whereas an insider 
share sale conveys negative information. Fidrmuc et al. (2006) proposed that monitoring 
activities of major investors could reduce the asymmetry of information between 
management and shareholders, making directors’ trading less important in signalling 
information to outsiders. This formed the hypotheses that “the announcement effect of 
directors’ purchases and sales is weakened by the presence of an outside blockholder who 
monitors the firm” (Fidrmuc et al., 2006, p.2940). Notably, this article made a distinction 
between shareholders who are more likely to monitor managers (e.g. corporations, 
individuals and families unrelated to directors) and those who are less likely to monitor 
managers (e.g. institutional investors). These authors found that market reaction is higher 
for firms with significant shareholding by institutional investors.  They argued that 
institutional investors do not reduce information asymmetry, and associated market 
reaction, towards insider trading through monitoring activities because they avoid engaging 
in their investee corporates.  This is due to fears of being accused of insider trading, which 
attracts a custodial sentence as the UK law prevents institutional investors from trading on 
private insider information.  
In line with Fidrmuc et al. (2006), Goergen et al. (2008) concluded that institutional investors 
could not mitigate information asymmetry due to ineffective monitoring. They rejected their 
hypothesis, indicating that the monitoring activities of institutional shareholders were 
insufficient to transfer information about the firm’s future to shareholders. Faccio and 
Lasfer (2000) and Franks et al. (2001) also found that UK institutional shareholders did not 
monitor their investee corporations effectively and did not reduce problems of asymmetric 
information. On the other hand, Çelik and Isaksson (2014), who examined how institutional 
investors executed their CG roles, posited that institutional investors could provide valuable 
information about corporates and their prospect, through an empirical overview of the 




(2014) highlighted the importance of choosing investee corporations wisely via prior 
analysis and subsequent monitoring to ensure the protection of their investment. According 
to Çelik and Isaksson (2014) investors could have a beneficial role by bringing new and 
unique information about their investee corporates to the economy which is gained through 
monitoring.  This would make better use of the resources that are already allocated. It is 
notable that this study did not mention whether shareholders would be happy to share 
negative information about their investee corporates and risk the value of their 
shareholdings falling. 
3.1.3.3 Shareholder Engagement in Corporate Governance  
All major CG guidelines such as Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995) and 
Hampel Report (1998) stressed the role of institutional investors as an important CG 
mechanism in ensuring that corporates follow best practice. Bebchuk (2006) argued that 
shareholders should be given power to make an impact on CG of their investee corporates 
in order to benefit shareholders by reducing the agency cost, enhancing shareholder value 
and improving corporate performance. Lipton and Savitt (2007) criticised the Bebchuk 
proposal, arguing that he failed to propose a quantifiable benefit from transferring the 
power from managers to shareholders. They believed that Bebchuk (2006) did not address 
the potential negative impact from implementing his proposal, including the cost of 
disruption of corporate management as a result of a contested election, as well as a short-
termism approach that could be followed by investors such as hedge funds.  Arsalidou 
(2012) found that a low level of shareholder engagement in governance matters gives 
freedom to directors to manage the companies by using experts and without too much 
shareholder interference. At the same time, the low level of shareholder engagement can 
adversely affect the accountability of directors towards shareholders, which leads to agency 
problems of self-interest. 
3.1.3.4 Shareholder Activism and the Performance of Investee Corporates 
Many studies have attempted to address whether shareholder activism could result in 




Mooradian, 2011; Erkens et al., 2012; Faccio & Lasfer, 2000; Mehran, 1995; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Strickland et al., 1996). However, the evidence is inconclusive and conflicting. 
While some studies found a positive impact from institutional investor engagement on 
financial performance, others could not find any significant link between the engagement of 
investors and financial performance of their investee corporates. For example, Strickland et 
al. (1996) reported positive abnormal returns for investee corporate as a result of the 
United Shareholders Association’s activism between 1990 and 1993.   Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) by contrast, found weak evidence to support the relationship between institutional 
investors engagement and better corporate financial performance. Moreover, Karpoff et al. 
(1996) found that shareholder activism, in the form of shareholder proposals, did not 
improve company value nor corporate policy. 
Conversely, Faccio and Lasfer (2000) did not find evidence to support the positive impact of 
pension fund activism on company value or profitability. Employing a correlation matrix to 
determine if there was a positive relationship between firm value and ownership structure, 
they found a negative association and concluded that the existence of pension funds does 
not add value to investee corporates. They suggested that their results could be due to the 
fact that pension funds fail to monitor investee corporate because of monitoring costs. 
Faccio and Lasfer (2000) added that pension funds might refuse to intervene to avoid any 
public attention on their investee corporate’s problems. Erkens et al. (2012) explored the 
impact of Board independence and institutional ownership on bank stock returns in 30 
countries from January 2007 to September 2008 and found a negative relationship between 
the banks’ stock return and having larger institutional ownership in banks during the crisis. 
Moreover, Erkens et al. (2012) document a positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and bank risk-taking at the onset of the crisis. 
3.1.3.5 Return to Activist Investors 
In contrast to the academic studies that investigated the outcome of shareholder activism in 
their investee corporates, there is small evidence on the impact of activism for the activist 
investors. Brav et al. (2008) are among the few studies that explored the returns to hedge 




hedge funds in the US. This study found that these hedge funds increasingly followed an 
activism approach, which they found different from other institutional investors. Hedge 
funds’ activism brought positive abnormal returns for both shareholders in investee 
corporates as well as the activist hedge funds. To measure the performance of activist 
hedge funds, they used a capital asset pricing model (CAPM), and found that since 2003, 
activist funds have outperformed equity-oriented hedge funds. Their finding indicates that 
the way hedge funds choose investee corporates was an important factor, enhancing the 
financial performance of these activist funds and that hedge funds focus on value 
companies which are profitable but have low market value relative to book value.  The 
majority of papers that have explored institutional investors’ performance (e.g. Byström, 
2011; Cuthbertson et al., 2008; Cuthbertson et al., 2016; Thomas & Tonks, 2001) do not 
specifically explore the impact of shareholder activism on performance. 
 In summary, reviewing the academic literature on institutional investor activism revealed 
that the main focus has been to understand the characteristics of shareholder activism such 
as types of activism, the motivations behind activism and the impact of activism on investee 
corporates. As illustrated, academics have not reached a conclusive result around the 
outcome of shareholder activism. Hence, the real impact of shareholder engagement 
remains unknown. While some studies found a positive impact from shareholder activism 
and required higher accountability to shareholders by managers (Bebchuk, 2005, 2007; 
Dimitrov & Jain, 2011), others criticised the view of corporations as a portfolio of assets to 
benefit the shareholders (Welker & Wood, 2011). Most of the above studies have used US 
data, with little exploration of UK institutional investor engagement. Solomon (2013) called 
for further research around the link between shareholder activism and financial 
performance, as  without sufficient evidence it seems that it is just the assumption of 
supporters of shareholder activism, such as Hample Report, that institutional investor 
engagement in investee corporates creates higher returns, rather than a proven assertion. 
Notably, there is limited academic literature that has explored the outcome of activism for 
activist institutional investors from the perspective of the institutional investor. 
The aim of the next section is to gain a better understanding of shareholder responsibilities 




demotivate institutional investors to actively engage in investee corporates and therefore 
may help to explain the inconsistent results discussed above. 
3.1.4 Barriers of Shareholder Engagement  
Institutional investors do not always find it easy to exercise voting rights due to barriers that 
they face (Mallin, 2010). IMA (2009) found a lack of resources, the size of holding, concerns 
over acting in concert and being labelled insiders, differing opinions among portfolio 
managers and shareholders, and lack of client demand as the barriers to shareholder 
engagement. Some of these factors that were found in existing studies are explained in 
more detail below.  
3.1.4.1 Size of Holdings 
Micheler (2013) posited that asset owners are unlikely to engage in investee corporates or 
receive attention from investee corporates if they have a small investment. Micheler added 
that even if sufficient investment is held to approach their investee corporate, the 
corporation may have a weak governance structure that prevents effective shareholder 
engagement. For example, the person who is responsible for communicating with 
shareholders may not be informative about addressing investors’ complaints. According to 
FRC (2011) the issue with the size of the investment can be overcome by collective 
engagement. Collective engagement requires individual investors to find other investors 
with the same view as well as comparing it to the opinion of other market participants, 
which is an intensive exercise and needs high resources. Factors that make coalitions 
difficult include conflict of interest, the rivalry between investors as well as different 
locations of investors, which makes the connection between investors a challenge 
(Micheler, 2013). 
3.1.4.2 Risks of Insider Trading 
Micheler (2013) argued that collective engagement might be difficult due to regulatory 
reasons such as the rules on acting in concert and being made insiders.  Faccio & Lasfer 




level of Investors’ intervention and fear of becoming an insider from involvement in their 
investee corporate. 
3.1.4.3 Intermediation of Shareholders 
Increasing intermediation of shareholdings is another reason leading to a low level of 
engagement. Rodrigues (2011) refers to this phenomenon as a separation of ownership 
from ownership as asset owners, such as pension trustees, employ asset managers to make 
investment decisions on their behalf. It is notable that within the asset management system, 
there is a significant degree of separation of function (Micheler, 2013). For example, there 
are individuals who are involved in analysis, those who make investment decisions and 
those who take stewardship responsibilities. The separation of function does not lead to 
problems on its own, rather the individuals who are appointed for these functions raise the 
complications. Asset managers and investment analysts, for example, usually know more 
about markets without trying to understand individual investee corporates. Besides, they do 
not use the information available to them from those individuals who are responsible for 
performing stewardship responsibilities but rely heavily on quantitative data to perform 
their duties. Hence, asset managers with little understanding of the business they invested 
in would be less able to engage in investee corporates. This issue was addressed by Reisberg 
(2015) who stated that the separation of functions along the intermediary chain had 
weakened the ultimate investors’ accountability towards their investee corporates.  
Furthermore, asset owners usually hold shares in companies through a chain of 
intermediaries known as custodians. Custodians arrange engagement between investee 
corporates and the asset owners, such as pension funds, complicated and impossible 
(Micheler, 2013). Furthermore, some of these intermediaries, despite having the rights to 
monitor and control investee corporates on behalf of the asset owners, are not motivated 
to be accountable towards their investments. In line with this, Gilson and Gordon (2013) 
proposed that the business model of key intermediary investment institution has made 
them less motivated and less capable to actively engage in their investee corporates, e.g. 
mutual funds whose main focus is to increase assets under their management by returning a 




in, these investors monitor share performance and pay high returns to attract and retain 
clients. Therefore, mutual funds have less incentive and capacity to monitor their investee 
corporates. The ownership behaviour is described as “rationally reticent”, indicating that 
they are willing to respond to governance proposals but not to create them (Gilson & 
Gordon, 2013, p.867).  
3.1.4.4 Client Demand 
Sometimes asset owners do not demand stewardship from their asset managers. According 
to Kay (2012) a lack of demand could be due to uncertain financial benefits from 
shareholder engagement. Although institutional investors do not need to engage in the day 
to day management of investee corporates, they could make an effective contribution to 
major investment decision making (Micheler, 2013). Furthermore, the financial crisis raised 
awareness of the importance of effective stewardship activities by institutional investors 
(Walker, 2009). Micheler (2013) found that during the financial crisis, corporates with poor 
governance structures failed to identify and manage risk effectively, causing widespread 
damage to the economy. This, he suggested, was compounded by the short-term focus of 
institutional investors. 
3.1.4.5 Type of Investor 
An index-tracking fund is a passive investor who invests in the corporates in a fixed 
proportion relative to their size and portion on the stock exchange i.e. they cannot choose 
the investee corporate in their portfolio as these are determined by the stock market listing 
(Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Therefore, the expectation is that passive institutional investors 
would be less interested in CG and the activities of investee corporates. Solomon (2013) 
argued that passive investors could not easily change investee corporates through the 
threat of divestment, as divestment is not an option. Therefore, there is a greater incentive 
to influence corporate management through exercising voting rights and through active 
dialogue. In line with Solomon, Monks (2001) also found that shareholder activism could be 
important for passive, index-tracking fund managers since they cannot divest their shares 




3.1.4.6 Liability Structure  
The choice of liability has been considered as an essential part of the business model for 
institutions (Çelik and Isaksson, 2014). Some institutions, such as life-insurance corporates, 
are experts in long-term obligations, whereas others, like mutual funds, provide undefined 
or short-term obligations. Çelik and Isaksson (2014) argued that long-term obligations are 
measurable with accuracy, enabling institutions to match their portfolio liquidity 
accordingly. In contrast, mutual funds, where investors could exit without any notice, 
required a fully liquid portfolio. They posited that the liquidity requirement could be a 
barrier to ownership engagement where shareholder engagement could restrict trading 
shares legally. 
3.1.4.7 Portfolio Strategy  
Çelik and Isaksson (2014) considered the number of investee corporates within the 
institution’s portfolio as another factor that determines the quality of engagement. The 
degree of portfolio concentration varies among institutions:  CalPERS, for example, holds 
shares in more than 10,000 corporates, whereas others may have very few holdings. This 
factor affects monitoring costs, which could limit the engagement of institutions who have a 
large diversified portfolio. Such institutions chose to reduce costs by buying monitoring 
services from consultancies which apply a predefined formula in their advice. Although a 
diverse portfolio could reduce the quality of engagement due to monitoring costs, a 
concentrated portfolio may not result in high-quality engagement (Çelik and Isaksson, 2014) 
as an institutional investor with a concentrated portfolio may still perform limited 
engagement e.g. some sovereign wealth funds. 
3.1.4.8 Free rider issues 
A number of studies suggested that free-riding problems demotivate shareholders from 
active engagement as activists shareholders bear the costs whilst others enjoy the benefits 
(Becht et al., 2009; Goranova & Ryan, 2014; McCahery et al., 2016; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) 
McCahery et al. (2016) identified the free-rider problem as one of the main barriers 
institutional investors face limiting their engagement.  
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3.1.4.9 Cross-border Voting 
In the UK, foreign investors are considered as major shareholders. Therefore, the ownership 
role of these shareholders cannot be ignored. Mallin (2010) recognised the following as the 
barriers that are involved in cross-border voting: 
● Timing of the AGM; for example, in Japan the vast majority of AGMs are clustered
around a few days in June, and so institutional investors have to deal with a lot of
meeting notices in a short space of time. In the UK many AGMs are held from 7th to
28th of May, making it difficult for investors with large portfolios or international
investors to thoroughly investigate and challenge the proposed resolutions at the
meetings (FRC, 2011). The following graph was published by FRC, illustrating the
timing of AGM (Source: Manifest - the proxy voting Agency).




● Translation.  Mallin (2010) found that translation can act as a barrier to effective 
engagement among foreign shareholders. 
● Availability and reliability of resolution information. 
● Depositing or share blocking, which is required in some countries.  
● Voting methods, for example, some countries do not allow electronic voting and 
investors must be physically present at the meetings to vote. 
● Voting control mechanisms such as multiple voting rights. 
 
To enhance shareholder engagement, both domestic and foreign, it is important for 
policymakers and corporates to address these barriers. According to the EU proposal in 
2007, the only way to deal with intermediation issues is to develop regulations aimed at 
asset managers and ask them to publicly disclose strategy, monitoring, engagement and 
dialogue with investee corporates. Although academics and policymakers were successful in 
recognising the barriers of active engagement, the real impact of shareholder engagement 
remains unknown. Introduction of the Stewardship Code (2010) and its popularity among 
institutional investors have given new motivation to investigate the stewardship 
responsibilities of the institutional investors in investee corporates. The following section 
presents the existing academic evidence around the effectiveness of this guideline. 
3.2 The Stewardship Code 
Although institutional investors, as owners, are entitled to elect appropriate managers, they 
are not directly involved in day-to-day decision making of investee corporates. This 
restriction should not prevent investors from actively engaging with investee corporates, 
given that they are recognised as key players within CG (Monks & Minow, 2011). Published 
in 2010 by the FRC, the Stewardship Code sought to enhance the quality of engagement 
between investors and investee companies. According to the FRC, applying the Stewardship 
Code would benefit investors, companies and the economy as a whole. Since the 
publication, this guideline has been successful in attracting a significant number of 
signatories and inspiring other countries (e.g. Japan, South Korea and Malaysia) to publish 




it is important to determine whether it has achieved its proposed aims (i.e. to enhance the 
quality of engagement, to benefit investors and to benefit companies). Since the publication 
in 2010, FRC as the responsible regulator has reviewed the application of the Stewardship 
Code annually. Reviewing all the available resources, the current study found very few 
academics which explored the Stewardship Code. A summary of the reviews of the 
Stewardship Code, and then a review of the limited academic literature in this area, is 
presented in the following sections. 
3.2.1 The FRC Review 
The first review of the Stewardship Code was carried out in 2011 through assessing 
stewardship statements and conversations with companies, investors and other interested 
parties, including a ‘One Year On’ event for signatories. The FRC was excited by the number 
of signatories and stated that “the sign-up to the Stewardship Code by over 230 asset 
managers, asset owners and service providers in its eighteen months of life was beyond our 
expectations” (FRC, 2011, p.1). On the other hand, signing up to the Stewardship Code by a 
large number of signatories does not imply that they followed the principles of Stewardship 
Code thoroughly. In line with this, the FRC emphasised that the main aim of the Stewardship 
Code was to help investors improve the quality of their engagement and to become a 
signatory is only the first step. It is notable that this review was carried out eighteen months 
after the publication of the Stewardship Code. Hence, the FRC could not claim that it has 
been successful in achieving this aim. The FRC found that the Stewardship Code was not 
clear on the stewardship role of asset owners. Also, some investors suggested providing a 
clear definition of stewardship would help to encourage better engagement in the 
Stewardship Code by asset owners as well as foreign investors with large shares in the UK 
equity market. Another issue raised in this review was the quality of stewardship reports. 
The FRC found while some signatories provided detailed stewardship statements, others 
offered general and brief reports on their stewardship statements. Therefore, the FRC 






From 2012 to 2014, the FRC published three reviews. In each the FRC positively reacted to 
the number of signatories, which was increasing, but at a slower rate compared to the first 
twelve months. In line with the first review, the primary concern of the FRC was the quality 
of stewardship statements. The FRC (2012) emphasised that it was crucial for signatories to 
publish high-quality statements since they help companies to understand the stewardship 
approach taken by their major shareholders and enable potential clients in identifying 
managers whose approach is in line with their own. Further reviews were published by the 
FRC from 2011 to 2017 outlining the following characteristics of a high-quality stewardship 
statement: 
 
1. A transparent report on the issues that are raised in the Stewardship Code, such as 
showing a willingness by signatories to act collectively with other investors, the use 
of proxy voting agencies and other service providers. Regarding collective 
engagement, the FRC expected signatories to “explain whether they act collectively 
and, where they do not, explain their alternative approach” (FRC, 2016, P.25). In 
addition, FRC review in 2014 stated that “It is the responsibility of signatories to 
make clear the scope of such services, identify the providers and disclose the extent 
to which they follow, rely upon or use recommendations made by proxy advisers” 
(p.21). 
2. To clearly describe how signatories have applied the seven principles of the 
Stewardship Code while disclosing necessary information for each principle. For 
example, if an investor decides not to follow a principle, the FRC expect to see “a 
proper explanation for non-compliance with a Principle of the Code provides 
information as to why the signatory does not comply, details their alternative 
approach and explains how it continues to meet the spirit of the Code” (FRC, 2016, 
P.26). 
3. Clear disclosure on how conflicts of interest are managed. According to the FRC 
(2016, P.25), institutional investors should “describe which conflicts are relevant to 
them given their client base, holding structure and investment style, amongst other 
things, and how they would address these conflicts if they were to arise.”  





5. Annual update of the stewardship statement. 
  
.  Despite a revision of the Stewardship Code in 2012, 20% of the signatories had not revised 
their statements, suggesting that they were following a “box-ticking” approach whereby 
signatories just signed up to the Stewardship Code to claim compliance without committing 
to adopt and report against its principles.  In the 2015 review, the FRC reminded signatories 
of the main objectives of the Stewardship Code including: to help build a critical mass of 
investors that are willing and able to engage with investee companies; to increase the 
quantity and quality of engagement, and; to increase accountability down the investment 
chain to clients and beneficiaries.  
The FRC believed that the Stewardship Code was going in the right direction, and they 
received encouraging news on the occurrence of more engagement between investors and 
companies, including an increase in voting activity of UK institutional investors. The quality 
of stewardship statements, however, was criticised again, stating that too many signatories 
do not comply with the Stewardship Code completely. Due to the low quality of stewardship 
reports, the FRC was cautious about claiming an improvement in the quality of engagement. 
The quality of stewardship statements varies. Low quality statements exist where the 
signatures fail to provide a thorough disclosure against each principle of the Stewardship 
Code. This was raised as a concern in the FRC reviews from 2011 to 2014 and in response, in 
2016, it was announced that all the signatories’ statements were going to be assessed and 
tiered from Tier 1 (high-quality stewardship statements) to Tier 3 (low-quality stewardship 
statements). This tiering system aimed to “improve the quality of reporting against the 
Code, encouraging more transparency in the market and maintain the credibility of the 
Code” (FRC, 2015).  According to the FRC website: 
 
● Tier 1 signatories represent those “provide good quality and transparent description 
of their approach to stewardship and explanations of an alternative approach where 
necessary”.  
● Tier 2 signatories include investors who “meet many of the reporting expectations 
but report less transparently on their approach to stewardship or do not provide 
explanations where they depart from provisions of the Code”.  
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● Tier 3 included signatories whose stewardship reporting “required significant
improvement”.
The FRC stated that Tier 3 signatories who could not improve the quality of their reports 
would be removed from the signatory list in mid-2017. After this deadline, around 20 of the 
signatories of the Stewardship Code stopped implementing this guideline. And, the rest 
moved either to Tier 2 or Tier 1 stewardship statements.  The Tier 3 category has now been 
removed. 
The following figures show examples of the difference between the stewardship statements 
of Tier 1 (Brewin Dolphin) and Tier 2 (Baring Asset Management) asset managers, explaining 
how they followed the second principle of the Stewardship Code (i.e. managing the conflicts 
of interest in relation to stewardship).  
Figure 3.4 Brewin Dolphin Stewardship Statement (Tier 1) 
Figure 3.4 has been removed from this 
version of the thesis due to copyright 
restrictions
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The above figure illustrates that Brewin Dolphin fully explained how they manage conflicts 
of interest, by providing examples of conflict of interest situations that they previously 
faced, as well as details of their policy.  On the other hand, Figure 3.5 shows that Baring has 
provided a general explanation of how they manage conflicts of interest when managing 
their clients' funds.  
Figure 3.5 Baring Asset Management Stewardship Statement (Tier 2) 
Based on the FRC (2018) signatories should avoid a box-ticking approach when applying the 
Stewardship Code. More importantly, this report addressed the change in the UK 
investment market where listed equities are no longer the main investment for many 
investors. The FRC is aware of the growing recognition of the importance of responsible 
investment, specifically around the environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues which 
cannot only improve financial performance but grant a more sustainable financial system. 
To address these points, the FRC issued a revised Stewardship Code for consultation on 30 
January 2019, which was subsequently published in January 2020.  In contrast to the 2012 
version, the 2020 Stewardship Code uses different guidance for asset owners, asset 
managers, proxy advisors and investment consultants while emphasising the stewardship 
responsibilities of all key actors. Furthermore, it aims to recognise that stewardship is not 
only the engagement between asset managers and companies to improve corporate 
performance, but it also involves the responsible management of assets which would 
Figure 3.5 has been removed from this 





improve long-term financial returns for asset managers, asset owners, and ultimate 
beneficiaries.  Whilst the 2020 Stewardship Code is discussed here it is important to note 
that this was published after the completion of this PhD research, consequently this 
research focuses on the 2012 Code.  
  
In conclusion, the main focus of the FRC reviews was on the quality of stewardship 
statements. This resulted in developing the tiering system where the investors categorised 
into Tier 1, 2 and 3, based on the quality of their stewardship statements. In all of the FRC 
reviews, more engagement between signatories of the Stewardship Code and companies 
was highlighted. Despite this, considering low-quality stewardship statements, the FRC 
could not translate the increase in the number of engagements into a better quality 
engagement. The first finding after reviewing the FRC reports was that the Stewardship 
Code has been successful in attracting a significant number of signatories to sign up to this 
guideline. The second finding was that the FRC raised concern over the quality of 
stewardship statements in all of its reviews, making it hard to believe that application of the 
Stewardship Code could enhance the quality of engagement between investors and 
companies.  
 
The FRC’s review to explore the success of the Stewardship Code is a useful source of 
information, however it should be noted that the FRC, as a responsible body which 
developed this guideline could be biased in its review. Furthermore, the process of the FRC’s 
selection of individuals who were surveyed about the Stewardship Code is not clearly 
explained in the reviews. This would make it difficult to validate the reviews’ findings. 
Therefore, it is essential to look at some independent resources before concluding the 
success or failure of the Stewardship Code. The next section summarises the existing 
academic studies which investigated this. 
3.2.2 Academic Perspectives on the Stewardship Code 
Arsalidou (2012) noted that since the publication of the Stewardship Code in 2010, many 
investors have welcomed this development and more than 282 asset managers, asset 
owners and service providers have signed up to the Stewardship Code. The supporters of 
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the Stewardship Code believe that it will bring the so-called “ownerless” corporation to the 
top of the agenda, promoting active owner participation. Only a small number of key studies 
were found which investigated the Stewardship Code. The following table summarises the 
most relevant papers which are published in CG, Law and Accounting journals.  
Table 3.1 Summary of Key Academic Reviews of the Stewardship Code in chronological order 
Author(s) Aim Findings 
Cheffins (2010) Determine the impact of the Stewardship Code 
on passive behaviour of shareholders. 
Doubted any significant transformation in the 
engagement behaviour of institutional investors through 
the application of the Code.  
Roach (2011) Explore the origin and scope of the 
Stewardship Code as well as discussing its 
content. 
Despite recognition of the Stewardship Code as an 
important guideline, the author doubted a significant 
impact from its application on shareholder engagement. 
Arsalidou (2012) Exploring whether the publication of the Code 
helps to develop a systematic and continuous 
relationship between institutional shareholders 
and managers. 
Doubted the success of the Stewardship Code to achieve 
its proposed aims, specifically to enhance the quality of 
engagement between investors and companies. 
Tilba and McNulty 
(2013) 
Investigate how the practice of pension fund 
management informs the ownership behaviour 
of pension funds regarding investee 
corporations. 
 Raised concern over the success of the Stewardship 
Code to achieve its proposed aims. 
Micheler (2013) Examines the idea that the creation of an 
online review facility where all market 
participants are able to review and rate all 
companies listed in a particular market would 
encourage better engagement from the 
shareholders. 
Institutional investors cannot fully commit to the 
Stewardship Code, affecting the success of the 
Stewardship Code in enhancing the engagement between 
shareholders and their investee corporates. 
Sergakis (2013) This paper aims to analyse the benefits of the 
Stewardship Code and to address remaining 
problematic issues. The author proposes that 
the findings of this study will help the UK 
regulatory framework achieve optimal impact 
on the market. 
Doubted an effective practice of stewardship 
responsibilities by institutional investors due to the 
structure of the investment chain. It is not practical for all 
market participants to exercise stewardship due to the 
considerable distance between investee corporates and 
investors.  
Reisberg (2015) Explore the success or failure of the 
Stewardship Code by reconsidering arguments 
about the conceptual problems with this Code 
(i.e. how it is drafted and upon what it 
focuses). 
Stewardship Code has achieved very little of its proposed 
objectives since the publication. The author doubted the 
effectiveness of the Code to enhance the quality of 
engagement, changing the attitude of companies 
towards their investors as well as helping the investors to 
provide a high-quality stewardship statement.  
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Lu et al. (2018) Examined whether compliance by institutional 
investors with UK Stewardship Code is related 
to the 
earnings quality of their investee companies. 
The authors did not find any direct effect between Code 
compliance and earnings quality. Based on their findings, 
this study proposed that the Stewardship Code in its 
current form is unlikely to have a significant impact on 
institutional investors’ CG. 
Very shortly after the publication of the Code in 2010, Cheffins (2010) tried to find the 
answer for the following question: “Will the launch of the Stewardship Code disrupt the 
traditional pattern of passivity and foster substantial shareholder involvement in UK 
corporate governance?”.  Cheffins (2010) argued that any significant transformation in the 
engagement behaviour of institutional investors through the application of the Stewardship 
Code is unlikely. The author described the factors that discourage institutional shareholders 
from engaging in activism including a lack of expertise by shareholders, preference of asset 
managers to act as traders rather than owners to retain the value for their clients and the 
free-rider problem where passive shareholders receive the same returns as active 
shareholders. Cheffins stated that the publication of the Stewardship Code suggested by the 
Walker Review could reduce the power of these factors and encourage activism among 
institutional investors. On the other hand, he explained that the share ownership of UK 
publicly funded companies is a major obstacle to achieve this goal. Cheffins (2010) argued 
that over the past 20 years, there had been a change in ownership from UK-based fund 
managers, pension funds and insurance companies to foreign shareholders. This is 
problematic for the Stewardship Code as foreign shareholders are not its primary intended 
audience. In addition to the above conclusion, the author emphasised that previous studies 
failed to find a significant relationship between shareholder activism and improvement in 
the long-term operating performance of their investee corporates. 
Moreover, during the financial crisis, institutional investors were part of the problem by 
being “relaxed” when the banks used leverage to generate high returns for them, placing 
short term gains ahead of long-term sustainability and stability. Therefore, policymakers 
should not assume that shareholder activism is necessarily a good thing, suggesting 
arguments against a change from a voluntary approach to mandatory regulation to increase 
shareholder activism. It is notable that Cheffin’s study was conducted very shortly after the 
publication of the Stewardship Code in 2010. Therefore, the author could not explore the 




conclusion, he reviewedCG developments in the UK by referring to the published reports 
(e.g. Cadbury Report, Hampel Report and Combined Code). Then, Cheffin examined the 
potential impact of the Stewardship Code by reviewing the existing resources including 
reports by relevant associations such as NAPF (2009), IMA (2009), ISC (2009) and FRC 
(2010).   
In line with Cheffins (2010), Arsalidou (2012) also doubted the success of the Stewardship 
Code to achieve its proposed aims, specifically to enhance the quality of engagement 
between investors and companies. The first issue mentioned is that the Stewardship Code 
included short-term institutional investors as part of the solution to improve engagement, 
whereas they were part of the problem during the financial crisis. Then, it is argued that in a 
perfect world, institutional investors would engage effectively with management, but in 
reality, managers and shareholders in large companies exist separately. In addition, 
Arsalidou doubted whether institutional investors are interested in having a conversation 
with management. Investors believe that the Board are the true stewards of the company 
and shareholders do not have the knowledge or interest to direct investee companies’ 
matters. Also, opportunity costs discourage investors from gathering information for 
monitoring management, and it is not clear whether the benefit of monitoring is greater 
than its associated costs. More importantly, he proposed that stewardship is not a priority 
for the investors, and pressure to sign up for the Stewardship Code may result in a “box-
ticking” exercise rather than encouraging more efficient stewards. The box-ticking approach 
was also raised as a concern by FRC (2014), as aforementioned, as it received reports that 
accused proxy advisors of following “box-ticking” without any effective corporate 
engagement.  
Furthermore, Arsalidou (2012) argued that firms do not use the comply or explain model 
effectively to adjust their governance to changing circumstances and instead focus simply 
on the choice of whether or not to comply. Finally, Arsalidou (2012) argued that the 
domestic focus of the Stewardship Code is a major limitation given the increase in the 
number of foreign investors. It is notable that the FRC recognised that this issue would 
create a challenge for enhancing the engagement of investors through the application of the 
Stewardship Code. Lack of expertise, cost of engagement and domestic focus of the 
Stewardship Code were also raised by Cheffins (2010) as reasons that could lead to the 




Arsalidou (2012) was the proposition that the UK CG Code reduces the importance of the 
Stewardship Code as it provides more practical approaches for the investors’ engagement. 
For example, to enhance the accountability of directors, UK CG Code recommends that all 
directors of FTSE 350 companies should face annual re-election. Arsalidou (2012) explained 
the annual re-election makes the directors vulnerable to shareholder dissatisfaction and 
forces companies to listen to shareholders. This method is considered as a practical and 
useful alternative to the stewardship duties presented by the Stewardship Code. In addition, 
the latest version of the CG Code (2018) emphasised the establishment of effective 
engagement between the Board of Directors and shareholders. To support this principle, the 
CG Code stated that if the Board receives a significant level (20% or more) of votes against 
its resolution, the company should explain how it will consult shareholders to address their 
concerns, as well as providing a summary of this event in its annual report. Finally, Arsalidou 
(2012) argued that there are more logical alternatives to company democracy and investor 
engagement than the generalist duties of the Stewardship Code. The recognition of two-tier 
share ownership with greater voting rights given to longstanding institutional investors, the 
improvement of shareholder remedies and the annual re-election of all directors of FTSE 
350 companies as recommended by the UK CG Code 2010, are some possible alternatives. 
In agreement with Cheffins (2010), Arsalidou also provided a discussion around the 
effectiveness of the Stewardship Code using the existing evidence. This article was published 
in 2012, enabling the author to bring more insight into the debate by reviewing the 
stewardship statements and including the opinions of the signatories of the Stewardship 
Code.  
In line with these studies, Tilba and McNulty (2013) also raised concern over the success of 
the Stewardship Code to achieve its proposed aims, albeit that the main focus of this study 
was not exploring the Stewardship Code per se but to investigate how the practice of 
pension fund management informs the ownership behaviour of pension funds regarding 
investee corporations. After conducting interviews with pension fund trustees, executives, 
investment officers and financial intermediaries, together with documentary analysis and 
observations of four fund investment meetings, Tilba and McNulty found a significant gap 
between the expectations of the Stewardship Code and the actual exercise of stewardship 
responsibilities by pension funds.  They found that pension funds do not act as effective 




finding is in line with Arsalidou (2012) and Cheffins (2010) who included lack of expertise as 
a barrier towards the success of the Stewardship Code. Moreover, Tilba and McNulty (2013) 
proposed that pension funds operate at a distance to their corporates, motivating them to 
build a stronger, closer relationship with their asset managers instead of the corporates. 
This finding indicated that in contrast to the expectation of the FRC, the majority of pension 
funds would not be able, or motivated, to comply with the guidelines of the Stewardship 
Code. Tilba and McNulty (2013) suggested that to increase engagement of pension funds in 
investee corporates and comply with the guidelines, policymakers should consider the 
relationship between pension funds and other agents as well as complexity within the 
investment chain.  
Micheler (2013) proposed findings in line with these studies, but also raised the issue of the 
lack of a monitoring body to evaluate investor commitment to responsible engagement. 
Micheler (2013) also found the ‘comply or explain’ approach ineffective to illustrate the full 
commitment of the signatories, suggesting setting up an internet-based review and rating 
system to facilitate shareholder engagement instead.  
More recently, Reisberg (2015) proposed that the Stewardship Code has achieved very little 
of its proposed objectives since publication. It was criticised for being an ineffective CG tool 
due to its lack of enforceability, triviality, its non-progressive nature, and unresponsiveness. 
Reisberg also questioned the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code to enhance the quality 
of engagement, changing the attitude of companies towards their investors as well as 
helping investors to provide high-quality stewardship statements. The author argued that 
despite the positive reports of the FRC’s reviews, the Stewardship Code has not been 
successful in enhancing the quality of engagement between investors and companies and 
consequently challenged the quality of the stewardship activities by the signatories on two 
counts. Firstly, that compliance of institutional investors could be based on a fear of the 
alternative representing a “regulation-based approach which is seen as carrying with it the 
loss of rights” (p.7), and secondly, that criticism had been deflected because signing up to 
the Stewardship Code was seen as a trendy activity. Consequently, the evidence that this 
guideline has been successful in attracting a significant number of signatories (300 as of 
October 2013), did not demonstrate commitment of signatories to the principles of the 
Code per se. Furthermore, Reisberge proposed that the Stewardship Code has not changed 




investors felt that their investee corporates did not take engagement seriously. In line with 
this, FRC (2011) found mixed results with some companies following a more active approach 
to engage with their major shareholders, others were found less responsive towards 
shareholder votes. Reisberg (2015) concluded that the Stewardship Code did not have a 
positive impact on the quality of disclosures made by institutional investors. FRC (2013) had, 
however, admitted that many statements provided little insight into stewardship practices. 
Reisberg (2015) blamed the limitation of the comply or explain approach.  This  does not 
allow investors to reflect on their true engagement activities, as some signatories follow a 
box-ticking approach, which negatively affects the quality of stewardship statements. 
Reisberg (2015) proposed that although, in theory, it is sensible for investors to engage in 
investee corporates to enhance performance, in reality, investors are more likely to sell 
their under-performance shares instead of exercising stewardship responsibilities. According 
to Reisberge (2015), the Stewardship Code has not been successful in encouraging investors 
to actively engage in their investee corporates. The following reasons were given to explain 
the failure of the Stewardship Code: 
 
●  After the financial crisis, the FRC rushed to publish the Stewardship Code and 
included the principles without testing them first, to be seen to be doing something. 
●  A lack of a clear definition of stewardship confused the signatories about what is 
expected from them. This issue should have been addressed in the 2012 revisions 
but the FRC has missed this chance to develop thoughtful principles that could 
change shareholder behaviour in the long run. 
● Shareholders do not have enough incentive to act as stewards in investee 
corporates. According to Reisberg (2015), the engagement costs and difficulties of 
determining the value and outcome of engagement initially demotivates 
shareholders to engage. To further explain this factor, he argued that within the 
diverse and modern UK share ownership structure, agents hold shares for the 
benefit of owners who are not considered in the Stewardship Code.  
● In line with the previous articles, Reisberg highlighted that the Stewardship Code 
overlooked non-UK investors, despite being regarded as a dominant UK shareholder 
group.  He emphasised that the need for foreign investors to buy into a Stewardship 





In summary, all the academics that exclusively investigated the Stewardship Code doubted 
its success in achieving the proposed aims, including enhancing the quality of engagement 
between investors and companies. The most cited reasons included a lack of shareholder 
incentive to engage in investee corporates due to engagement cost, the free-rider problem 
and the unknown outcome of the engagement. These studies collectively argued that 
publication of the Stewardship Code could not resolve these issues. Moreover, existing 
studies criticised the Stewardship Code for not considering the shift in the ownership 
pattern from domestic to foreign investors. Therefore, the existing studies concluded that 
transforming the passive behaviour of shareholders by applying the Stewardship Code is not 
very likely.  
It is notable that all of the above studies applied existing arguments and evidence to find the 
significant obstacles leading to failure of the Stewardship Code in achieving its proposed 
aims. Therefore, these findings are not driven based on the stewardship activities or the 
opinions of the signatories of the Stewardship Code. One reason behind this approach could 
be the age of the Stewardship Code, being a relatively young guideline. Hence the previous 
studies did not have access to adequate evidence, such as the stewardship statements, to 
form sound conclusions. Given it is now 10 years after the publication of the Stewardship 
Code it is crucial to determine its success to enhance the quality of engagement between 
investors and companies. Although the FRC sounded positive in its reviews and believed 
that the Stewardship Code is going in the right direction, academics have doubted its 
effectiveness. Therefore, this PhD study aims to close the existing research gap by 
investigating the stewardship activities of the signatories through a review of stewardship 
statements and seeking the opinion of signatories in the determination of the impact of 
applying the Stewardship Code for asset managers as the main signatories of this guideline. 
3.3 Theoretical Review 
The range of definitions existing to describe CG illustrates the scale and scope of published 
papers, which has grown considerably over the years since the 1990s. Academic journals are 
applying CG related topics across a range of fields including economics, accounting, law and 
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management. Despite this growth, existing papers have failed to propose a widely accepted 
theory that would help to explain the mechanism of CG and how they work.  The following 
sections outline the main theories used to explain the role of shareholders within CG. These 
are agency theory, transaction cost economics, stakeholder theory (including enlightened 
stakeholder theory) and stewardship theory.   
3.3.1 Agency theory 
In the UK and USA, shareholders provide capital to allow a business to develop and, 
therefore, collectively own its assets while transferring the duty of running the company to 
managers and other employees within the business. Therefore, the market structure leads 
to a separation between ownership and control.  Solomon (2013) argued that this can lead 
managers to make decisions that may not be in the best interests of shareholders, as the 
agent-principal relationship provides an opportunity for the managers to misuse their power 
and take inappropriate risks. The figure 3.6 illustrates this relationship. 
Figure 3.6 Agent-Principal Relationship
Mallin (2010) recognised that agent-principal relationships can also be negatively affected 
by information asymmetry. Although shareholders own companies, directors have access to 
more information since they are involved in the day-to-day running of the business, leaving 




managers (agents) can result in agency problems (Mallin, 2010) raising the question of “How 
can shareholders ensure that managers will act only in their interests?” Since the mid-19th 
century and after growing in the number and diversity of shareholders, the agency problem 
has increased in complexity.  Agency theory has been applied to explain how CG 
mechanisms can help overcome agency problems (Eisenhardt, 1989). This theory assumes 
that a manager’s interest is to maximise their own benefit while ignoring the shareholder 
interests. The main reason behind this self-interest behaviour is that managers are not the 
owner of the business, which could demotivate them to deliver their responsibilities 
efficiently (Carney et al., 2011). An example of such behaviour can be found in the Lehman 
Brothers scandal. Lehman was a 158 years old firm which filed for bankruptcy in 2008 after 
losing most of its clients, dramatic losses in its stock and lack of liquid assets. A major reason 
behind the collapse of Lehmans related to the agency problem as executives followed their 
own interests rather than shareholders (Kim, 2016). Among the factors that led to this 
failure was that executives did not own a considerable number of shares and they were 
offered inappropriate executive pay arrangements, encouraging them to make high-risk 
decisions that would primarily benefit themselves (Kim, 2016). Bebchuk et al. (2010) 
investigated executive compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and estimated 
that the top five executive teams at Lehman earned a total amount of $1 billion during the 
2000-2008, which was significantly higher during this period and excessive compared to 
shareholder returns. This finding indicates that managers should not be assumed to act 
according to shareholder interests, and their decision making may only benefit themselves 
rather than the owners of companies. Hence, it is important to monitor managers as well as 
implementing a relevant payment system to prevent such a crisis in the future. 
Proponents of agency theory view shareholders as an important CG mechanism to reduce 
agency problems by closely monitoring manager actions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990). This increases accountability, helping managers to align their 
interests with shareholders (Burkart et al., 1997; Mallin, 2010).  Shareholders incur 
monitoring costs (i.e. time and money) which include the cost of monitoring, costs of 
evaluating managerial performance (Panda & Leepsa, 2017), the cost of appointing and 
maintaining Boards, the cost of recruiting executives and the cost of training them. 
Monitoring costs are initially incurred by shareholders, but later on, managers should pay 




costs act as a barrier to monitoring. Institutional investors, however, as the major 
shareholders are expected to have the incentive to monitor investee corporates to protect 
and enhance the value of their investments (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
Solomon (2013) recognised direct monitoring methods which can be practised by 
shareholders. The first direct monitoring method is exercising voting rights at AGMs. 
According to Solomon (2013), voting rights are valuable financial assets for shareholders, 
helping them to influence investee corporates, such as voting on the composition of the 
Board of Directors. Shareholders can also directly monitor managers through the takeover 
mechanism. Solomon explained that the threat of takeover when the shareholders are not 
happy with a management structure is a powerful tool to control managers since they do 
not want to lose their jobs. Another monitoring method is through one-to-one meetings 
between the investors’ representative and a manager. Solomon (2013) proposed that such 
meetings have become more popular among shareholders, helping them to influence 
investee corporates significantly. Alternatively, shareholders can encourage the alignment 
of interest through bonding, for example by imposing incentive schemes via remuneration 
contracts and debt covenants. Finally, Solomon (2013) added that if monitoring mechanisms 
do not effectively control managers to increase their accountability, the government needs 
to intervene by producing regulation or formal guidance. The example of such intervention 
can be found in several voluntary codes of practice and policy documents in the UK (e.g. 
Cadbury Code and Greenbury Code). 
Agency theory has been widely applied by CG researchers, specifically, those that 
investigate shareholder activism (Faccio & Lasfer, 2000; Gillan & Starks, 2003; Judge et al., 
2010). Gillan and Starks (2003), for example, explored the role of institutional investors in 
financial markets and the CG of investee corporates by reviewing academic papers. They 
proposed that institutional investors play a central role in encouraging change in many CG 
systems, such as encouraging Board independence. The authors illustrated the difficulty in 
measuring the effectiveness of shareholder activism as most engagement occurs behind the 
scene. They concluded that empirical evidence of the influence of shareholder activism is 
diverse. Although studies have found some change in real activities of investee corporates, 
they found it difficult to confirm a causal relationship between shareholder activism and 




Judge et al. (2010) applied agency theory to further explore motivations behind 
shareholders activism, categorised into financial motivation and social motivation. Socially 
motivated reasons for engagement included shareholder concerns over the natural 
environment and employee welfare. Financial motivation involves shareholders concern for 
management decision making, dividend payments or remuneration policies. Judge et al. 
(2010) used agency theory to explain financial motivation of shareholder activism across six 
economies (Australia, Germany, Japan, South Korea, UK, USA). They predicted that prior 
profitability of investee corporates would be negatively related to financially driven 
shareholder activism. In other words, when the investee corporates are profitable, 
shareholders are less financially motivated to engage in investee corporates. They proposed 
that firms with more concentrated ownership are less likely to be associated with financially 
driven activism as concentrated ownership would motivate and enable close monitoring of 
managers due to the ability of institutional investors to bear activism costs compared to 
individual investors. In line with their predictions, their findings indicated that agency theory 
fitted sufficiently to explain the financial motivation behind shareholder activism. 
Hendry et al. (2007) conducted a series of in-depth interviews with UK asset managers to 
explore institutional investor engagement. Although they did not directly apply agency, they 
found evidence suggesting that shareholder monitoring will help to align the interests of 
owners with managers. One of their participants stated that: 
 
“When executives know that they have a few large shareholders who are constantly 
monitoring their moves, they will be very careful” (Hendry et al., 2007, p.232). 
 
Agency theory remains a relevant theory to explain the mechanisms of CG. Rashid (2015), 
for example, examined the influence of Board independence on firm agency cost among 
listed firms in Bangladesh. This study included agency costs as the dependent variable and 
Board independence, Board size, frequency of Board meetings and, CEO duality, as the 
independent variable. The results indicated that the Board appointed by institutional 
investors to monitor managers can play an important role to control management actions, 
reduce agency costs and add shareholder value. After revisiting agency theory, Rashid 
(2015) concluded that agency theory is still valid to explain the role of outside independent 




In line with Rashid, Yegon et al. (2014) found a positive influence from CG mechanisms on 
reducing agency costs of service firms listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange during the 
period 2008-2012. Agency costs were considered the dependent variable, measured by the 
asset utilisation ratio (i.e. total revenue divided by total assets), with various explanatory 
governance variables, such as director ownership, external ownership, and institutional 
ownership, as independent variables. According to Yegon et al. (2014), higher institutional 
ownership reduced agency costs, and that institutional investors have helped investee 
corporates to make optimal and productive investment decisions.  
On the other hand, Tilba and McNulty (2013) found little evidence to support agency theory. 
These authors explored the ownership behaviour of pension funds using in-depth semi-
structured interviews with pension fund trustees, executives, investment offices and 
financial intermediaries, and observations of four fund investment meetings and document 
analysis, making their findings valid and reliable. They proposed that pension funds do not 
consider themselves as principals to actively engage in investee corporates. In fact, the vast 
majority of their participants acted at a distance from investee corporates and followed 
“exit” ownership behaviours, whereby investors divest if dissatisfied with management 
performance. Only a small number of well-resourced pension fund managers were actively 
engaged in investee corporates. Tilba and McNulty (2013) suggested a complex relationship 
within the investment chain of pension funds as one of the reasons behind the adoption of  
“exit behaviour” as pension funds often rely on external experts to manage their 
investments, making them more likely to emphasise share performance over sound CG. 
Consequently, within the investment chain, the primary role of trustees is to decide on 
investment strategy, which is transferred to external experts, including investment 
consultants and fund managers. Nevertheless, the trustees remain accountable for poor 
investment strategies. Although external experts are a very powerful part of the investment 
chain, they hold little responsibility for the outcomes of the actions they followed on behalf 
of the trustees. The authors proposed that in practice, the main interests of trustees are to 
enhance the performance of their investment portfolio in general, regardless of the 
performance of individual shares. Consequently, multiple actors within the investment chain 
reduce the explanatory power of agency theory with regards to the ownership behaviour of 




Davis (2008, 2009) and Jackson (2008), who argued that institutional investors do not act as 
responsible owners.  
Based on the above studies, agency theory has allowed the researchers to explore different 
CG mechanisms, including shareholder engagement. The popularity of agency theory is in 
part because it focuses on the relationship between shareholders and Boards, which 
removes the necessity for researchers to access the Boardroom directly, enabling research 
based on secondary publicly available data such as directors’ reports and company 
accounts. Tricker (2015) concluded that, because of the simplicity of this theory and the 
availability of reliable data, it creates a powerful approach to understand CG mechanisms. 
Consequently, many authors (e.g. Clarke & Branson, 2012; Daily et al., 2003; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Tricker, 2015) highlighted its limitations, which are presented 
as follows:  
 
● To study CG in detail, it is naive to only focus on the relationship between agents and 
principals (e.g. Tilba & McNulty, 2013). 
● Shareholders act to increase their return, with a limited role within the firm. The 
director’s role is limited to monitor managers.  
● In practice, the shareholder/director agency model is too simplistic to reflect reality. 
Institutional investors such as pension funds and hedge funds can act as traders 
rather than long-term investors perceived by agency theory. Monks and Sykes (2002) 
argued that although institutional investors are major shareholders, for many years 
they have preferred to act as absentee landlords who are not interested in engaging 
in investee corporates. They argued that this passive behaviour had caused loss of 
millions of pounds for ultimate beneficiaries of pension schemes. 
● Agency theory assumes that people are self-interested and unable to look after the 
interests of others. This is based on a questionable conjectural morality that people 
cannot be trusted and act in the interest of others. Hence, this theory considers 
managers as opportunistic and ignores their human capabilities. 
● Agency theory focuses only on a few stakeholders and treats shareholders as the 
centre of attention. Despite this, in reality, legal rules of CG rarely allow control by 
shareholders over corporate policies. Therefore, shareholders have to appoint the 
Board of Directors to monitor managers. This delegation of duties from the owners 
 101 
to directors to control decision-making of managers provides very little opportunity 
for shareholders to engage in investee corporates. 
Since the application of the agency theory by Berle and Means (1932) this theory has been 
popular among researchers. At the same time, it has been criticised for using an excessively 
narrow vision to explain CG (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Hirsch & Friedman, 1986; Nyberg et al., 
2010; Perrow, 1986). For example, in the UK, foreign investors became the major 
shareholders in UK listed companies, making the distance between owners and managers 
more considerable, negatively affecting the quantity and quality of shareholder engagement 
and its impact on reducing agency problems. Therefore, it is not clear how institutional 
investors are able, and willing, to follow an active ownership attitude to reduce the agency 
problems in investee corporates.  CG mechanisms are indeed much more complex 
compared to the 19th century when agency theory was first applied, reducing the predictive 
power of agency theory. Nevertheless, agency theory is still considered as a valid theory 
helping to simplify the governance system of companies. Specifically, this theory is helpful 
to explore institutional investors and their role within investee corporates. In addition, the 
application of agency theory has helped to develop alternative theories to address its 
shortcomings. These theories are explained in the following sections.  
3.3.2 Transaction Cost Economics Theory 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory is defined as “an interdisciplinary alliance of law, 
economics and organisation” (Williamson, 1996). Originally TCE theory aimed to explore the 
scale and scope of firms, more specifically to determine why economic activities are 
coordinated through firms rather than through market contracts (Coase, 1937; Shelanski & 
Klein, 1995).  This theory was initiated by Coase (1937), who proposed if a firm internalised 
its transactions, it could save costs. The first reason behind this argument is that 
internalisation removes risks and uncertainties about future prices and the quality of 
products. The second reason is that it helps to remove information asymmetries and 
reduces business risk and so there are economic benefits for companies to undertake 
transactions themselves (Solomon, 2013). On the other hand, as companies grow, more 




undertake the transactions externally (Coase, 1937). Based on this argument, companies 
may become less efficient as they expand. According to Tricker (2015), TCE theory focuses 
on the enforcement costs such as internal and external audit controls, having independent 
outside directors on Boards, the separation of the roles of Chairman and CEO and the 
addition of risk analysis procedures. These costs should occur to the point that the increase 
in costs equals the reduction of the potential loss from non-compliance. 
TCE theory considers managers behaviour to be characterised as “bounded rationality” 
(Solomon, 2013). This is the first assumption of this theory, indicating that human behaviour 
is limitedly rational due to the cognitive limitation of mind, lack of available time to make 
decisions and challenging problems to solve. Proponents of this theory also consider 
managers to be opportunistic by nature, at least some of the time. In line with this Mallin 
(2010) proposed that managers’ behaviour is bounded rationality since they have a 
tendency to follow personal interests rather than profit maximisation. Opportunism is the 
second assumption, which has been defined as the tendency of agents to take advantage of 
all the available opportunities to reach their own interests (Crozier, 1964). Based on these 
two assumptions, managers organise transactions in their own interest; hence, their actions 
need to be controlled.  
It was after the publication by Williamson (1975) that other empirical studies began to apply 
TCE in different disciplines including economics, sociology, organisation theory, law, 
corporate finance and marketing (e.g. Clegg et al., 1996; Granovetter, 1985; Moe 1991; 
Palay, 1984; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), through a thorough 
review of published academic studies, argued that transaction cost analysis is not very well 
integrated as studies mainly considered a governance problem as the independent variable 
and the governance mechanisms as the dependent variable in analysis. Monitoring is one 
such mechanism analysed through TCE theory (e.g. Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Parkhe, 1993; 
Stump & Heide, 1996), for example partner selection and incentives used by buyers to 
safeguard their assets (Stump & Heide, 1996). 
Despite its popularity TCE theory has been widely criticised over its assumptions of bounded 
rationality and opportunism (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Dore, 




argued that it is inconsistent to bring bounded rationality as an essential assumption in the 
analysis of contracts and governance structures, and then assume that substantively 
rational choices can be made with respect to the contracts and governance structures. Also, 
the relevance of opportunism was criticised by Foss and Klein (2010) who stated that there 
are few chances that opportunistic action can be observed, thereby reducing the reliability 
of TCE to explain CG in practice. Moreover, Ghoshal and Moran (1996), who reviewed TCE 
theory by mainly focusing on Williamson’s TCE publications (1975, 1987, 1991), argued that 
bounded rationality and opportunism are not only wrong, but dangerous assumptions for 
corporate managers to follow.  According to TCE theory, organisations exist because of their 
ability to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of humans through hierarchical controls that 
are not available in the market. By contrast, Ghoshal and Moran (1996) proposed that such 
controls are not a guarantee to resolve such issues, and instead, they could encourage 
opportunism within organisations. The authors explained that imposing hierarchical controls 
in organisations can adversely affect both the controller (i.e. manager) and the controllee 
(i.e. employee). Previous studies showed that use of such controls could lead to managerial 
distrust of employees and increase the imposition of further organisational controls 
(Galinsky et al., 2003; Kipnis, 1972). Kipnis (1972) found that managers who were given the 
power to control their employees valued the performance of the employees less and linked 
the employee’s efforts to their own control rather than the motivation of the employees. 
On the other hand, employees who were being controlled might feel that they are not being 
trusted to behave appropriately without the controls of managers. This could make the 
employees demotivated and less committed to performing their duties effectively (Arnaud 
& Chandon, 2013; Baker et al., 1988; Enzle & Anderson, 1993). Based on these arguments, 
controlling opportunistic behaviour is very difficult within the organisation even through 
hierarchical controls. This conclusion challenges the TCE theory proposition that 
organisations exist due to their ability in controlling human opportunistic behaviour. 
Ghoshal and Moran instead declared that the organisation exists in the market because 
“they are able to achieve efficiency and facilitate adaptation in different ways, following 
different institutional logics” (p.32). They argued that TCE theory is bad for practice since it 
has not recognised the purpose of organisations correctly and called for building a different 




 In conclusion, TCE is closely related to agency theory, as both are based on economic 
rationalism. Both theories present a rationale for controlling managers by the shareholder 
but mainly used different terminology. While TCE assumes people are opportunistic, agency 
theory focuses on the consequence of this opportunistic behaviour (agency cost). Likewise, 
TCE focuses on transactions to analyse CG issues, whereas agency theory places the 
emphasis on agents. Furthermore, TCE assumes that humans are self-interested and unable 
to care for the interest of others; an assumption has already been questioned and 
considered as one of the weaknesses of agency theory.  This overlap makes it difficult to find 
a considerable difference for CG studies and restricts its ability to resolve the weaknesses of 
agency theory.  
3.3.3 Stakeholder Theory 
In contrast to Agency theory, Stakeholder theory takes into account the interests of wider 
stakeholder groups affected by company decisions (Freeman, 1984). Solomon (2013) stated 
that corporate stakeholders could be defined in different ways depending on the user’s 
perspective. She included shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, 
communities near the company’s operations and the general public. Freeman (1984) is 
credited with developing stakeholder theory as a strategic theory of the firm. This theory 
assumes that managers and directors are interested in the firms’ long-term success (Mallin, 
2004). In fact, over time, managers see the company as an extension of themselves, 
encouraging them to follow optimal decisions to run a sustainably successful business 
(Clarke, 2004). Proponents of stakeholder theory suggest that companies which manage a 
broad group of stakeholders effectively and efficiently will gain benefits that are not 
available to other organisations (Freeman, 1984). According to Solomon (2013), 
accountability to all stakeholders is the only way to ensure the satisfaction of shareholder 
interests and long-term success of the company.  
The argument for being accountable to a wide range of stakeholders is based on the 
concept of legitimacy, meaning that responsible behaviour is the price demanded by society 
for the privilege of incorporation which will grant shareholders limited liability for 
companies’ debts (Tricker, 2015). In the UK, the first time that an accounting body (i.e. the 




to all stakeholders was in the Corporate Report (ASSC, 1975). This report required 
companies to voluntarily publish additional statements for stakeholders.  
During the 1980s, stakeholder theory faded away due to the growth of the free market but 
has been revived because of growing environmental and social concerns worldwide since 
the 20th century. Stakeholder theory promotes the concept of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), indicating that companies should take into account their social 
responsibilities and how their activities affect the whole community (Bird et al., 2007). 
According to the European Commission (2001), CSR is a “concept whereby companies decide 
voluntarily to contribute to a better society and a cleaner environment” (European 
Commission, 2001, p. 4). Nowadays, CSR and sustainability reports are taken more seriously 
by existing and potential clients in the financial sector (Tricker, 2015), leading to a growth in 
the number of socially responsible investors (SRI). The growth in awareness of climate 
change and global warming, has been accompanied by a movement of the SRI sector 
towards businesses that positively impact the environment by creating harmless energy 
sources or reducing emission (Medleva, 2019). According to the US Sustainable and 
Responsible Investment Forum (US SIF), a foundation for responsible investors, total 
investments in managed funds that apply SRI strategies grew to more than $22.8 trillion in 
2017, compared to $1 trillion in 1995. In the UK, during 2017 investors bought £1 billion 
pounds in active ethical funds, a 500% increase in a single year (FT, 2018). Ethical funds 
usually avoid companies that harm the society, such as not dealing in tobacco, gambling or 
armaments. The shift in public opinion towards the stakeholder approach is also evident in 
the current versions of CG Guidelines:  
“Companies do not exist in isolation. Successful and sustainable businesses underpin our 
economy and society by providing employment and creating prosperity. To succeed in the 
long-term, directors and the companies they lead need to build and maintain successful 
relationships with a wide range of stakeholders” (FRC, 2018, p.1)  
Donaldson and Preston (1995) examined the underlying arguments behind stakeholder 
theory following three different approaches, including the descriptive, instrumental 
justification and normative validity. First, the author proposed that the stakeholder theory is 




theory has been used by academics to describe different CG mechanisms, management 
styles and how Board members think about the interests of corporate constituencies 
(Harjoto et al., 2015; Reynolds et al., 2006; Wang & Dewhirst, 1992). Second, stakeholder 
theory has been applied by many CSR studies to identify the relationship between 
stakeholder management and the achievements of traditional corporate objectives such as 
profitability (e.g. Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Li et al., 2018; Theodoulidis et al., 2017; Preston & 
Sapienza, 1990). These studies concluded that following stakeholder thinking would help 
companies to achieve better results compared to other corporates. For example, Kotter and 
Heskett (1992) stated that highly successful companies such as Hewlett Packard, Wal-Mart, 
and Dayton Hudson all shared a stakeholder perspective. Third, under the normative 
approach, the theory was applied by academics to interpret the function of corporations 
such as identifying the moral behind operation and management of corporations (e.g. 
Deegan, 2002; Durden, 2008; Moir, 2001; Nowak, 2015). For example, Durden (2008) 
followed a normative approach to investigate the measurement and monitoring of CSR 
within the management control system (MCS) of a case study. He defined the MCS as 
“processes by which managers influence other members of the organisation to implement 
the organisation’s strategies” (Durden, 2008, p.689). The MCS did not measure or monitor 
social responsibility but applying stakeholder theory helped to explore the link between 
stakeholders, social responsibility and the MCS.  
Stakeholder theory has gone beyond acknowledging stakeholders to the belief that 
following a stakeholder philosophy by managers will lead to better corporate performance. 
By contrast, Donaldson and Preston (1995) proposed that although such a declaration is 
widely believed, it is not enough to be used to justify this theory, which should have 
business ethics at its core.  
One of the challenges of applying stakeholder theory is for Boards to balance the interests 
of diverse stakeholder groups. While there is a potential conflict of interests within different 
stakeholders, meeting their needs simultaneously is not always achievable (Tricker, 2015). In 
line with this argument, Sternberg argued that it is not possible to maximise the interest of 
all stakeholders at once and that it is not clear who should establish the interest of each 
shareholder group: management or the stakeholders themselves. Sternberg (2000), a critic 
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of stakeholder theory, proposed that to overcome the potential conflicts of interest 
between different stakeholders, Boards should have sole responsibility to their 
shareholders. In addition, compared to shareholders, most of the stakeholders, such as 
creditors and suppliers, are restricted to engage and influence the governance of 
corporates. Hence, they have limited power to protect their investments and make sure that 
their interests are being followed by managers. For example, Carney et al. (2011) found 
visible engagement restrictions on suppliers of venture capital, which exposed the suppliers 
of capital to considerable risk since they have to rely on managers’ decision making to 
receive their return. This might affect the practicality of stakeholder theory, where there is 
an emphasis on the interests of all stakeholder groups without paying attention to their 
power and influence on corporates.  
Power and influence were specifically addressed by Mitchell et al., (1997). They recognised 
the main weakness of this theory (i.e. the degree to which managers should give priority to 
different groups of stakeholders) by proposing a theory of stakeholder salience. They 
proposed three attributes that are fundamental in the recognition of a stakeholder: power, 
legitimacy and urgency. Firstly, the stakeholder’s power to influence the firm’s behaviour. It 
should be noted that power alone does not warrant high levels of salience in the 
stakeholder-manager relationship as it may be latent and therefore can be ignored.  
Secondly, the legitimacy of the stakeholder’s relationship with the firm i.e. the right to have 
their interests considered. The final attribute of the salience theory is urgency, meaning the 
degree to which stakeholders’ claims call for immediate attention. The authors proposed 
that the greater the number of attributes, the greater salience and the more resources and 
attention management should grant to attending to stakeholders’ needs. Figure 3.5 depicts 
how management should balance stakeholder needs according to the degree of salience. 
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Figure 3.5 Stakeholder Groups 
Source: Mitchell et al. (1997) 
Definitive stakeholders exhibit all three attributes and are considered as having the highest 
level of salience. Hence, Definitive stakeholders are considered an important CG 
mechanism, as they have power to be listened to, an urgent issue to address and the 
legitimacy to have their claims answered. In contrast, Dormant, Demanding and 
Discretionary stakeholders represent those with only one attribute, making them less 
important to management. Meanwhile, managers should be aware that these stakeholders 
can become more salience by achieving other attributes. In conclusion, Mitchell et al. (1997) 
proposed that stakeholder theory should incorporate these three attributes to make a 
dynamic and comprehensive model, helping to maximise firm value.  
Figure 3.5 has been removed from this 






In summary, stakeholder theory has played an important role in the studies in the 
management field. In contrast to agency theory, which mainly focuses on the shareholders, 
this theory has addressed a wide group of stakeholders, promoting accountability of 
managers and helping them to build a more sustainable business. On the other hand, this 
theory failed to provide a clear guideline for management. Even the definition of 
stakeholders is not very clear, so the managers do not exactly know who should be included 
as a stakeholder in their company. For example, radical deep green ecologists suggest that 
the environment, animal species and future generations should be included as stakeholders 
(Solomon, 2013). In addition, the extent to which the managers should be accountable to 
the stakeholders is not very clear. These weaknesses could encourage managers to adopt 
opportunistic behaviour (being accountable to everyone means being accountable to no 
one?), hence increasing agency problems. These weaknesses of stakeholder theory lead to 
the conclusion that Stakeholder theory does not provide the best explanation of CG, nor 
does it help to resolve the main CGI problem (i.e. agency problem), but it does provide a 
lens for both long-term performance and the impact of CG on a wider range of corporate 
actors. Following stakeholder theory would make managers aware of all the stakeholders’ 
interests, even if it does not provide clear guidance on how to meet those interests. To 
address the shortcomings of the Stakeholder Theory, the Enlightened Stakeholder theory 
was proposed, which is explained in the next section. 
3.3.4 Enlightened Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theorists purport that managers should take into account the interests of all 
stakeholders in a firm. Solomon (2013) believes that it is more likely that businesses which 
create value for stakeholders will also create financial value for shareholders, so ignoring 
the interests of stakeholders can lower financial performance and even result in corporate 
failure. Furthermore, Solomon concluded that empirical evidence demonstrates that by 
taking account of stakeholder interests as well as shareholder interests, companies can 
achieve long-term profit maximisation and consequently shareholder wealth maximisation. 
Jensen (2001), however, argued that stakeholder theorists did not determine how managers 




Jensen (2001), the stakeholder theory requires managers to serve “many masters” whose 
interests could conflict with each other. The stated issue could make managers 
unaccountable for their actions as they become accountable to everyone and therefore to 
no one. Jensen proposes that following stakeholder theory is unlikely to help the managers 
to maximise the value of corporates since this approach does not provide a specific 
objective function for them. Without a specific objective function, managers’ performance 
cannot be evaluated, allowing them to use corporate resources to pursue their own 
interests. Consequently, Jensen (2001) believed that the application of stakeholder theory 
could increase agency costs in the economic system.  
It is notable that the findings of Mitchell et al. (1997) were not addressed by Jensen (2001) 
when he criticised stakeholder theory. Instead, Jensen tried to resolve the weaknesses of 
stakeholder theory by developing a new Enlightened Stakeholder theory. Jensen (2001) 
employed the structure of stakeholder theory but considers the maximisation of the firm’s 
long-term value when prioritising between interests of stakeholders. Therefore, the 
Enlightened Stakeholder theory was able to overcome the problem of conflict of interest 
that relates to the Stakeholder theory by introducing a specific objective function for 
managers. Jensen (2001) argued that providing an objective function for managers would 
also make them more accountable since their performance can be evaluated against this. 
Introduction of the Enlightened Stakeholders theory has been very appealing for academics, 
but it has not been subjected to much empirical evaluation. Sanda et al. (2005) proposed 
two reasons for the lack of application of this theory. The first reason is the growth of 
externalities and monopolies. These reasons were addressed by Jensen (2001): if 
externalities and monopoly exist, increasing the firm value does not result in maximising 
social welfare. He further explained that externalities exist when the decision-maker does 
not bear the full cost or benefit as a result of his/her decision (e.g. water and air pollution). 
The second reason is the difficulty in measuring long-term corporate value, which was 
proposed by the theory as the main objective of firms.  
Bird et al. (2007) applied the Enlightened Stakeholder theory to study the relationship 
between the companies’ CSR activities, both positive and negative, and their equity 
performance. First, the authors proposed that investment in some CSR activities could help 




objective of the Enlightened Stakeholder Theory. They provided three examples of such 
activities, helping to increase the value for companies. For example, investing in activities 
that result in a good corporate reputation would increase profitability and market value in 
the long-term. Improving the quality of the product or making a donation towards medical 
research are good examples of such activities. After running a regression analysis between 
the dependent variable (equity performance) and the independent variables (CSR activities), 
they found that companies who consider a wider group of stakeholder interests will benefit 
compared to those that failed to meet regulatory expectations and social norms. The 
Enlightened Stakeholder theory has also been applied in the management discipline (e.g. 
Agle et al., 2008; Benson & Davidson, 2010; Laplume et al., 2008). For example, Benson and 
Davidson (2010) explored the relationship between firm value, stakeholder management 
and compensation. They found a positive relationship between the management of 
stakeholder relations and firm value, indicating that managers were directed to follow the 
social welfare of their stakeholders. In line with the Enlightened Stakeholder theory, they 
found that firms’ ultimate goal is to maximise their value. In addition, they found that 
managers have been compensated based on this goal, which motivates goal congruence (i.e. 
value maximisation). 
 
Businesses are beginning to realise they cannot operate in isolation and need to consider a 
broader group of stakeholders as well as considering shareholders. According to Solomon 
(2013), compared to other CG theories, stakeholder theory, or enlightened stakeholder 
theory, is attracting more attention among academics, the business community and 
policymakers. In fact, directors have been encouraged to include wider groups of 
stakeholders by statutory requirements such as UK companies Act (2006) as well as CG 
guidelines such as UK CG Code (FRC, 2018):  
 
“The Board should understand the views of the company’s other key stakeholders and 
describe in the annual report how their interests and the matters set out in section 172 of 
the Companies Act 2006 have been considered in board discussions and decision-making” 
(FRC, 2018, p.5). 
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Like other theories, Enlightened Stakeholder theory has some criticisms. The critics of this 
theory believe that it continues to make shareholders the centre of attention for companies 
and their managers. Satisfying the interests of stakeholders achieve by sacrificing the value 
maximisation for shareholders. Therefore, although managers should act in the best 
interests of all stakeholders, the ultimate result mainly benefits shareholders (Andreadakis, 
2012). On the other hand, managers are presented as the main mechanism to maximise the 
value of companies, however, a lack of cognitive resources available to humans as well as 
bounded rationality of some managers raises the question over the practicality of this 
theory (Bolton & Faure-Grimaud, 2010). Furthermore, as with Stakeholder theory, the 
Enlightened Stakeholder theory has failed to clearly direct managers on how to fulfil all 
stakeholder interest to maximise firm value. Lack of clear guidelines would make it difficult 
to evaluate the managers and can make managers unaccountable for their action 
(Andreadakis, 2012). 
In conclusion the Enlightened stakeholder theory has been successful in addressing one of 
the weaknesses of the stakeholder theory, by providing a single objective for managers 
(maximising the long-term value of the firm). On the other hand, it has been criticised for 
the same shortcomings concerning the stakeholder theory. One of the most significant 
criticisms is the failure to make managers accountable for their actions, leading to agency 
problems. Hence this theory cannot be considered as a comprehensive framework for CG in 
assessing the Stewardship Code. 
3.3.5 Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship Theory developed in psychology and sociology to examine the situations where 
the agent acts as the steward or principal and therefore their interests are aligned with the 
principals (Davis et al., 1997). The agent follows rational behaviour and puts the higher value 
towards the objective of the organisation. Davis et al. (1997) proposed that following such 
behaviour, the agent will consequently benefit the principal, including an increase in profit 
resulting in higher share price and dividends. A key assumption made is the existence of a 
strong relationship between the success of the organisation and the principal’s satisfaction. 
This will motivate managers to act as stewards to maximise firm performance and 




that if the interest of a manager is in line with the principal, he/she should be empowered 
to enhance the performance of the manager. For such managers, their autonomy should be 
deliberately extended to maximise their benefits, since they can be trusted. Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) stated that CEOs as stewards can act more effectively if the corporate structure 
gives them more power and authority. Also, Mallin (2010) suggested that, by having the role 
of CEO and Chairman in one person, shareholders could reduce the risk of losing the return 
on their investments, as this will empower managers to make the best decision. 
Furthermore, Stewardship Theory suggests that monitoring and controlling of such 
managers should be stopped since these mechanisms can negatively affect the manager 
motivation (Argyris, 2017).  
 
In contrast to agency theory, where managers are believed not to always act in the best 
interest of shareholders, Stewardship Theory considers managers as less opportunistic and 
more as a trustee of shareholders (Clarke & Branson, 2012; Mallin, 2010). Notably, this 
consideration doesn’t imply that the Stewardship Theory views directors as completely 
unselfish, instead there are many situations where managers act rationally. This argument 
indicates that managers believe that following shareholder interests leads to serving their 
own interests (Daily et al., 2003; Lane et al., 1998). The reputation of the directors is 
therefore closely linked to the financial performance of their firms and so managers try to 
improve the financial performance indicators such as shareholders return to protect their 
reputations (Daily et al., 2003). According to Fama (1980) by being effective stewards of the 
firm directors can also effectively manage their careers. These arguments form the 
assumption of Stewardship Theory, which is the presence of a strong relationship between 
the success of the organisation and the principal’s satisfaction (Davis et al., 1997). 
In addition, proponents of Stewardship Theory recognise the importance of identifying the 
interests of customers, employees, suppliers and other legitimate stakeholders. It is notable 
that the first responsibility of managers is to their shareholders (Clarke & Branson, 2012). 
Hence, this theory has highlighted that the Board responsibility is to maximise shareholder 
value sustainability in the long-term (Tricker, 2015). 
Since its introduction, Stewardship Theory has been widely applied in legal and 




Theory have focused on a structure that empowers managers rather than a structure to 
monitor and control managers. These authors proposed that in such a structure, managers 
could act more effectively and choose the best strategy without the fear of cancelling their 
decision by outside directors (e.g. Donaldson & Davis, 1991, 1994; Fox & Hamilton, 1994). 
Empirical research has aimed to validate Stewardship Theory as an important predictor of 
CG, but conclusions are diverse. Supporters have illustrated an association between 
empowering managers and higher firm performance, reducing the need to control or 
monitor executives (e.g. Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Finkelstein & D’aveni, 1994; Coles et al., 
2001; Lin, 2005; Tian & Lau, 2001;).  Others have failed to find convincing support (e.g. 
Chaganti et al., 1985; Kula, 2005; Molz, 1988). For example, Donaldson and Davis (1991) 
conducted an empirical examination of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory to 
determine which theory better explained the CEO role and rewards. They compared 
shareholders' returns in the corporates with a dual CEO-Chair with those where the Chair is 
independent of the CEO. After analysing the data, they collected from 321 US firms, they 
found a positive relationship between CEO duality and shareholder wealth. The findings did 
not support Agency Theory, indicating that controlling opportunistic managers through 
having an independent chair from the CEO will not help to align the interests of managers 
and shareholders. On the other hand, in line with Stewardship Theory, they found that 
combining the roles of CEO and Chair led to empowerment and higher shareholder returns. 
Lin (2005) confirmed this result and proposed that having a different CEO and Chair of the 
Board could raise some issues in companies such as conflict of expectations, increasing 
competition and lack of trust leading to weaker performance. In contrast Kula (2005) 
evidenced that separating the role of the CEO and the Chair is positively related to firm 
performance. This finding is in contrast with Stewardship Theory, indicating that managers 
do not act as stewards in the companies and they need to be controlled and monitored 
using CG mechanisms.  
Stewardship theory reflects the classical ideas of CG that directors can act as a responsible 
agent with independence and integrity. Clarke and Branson (2012) provide criticism over 
Stewardship Theory. First, they argue that its shortcomings lie at the root of regulatory 
failings: i.e. it is unable to predict the relationship between the Board and corporate 




corporation’s best interests. Second, they argue that it is no longer fit for purpose for 
modern corporations in which shareholders are separated from managers and managers are 
not directly accountable to shareholders. Third, they challenged its application in other 
countries, such as continental Europe and Latin America, where there is limited protection 
for shareholders against empowered managers pursuing self-interests. 
Previous studies applying this theory failed to reach conclusive results. Considering the 
criticisms of this theory it is irrational to accept that this theory has been able to address all 
CG issues and provide adequate solutions to resolve them.  The Stewardship Code, however, 
has been able to address one of the main weaknesses of the previous CG theories by 
describing managers as stewards who can follow a rational behaviour and act to enhance 
firm performance.  
3.3.6 Discussion 
A range of theoretical bases have been applied to explain CG practice incorporating 
different perspectives including finance, economics, accounting and law. These are all 
problematic to some degree which means that academics still seek defining paradigms 
(Tricker, 2015). Solomon (2013) argued that whilst CG theories analyse the same problems, 
the findings are expressed using the languages of different disciplines. Agency theory, an 
early theory of CG, addresses the Agency problem of divergent interests of agents and 
principals. It has been widely applied empirically. Despite its popularity, agency theory was 
considerably criticised for assuming that all managers are self-interested and need to be 
monitored to align their interests with shareholders. In line with Agency theory, TCE theory 
considers managers as opportunistic individuals with bounded rationality behavior. Based 
on these assumptions, TCE theory suggests organisations could help to control managers’ 
behaviour through hierarchical systems. However, TCE theory is widely criticised over its 
assumptions ( e.g. Foss & Klein, 2010; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). To address the weaknesses 
of Agency and TCE theories, Stewardship Theory was proposed by CG academics. This 
theory assumed that managers could be trusted to act as stewards in increasing corporate 
value. The assumption of Stewardship Theory concerning manager behaviour complements 
the Stakeholder Theory assumption that the role of management is to recognise and 
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balance stakeholder interests. Enlightened stakeholder theory was developed to help 
managers prioritise stakeholder interests. These theories are summarised in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Summary of Corporate Governance Theories 
Theories Discipline Assumptions Criticisms Summary 
Agency Theory Finance and 
Economics 




2. Existence of agency
problems. 
1. Focus on quantitative metrics.
2. simplistic shareholder/director
relationship. 
3. philosophical assumption that
people are self-interested. 
Principals give managing 
responsibilities to another 
party (agents). CG 
mechanisms (Board of 
directors and shareholders as 
monitoring devices) have an 
important role to minimize 
agency problems. Corporate 
objective is the maximization 













in their own interest. 
Both assumptions of this theory 
regarding the behaviour of 
managers (bounded rationality 
and opportunistic) have been 
criticised for not being relevant. 
Views firms as governance 
structures. Assumes managers 
are opportunistic individuals 
whose behaviour could 
adversely affect the firm. 
Appropriate CG mechanisms 






Fiduciary duty and 
social responsibility; 
firms should take 
responsibilities for 
their actions. 
This theory has been criticized for 
not providing a single objective 
for firms. It is not clear how the 
firm should prioritise between 
the interests of different 
stakeholder groups. 
Managers need to consider 
the interests of all 
stakeholders (including 
shareholders). Corporate 
objective is the maximization 






Fiduciary duty and 
social responsibility; 
firms should take 
responsibilities for 
their actions. 
1. Shareholders have central
attention for managers. 
2. Managers are the main 
mechanism to maximize firm 
value. 
3. failed to clearly direct 
managers on how to fulfil all the 
stakeholders’ interest to 
maximise the value of their firms.
Advances stakeholder theory 
by reducing conflict of interest 
when prioritizing between 
divergent stakeholder 
interests. Corporate objective 
is the maximization of long-






A strong relationship 
between the success 
of the organization 
and the principal's 
satisfaction. 
1. Unable to predict the 
relationship between Board and 
corporate performance and 
whether the Board would pursue
the corporation’s best interests. 
2. Not fit for purpose for modern
corporations in which 
shareholders are separated from 
managers and managers are not 
directly accountable to 
shareholders. 
This theory indicates that 
managers can be trusted to 
act as stewards on behalf of 
the shareholders. 
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One of the noticeable differences between these theories is their recommendation about 
the main objective of corporates, which varied from the maximisation of shareholder wealth 
(Agency theory) to the maximisation of stakeholder value (Stakeholder theory) or the 
maximization of long-run value of the firm (Stewardship Theory).  It is therefore unsurprising 
that Mallin (2010) stressed the need within the theoretical framing of CG to consider 
whether the primary objective of a company should be an enhancement of shareholder 
value or delivering the interests of other stakeholders such as employees, customers, local 
communities and suppliers.  
In conclusion, CG theories have helped in the development of CG structures and 
emphasising its importance in companies (Mallin, 2010). Their implementation is, however, 
subject to legal, cultural, and ownership differences and, therefore, some theories may be 
more appropriate to particular contexts or cultures at different points in time, 
notwithstanding the aforementioned criticisms.  
3.3.7 Theory for This Research 
This study proposes that to explore CG structures by using empirical data, existing CG 
theories cannot be ignored and remain relevant to varying degrees.  The main focus of this 
study is to explore the Stewardship Code and its impact on financial performance and the 
ownership behaviour of investors. Given that the Stewardship Code has been introduced to 
enhance the engagement between investors and their investee corporates Agency Theory 
appears to be of most relevance as it is predominantly concerned with addressing the 
agency problem (Faccio & Lasfer, 2000; Gillan & Starks, 2003; Judge et al., 2010; Yegon et 
al., 2014).  This recognises that shareholder monitoring and engagement are key CG 
mechanisms, helping to align the interests of shareholders and managers, which is in 
accordance with the aims of the Stewardship Code.   
Recent and high-profile company collapses have resulted in criticism of the bases for CG 
thinking and agency theory has been a particular focus of attention. The key criticism is that 
the theory is overly simplistic and unable to explore the full range of shareholder 
responsibilities within investee corporates. Tilba and McNulty (2013), for example, found 




agent-principal when studying investor behaviour in UK pension funds. Other researchers 
criticised this theory for assuming that shareholders are able or have a tendency towards 
active engagement in their investee corporates (Hellman, 2005; Webb et al., 2003). It is 
acknowledged that Agency theory has been criticised for being overly simplistic and unable 
to explore the full range of shareholder responsibilities within investee corporates, 
however, in line with Rashid (2015), Agency Theory is valid, promoting outside independent 
directors as a good mechanism to monitor managers.  
 
While Agency Theory addresses the central issue of CG (i.e. agency problem), TCE theory 
seeks to find the reason behind the internationalisation of firm activities. Hence, given the 
focus of this study is to explore the impact of institutional investor engagement (i.e. market 
factors), TCE is not particularly relevant as a lens for analysis.   
Stewardship Theory can also be considered relevant as it attempts to resolve the 
shortcomings of Agency and TCE theories when explaining CG systems through the analysis 
of the relationship between shareholders and managers. Based on Stewardship Theory, 
managers should be empowered to improve their performance which leads to creating 
higher value for principals (Mallin, 2010).  
 
Stakeholder theory has received growing academic attention due to its suitability in the 
modern environment whereby companies are under public pressure to act ethically for the 
wider benefit of all stakeholders. It assumes that managers are accountable to a wide group 
of stakeholders, which will bring benefit to the shareholders in the long term (Solomon, 
2013). Hence, Stakeholder theory is another relevant framework for this study to consider, 
despite its criticisms, including its failure to provide a clear guideline for managers to 
prioritise the interests of stakeholders (Tricker, 2015).  This helps to compensate for the 
criticism that Agency Theory might be out of date for the shareholders of this study who are 
investing in a period where stakeholders’ interest is at the forefront of managerial decision-
making.  
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Consequently, this study concludes that it is better to consider Agency Theory, Stewardship 
Theory and Stakeholder theory to provide explanations of the role of shareholders and their 
ownership behaviour in engaging with investee corporates. This is in line with Rashid (2015), 
who encourages researchers to not dismiss a theory due to its criticism (e.g. Agency theory). 
Rashid (2015) proposes that by dropping a theory, researchers would miss the opportunity 




The Stewardship Code, despite its importance for corporate governance (CG), has received 
limited academic attention. The main aim of this study is closing the existing gap by 
exploring the application of the Stewardship Code to determine its outcome for the 
institutional investors both financially and non-financially. The objective of the methodology 
chapter is to develop and present an appropriate research approach to explore the 
proposed subject. Following are the main research questions, directing this study towards 
choosing the best method: 
1. To what extent has applying the Stewardship Code provided financial benefits to its
signatories?
2. To what extent has applying the Stewardship Code provided non-financial benefits to
its signatories?
3. To what extent has the Stewardship Code been successful in enhancing the quality of
engagement between investors and their investee corporates?
4. To what extent has the Stewardship Code been successful in achieving the aims that
are proposed by FRC?
Answering these questions will determine the real impact of applying the Stewardship Code 
on the quality of engagement between investors and their investee corporates as well as 
their financial performance. Mixed methods is a suitable approach to answer the above 
research questions. This methodology combines the potential strengths of both qualitative 
and quantitative methods, permitting researchers to uncover relationships and correlations 
that exist between important factors concurrently. By applying mixed methods, a better 
understanding of the motivations and pressures that drive ownership behaviour of 
institutional investors can be gained (Creswell, 2014). This is particularly apt in a research 
area, such as the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code, where the previous academic focus 




approach helps to combine the quantitative and qualitative findings to determine the 
impact of the Stewardship Code on financial performance as well as the behaviour of 
institutional investors towards their stewardship responsibilities. This study has followed a 
sequential explanatory research design. The explanatory research design begins with the 
quantitative method (i.e. regression analysis) to explore the relationship between the 
application of the Stewardship Code and the financial performance of institutional investors 
(i.e. signatories of the Stewardship Code). Then, a qualitative method (i.e. interviews) is 
applied to expand on the initial quantitative findings and to determine whether the 
Stewardship Code has been successful in enhancing the quality of engagement between 
investors and investee corporates. Following this research design permits the establishment 
of the relationship between the two variables (i.e. application of the Stewardship Code and 
financial performance of its signatories) as well as finding a reason behind this relationship 
(Saunders et al., 2019). Consequently, combining quantitative and qualitative findings is a 
useful strategy to understand the proposed research questions thoroughly. This chapter 
aims to justify and detail the quantitative and qualitative methods. To provide context, it 
starts with the philosophical worldview relevant to this study. 
4.1 Philosophical Worldview 
According to Burrell and Morgan (1979) researchers will make a number of assumptions 
relating to ontological (how we find facts) and epistemological positions (how we interpret 
facts).  The overriding ontological worldview adopted is one of realism, recognising that 
facts can be observed at the market level (through statistical analysis) and at the individual 
or corporate level (through interviews). In line with other papers this study assumes the 
epistemological position derived from the theories of CG outlined in the previous chapter, 
notably that: 
 i) shareholder engagement is an important CG mechanism, helping to reduce agency 
problems, asymmetry of informations and enhancing CG systems of investee corporates 
(Faccio & Lasfer, 2000; Bebchuk, 2005; Judge et al., 2010; Arsalidou, 2012; Gilson & Gordon, 
2013; Çelik & Isaksson, 2014; Yegon et al., 2014).  
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ii) shareholders can have a positive impact on investee corporates as well as themselves
through performing effective engagement activities. Therefore, applying the Stewardship
Code could benefit shareholders by enhancing the quality of their engagement. This is an
important ontological position that forms the basis for developing the current research
questions.
This study assumed that both quantitative and qualitative data are considered as valid 
knowledge which will be explained in more detail in section 4.2. In line with Saunders et al. 
(2015), the choice of data collection method should be the last step of the methodology. To 
justify the data collection method, it is essential that the researcher peel away the outer 
layers first. According to Figure 4.1 the first ‘layer’ is the research philosophy.   
 Figure 4.1 Research Onion 
Research philosophy is a system of beliefs and assumptions about the collection, 
interpretation and analysis of the collected data (Saunders et al., 2019). Different factors 
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can affect the researcher’s philosophy, such as the discipline orientation, the researcher’s 
mentor inclinations or past research experience. The researcher’s worldview dominates the 
choice between quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods approaches. The philosophical 
approaches that are followed to answer these questions, including positivism, 
interpretivism, pragmatism, and realism, are explained below.  
4.1.1 Positivism 
The first research question tries to determine the financial benefit of applying the Code for 
its signatories. Therefore, we asked: 
Question 1. “To what extent has applying the Stewardship Code provided financial benefits 
to its signatories?” 
To answer this question, the positivist approach should be followed. In line with the 
positivist philosophy, the researcher assumed that financial impact from the application of 
the Stewardship Code is a phenomenon which is measurable by using the existing data that 
indicates the financial performance of signatories of this guideline. Therefore, the answer to 
this question already exists, which could be understood by applying empirical and analytical 
methods (Saunders et al., 2015). The nature of data that is going to apply for this question is 
quantitative, leading to statistical analysis to generate research findings (Gill et al., 2010; 
Saunders et al., 2015). Following this method would create data that are not influenced by 
human bias or interpretation; hence, they are independent of the researcher. 
4.1.2 Interpretivism 
Interpretivism developed as a critique of positivism philosophy to study human beings and 
the meanings that are created by them. Interpretivism believes that positivism cannot be 
applied to study human beings the same way as physical phenomena since they are not 
directly observable and measurable. To analyse the non-financial impact of the application 
of the Stewardship Code, question two and three are developed as follows: 
Question 2. “To what extent has applying the Stewardship Code provided non-financial 





Question 3. “To what extent has the Stewardship Code been successful in enhancing the 
quality of engagement between investors and their investee corporates?” 
To investigate these questions, the researcher cannot apply any quantitative data that are 
readily available. This investigation requires in-depth understanding of the beliefs and 
actions of the signatories. Therefore, the signatories of the Stewardship Code need to be 
interviewed to provide answers. Accordingly, an interpretivism philosophy should be 
followed, assisting to study human beings and the meanings that are created by them. The 
interpretivism argues that human beings, in contrast to physical phenomena, are not 
directly observable and measurable. Therefore, they aim to develop new interpretations of 
social worlds by collecting data that are meaningful for the participants (Saunders et al., 
2015). Consequently, the focus is on the micro-level, or even mesa-level of analysis at the 
company, Board of Directors or individual management level. The interview data will include 
beliefs and opinions and therefore are qualitative in nature. Following the interpretivism 
philosophy allows us to explore the Stewardship Code by incorporating the signatories’ 
point of view while considering the complexity of shareholders. After conducting interviews, 
the researcher has to make meaning from the signatories’ responses expressed about the 
application of the Stewardship Code. Answering the above research questions while 
following an interpretivist approach, helps to create new understanding about following a 
guideline (i.e. Stewardship Code) by shareholders and how it has affected their engagement. 
Although this philosophy is helpful to explore complex phenomena, one of its criticisms is 
that the researcher’s values, as well as interpretation of the data, play an essential role in 
the research process. This would make it difficult for the researcher to understand the 
subject from the participants’ point of view.  
4.1.3 Pragmatism versus Realism 
The final question of this study helps to determine the success of the Code in reaching its 




Question 4. “To what extent has the Stewardship Code been successful in achieving the aims 
that are proposed by FRC?” 
 
Combining the results found by exploring the last three research questions helps to gain a 
stronger understanding of this research question (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Two 
philosophies generally applied by researchers who applied a mixture of data and 
methodologies to conduct their study, including realism and pragmatism (Saunders et al., 
2015).  
First, realism believes that reality exists externally, independent from the description of the 
researcher. Hence the researcher directs his/her attention to better understand this reality. 
There are two types of realism, including empirical realism and critical realism. Empirical 
realism states that the researcher can understand reality by using appropriate methods 
(Bryman, 2012). This philosophy has been criticised for being naive, as it assumes that 
reality can be fully understood and explained by the researchers. In line with this, Bhaskar 
(1982, p.2) proposed that empirical realism “fails to recognise that there are enduring 
structures and generative mechanisms underlying and producing observable phenomena 
and events”. Hence, the understanding achieved by exploring the reality is ‘superficial’ 
(Bryman, 2012, p.29). To address the shortcomings of empirical realism, critical realism was 
formed in the late twentieth by Roy Bhaskar, whereby the researcher is only able to 
understand reality by focusing on the structures of reality that form the observable event. 
Like empirical realism, critical realism considers reality as external and independent. But, 
not directly accessible through observation and having the knowledge of it (Bryman, 2012). 
Critical realism took two steps to understand reality. The first step is the experience of 
sensations and events. And, the second step is reasoning backwards, based on the 
researcher’s experiences, to reach the reality that might have caused them (Reed, 2005). In 
conclusion, critical realists “focus on explaining observable organisational events by looking 
for the underlying causes and mechanisms through which deep social structures shape 
everyday organisational life” (Saunders et al., 2012, p.140). 
Second, a pragmatic worldview assumes that collecting the various types of data provides a 
thorough understanding of the research problem rather than focusing on one type of data 
(qualitative or quantitative). This philosophy originated in the late 19th century in the work 




subjectivism and objectivism, values and facts, accurate knowledge and different 
contextualised experiences (Saunders et al., 2015). Based on this philosophy, research 
begins with a question and aims to contribute practical solutions informing future practice. 
Pragmatists acknowledge that there are different ways to interpret the world and conduct 
research. Therefore, no single point of view can ever give the entire picture, and there may 
be multiple realities (Saunders et al., 2015). Supporters of this worldview use methods that 
provide credible, reliable and relevant data collection, which help to advance the research 
(Kelemen & Rumens, 2008). A considerable number of mixed methods researchers and 
theorists made strong associations with mixed methodology and pragmatism (Bazeley, 
2003; Maxcy, 2003; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). 
To answer the last question, the findings of the previous research questions (i.e. Question 1, 
2 & 3) are going to be used to determine the reality behind them. This approach is in line 
with realism, where the quantitative analysis of the data which is readily available is 
followed by a qualitative method to explore the opinions of the institutional investors on 
the application of the Stewardship Code. Following this approach assists in the 
understanding of the impact of the application of the Stewardship Code on its signatories. 
4.2 Mixed Methods Approach 
Mixed methods refer to the research designs that combine both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches and their related data in a study. Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) study of 
psychological traits inspired other studies to collect various types of data such as 
observation, interviews and surveys in their studies (e.g. Sieber, 1973). It was by the early 
1990s that the idea of combining different types of research designs emerged, and mixed 
methods became an efficient convergence of quantitative and qualitative approaches. The 
central assumption of mixed methods is that the combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative data provides a better understanding of the research question, compared to 
each approach alone (Creswell & Clark, 2007): .The quantitative method is used to focus on 
the macro aspect while the qualitative method is used to focus on the micro aspects of the 




4.2.1 Rationale for adopting a mixed method 
In line with the realism philosophy, a different type of data will be collected, providing a 
thorough understanding of the research problem rather than focusing on one type of data. 
Consequently, there is no alternative method to mixed methods if we want to contribute to 
the real understanding of how the application of Stewardship Code affects the performance 
and ownership behaviour of the institutional investors. Following are the rationale behind 
choosing the mixed methods as the research approach of this study: 
i) Thorough Understanding of the Research Question 
The primary goal of this study is to determine the impact of the application of the 
Stewardship Code for its signatories, both financially and non-financially. According to 
Creswell (2014), quantitative research is suitable to identify and understand the best 
predictors of the outcomes. On the other hand, qualitative research is useful to explore and 
understand a new subject. The researcher believes that either the quantitative or qualitative 
method on their own are not enough to understand the research problem and the power of 
both methods bring the best understanding (Creswell, 2014). Collecting and analysing the 
available numeric data helps to identify the relationship between the application of the 
Stewardship Code and financial performance of the institutional investors. On the other 
hand, collecting and analysing the institutional investors’ view on the application of the 
Stewardship Code helps to uncover the impact of this guideline on their non-financial 
performance as well as their ownership behaviour. In addition, qualitative data will help to 
explain the quantitative findings. Consequently, with limited academic knowledge around 
the application of the Stewardship Code, both quantitative and qualitative methods can and 
should be used for this exploratory research. So, gathering knowledge from different 
perspectives (macro and micro) can help to map the landscape and understand what is 
happening. 
ii) Access to Data 
Assessing the impact of the Stewardship Code on the performance of institutional investors 
(both financial and non-financial) is not possible without analysing both quantitative and 
qualitative data. This study has access to the financial performance of the institutional 
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investors which are publicly available in the investors’ factsheets. Also, the stewardship 
statements provide data related to the degree and quality of the institutional investors’ 
engagements, including monitoring and voting activities in their investee corporates. Relying 
on quantitative data helps to determine whether the Stewardship Code is linked to the 
enhanced financial performance of funds, but it cannot tell us the reason behind the 
statistical findings. Besides, this study does not have access to the data related to private 
engagement between institutional investors and their investee corporates. Whereas, the 
importance of private engagement has been raised in various literature (e.g. Carleton et al., 
1998; Goranova & Ryan, 2014; McCahery et al., 2016). For example, Goranova and Ryan 
(2014) believed that private engagement would be more powerful than the public 
engagement. They argued that, since directors are more reactive to shareholder requests 
behind the scene to prevent public embarrassment and cost to their reputations, investors 
are more likely to persuade their desired changes. This emphasises the importance of 
analysing private engagement in addition to monitoring and voting activities of the 
signatories. Therefore, using qualitative data is as important as using quantitative data in 
this study. Interviews with institutional investors could help this study to investigate the 
quantitative findings further, get valuable information about shareholder private 
engagement as well as the impact of the Stewardship Code on the non-financial 
performance of investors. 
iii) New Subject
The proposed research subject is relatively new and there is a lack of academic evidence.  It 
is therefore important to explore a range of available data, including quantitative and 
qualitative. This will prevent the chance of missing or wrongly measuring important 
variables. Mixed methods provides an opportunity to discover unpredicted variables and 
include them again if necessary. 
iv) Triangulation
Applying both quantitative and qualitative methods enables this study to combine data to 
establish whether the findings from one method verify the findings from another method 




factors such as the trading environment, organisation-specific characteristics and strategy-
based variables (Capon et al., 1990). Hence, the application of qualitative methods allows 
this study to confirm the reality of the initial quantitative findings, which are based on a 
positivist assumption (Saunders et al., 2019). In addition, triangulation will add depth and 
richness to the qualitative findings which are based on interpretivism assumptions (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2011). 
 
In conclusion, quantitative methods seek to determine the potential relationship between 
the Stewardship Code and financial performance of institutional investors, whereas, 
qualitative methods will seek to thoroughly understand the quantitative results as well as 
revealing non-financial impact from the application of the Stewardship Code. The mixed 
methods approach has been valued for bringing the strengths of both quantitative and 
qualitative methods together, whilst overcoming the weaknesses of both approaches 
(Creswell & Creswell, 2018). Despite the benefits of the mixed methods, there are some 
challenges associated with this methodology including the requirement for extensive data 
collection.  This is time-consuming to analyse and requires skills and familiarity of both 
approaches. Considering the above rationales, whilst being aware of its challenges, this 
methodology is the appropriate approach to reach the research objectives. 
4.2.2 Research Design 
The most important determinant of the research design for the mixed methodology is the 
research problem or research question (Saunders et al., 2019). The way researchers 
combine quantitative and qualitative methods and the extent of this combination leads to 
various mixed methods designs including concurrent, sequential explanatory, sequential 
exploratory and sequential multi-phase research designs (Saunders et al., 2019).  
The concurrent design includes a single phase of quantitative and qualitative data collection 
and analysis, whereas the sequential design allows the researcher to follow the use of one 
method with another to expand the initial findings (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). The 
sequential research design will be a more appropriate strategy if the study has a time 
constraint. Besides, Creswell (2014) proposed that since sequential design involves 
collecting and analysing quantitative and qualitative databases separately, it could be 
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spread over time. In other words, the investigation can be divided into two manageable 
tasks rather than multiple data collection and analysis procedures. One of the challenges 
related to this research design is identifying the appropriate quantitative/qualitative results 
for further investigation in the follow-up stage.  
This mixed methods study will address the impact of the Stewardship Code on the 
performance of institutional investors by applying an explanatory sequential design. Figure 
4.2 illustrates how this study combines quantitative and qualitative methods through the 
proposed research design (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). 
Figure 4.2 Combining Quantitative & Qualitative Methods 
The explanatory sequential research design involves collecting quantitative data first and 
then explaining the quantitative results with in-depth qualitative data. The sample of this 
study includes asset managers who have applied the Stewardship Code. During the first 
stage, quantitative data will be collected from the Stewardship statements and the 
factsheets of the institutional investors, which are publicly available. This stage aims to 
assess whether there is any relationship between application of the Stewardship Code and 
financial performance of the investors by following a deductive approach. Based on 
deduction, this study starts with a testable proposition, informed by existing theory, about 
the relationship between applying the Stewardship Code and financial performance of its 
signatories. Following this approach allows this study to determine whether there is any 




measurable data (Saunders et al., 2019). After completing the first stage, the qualitative 
method will be conducted as a follow-up method. It is notable that the quantitative findings 
will be used to develop the interview questions, allowing the study to explore the statistical 
results. In other words, the quantitative findings will influence the qualitative part of this 
study. In the exploratory follow-up an inductive approach will be followed, which includes 
interviewing a sample of signatories of the Code to further explore the initial quantitative 
results through gathering perspective of the signatories on the application of the 
Stewardship Code and how it affects their financial and non-financial performance. The next 
section describes the two methods stages of this study. 
4.2.3 Quantitative Method 
The quantitative method has been popular among researchers since the late 19th Century, 
whereas qualitative approaches became more popular during the latter half of the 20th 
Century along with the development of mixed methods (Creswell, 2014). The quantitative 
researchers see the world in terms of variables, and they explain phenomena based on the 
statistical relationship between different variables (Maxwell, 2013). According to Creswell 
(2014), researchers who use quantitative methods create assumptions about testing 
theories deductively through specifying narrow hypotheses and the data collection to either 
support or reject the hypotheses. As a rule, quantitative research seeks to create findings 
that are generalizable and replicable (Creswell, 2014). Quantitative methods can help unpick 
problems in which the researcher tries to understand the scale of an impact or the outcome 
of an intervention, prove or disprove a hypothesis (Burns & Burns, 2008), or determine the 
links between known variables (Creswell, 2014).  
The main research question that this study seeks to answer is “what is the relationship 
between the Stewardship Code and the financial performance of institutional investors?” 
The important aim of the first quantitative stage is to answer this question by using the 
regression analysis. This study used correlational statistics to measure the degree of 
relationship between the variables (Creswell, 2014). Other aims of this stage are to 
determine the quantitative results that require further investigation and develop the 




steps that are taken within the quantitative method to find an answer for the proposed 
question.  
i) Choosing the Sample 
There are two main types of quantitative sampling: probability sampling and convenience 
sampling (Maxwell, 2013). In probability sampling, each member of the population has the 
same chance of being included in the sample. In situations where the researcher intends to 
learn about a group which is difficult to gain access to or a type of people which are 
relatively rare, a practical sampling approach is needed, such as convenience sampling 
(Weiss, 1994). Due to the lack of available data, this study follows convenience sampling.  
 
This study started sampling for the first phase of the methodology in August 2017. By this 
time, the Stewardship Code had 252 signatories, including asset managers (164), asset 
owners (77) and service providers (11). The Stewardship Code is directed in the first 
instance to institutional investors, i.e. asset owners and asset managers with equity holdings 
in UK listed companies. It is notable that asset owners’ commitment to the Stewardship 
Code may include engaging directly with companies or indirectly through the mandates 
given to asset managers. They should clearly communicate their policies on stewardship to 
their managers and hold them to account for their stewardship activities. Although the FRC 
has encouraged asset owners to follow the guidelines of the Stewardship Code, asset 
managers are the primary audience of the Stewardship Code. The Stewardship Code (2012) 
has emphasised the important role of asset managers and posited that asset managers with 
day-to-day responsibility for managing investments are well positioned to influence 
companies’ long-term performance through stewardship. Hence the first criteria considered 
for sampling was to only include asset managers in this research.  
The second criteria considered for sampling was the portfolio of asset managers. Among the 
listed signatories, asset managers have formed the vast majority group, including 164 
institutions who are applying the Stewardship Code. Asset managers offer a range of funds 
to their clients, investing in different countries, including the UK. Funds are an attractive 
type of investment, where asset managers pool and invest their clients’ money in different 




creates a diversified portfolio, helping to reduce the investment risk compared to investing 
directly in individual companies’ shares. This study only includes those asset managers with 
UK equity funds in their portfolio, who have applied the Stewardship Code. Institutional 
investors who manage UK equity funds are more likely to implement the guidelines of the 
Stewardship Code. This criterion reduced the sample size from 164 to 92 asset managers 
who held UK equity funds in their portfolios.  
The third criteria considered to select the sample was having access to data necessary to 
answer the proposed research questions. Only those asset managers with data available in 
the public domain, including stewardship statements and financial performance added to 
the sample. Having access to the stewardship statements is important as it would provide a 
potential source of data for this study. Since December 2010, all UK-authorised asset 
managers are required under the FCA’s Conduct of Business Rules to produce a statement of 
commitment to the Stewardship Code or explain why it is not appropriate to their business 
model. Asset managers should regularly report to their clients or beneficiaries as to how 
they have discharged their responsibilities. Consequently, only those asset managers who 
publicly published their stewardship statements on the FRC website included in the sample 
of this study. Moreover, this study requires access to the financial performance of UK equity 
funds to answer the first research question. In total, 50 asset managers were identified that 
meet the sample requirements, and these are listed in the table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Sample 







Total 50 209 
 
According to Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998), to enhance the probability of the external 
validity of the study, it is important to have a sample that is representative of the 
population. The sample of this study represents the population of asset managers who are 
applying the Stewardship Code. This sample is the best representative of the institutional 
investors, who are implementing this guideline.  
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ii) Quantitative Variables
To accomplish the first stage, a regression analysis of the UK asset managers’ financial 
performance, as the dependent variable, and their application of the Stewardship Code, as 
the independent variable, is performed. Table 4.2 summarises all the variables that are used 
in the statistical analysis. These variables will be explained in more detail in this section. 
Table 4.2 Variables 
Variable Type Definition Sources Data Collection Source 
Annual Financial 
Performance 
Dependent Variable Rolling 12 months total 
return on a bid to bid 
basis 
UK Stewardship Code 
(2012) 
Morningstar website & 
Funds’ factsheets 
Monitoring 










1) Monitor Compliance 
with the CG Code by their
investee corporates. 
2) Attend the annual 
general meetings (AGMs)
of investee corporates. 
3) Consider material risks
related to the investee 
corporates. 
4) Monitor their 
stewardship activities.
UK Stewardship Code 
(2012) 
Shleifer and Vishny, 
(1986) 
Wang (2014) 








1) Publicly disclose their
voting records. 
2) Consider voting against
management proposals. 
UK Stewardship Code 
(2012) 
Goranova and Ryan, 
(2014)  
Mallin (2010) 
James and Gifford, (2010) 
McCahery et al. (2016) 
Stewardship Statements 
Total Stewardship Rate Independent 
Variable 
Sum of monitoring and 
voting rates 





Controlling Variable Size: Total assets of the 
fund 
Age: Launch date of the 
fund 
Thomas and Tonks, (2001) 
Dahlquist et al. (2000) 
Chen et al. (2004) Pollet 
and Wilson (2008) 
Yan (2008) 
Ferreira et al. (2012) 
Funds’ factsheets 
Tier Dummy Variable Quality of stewardship 
statements (Value of 1 if 
Tier 1, 0 otherwise) 







The dependent variable is a variable that is measured or observed to detect changes due to 
the variation of the independent variable. This variable is treated as the effect in the causal 
model that depends on the influence of some other factor (Frenz et al., 2011). According to 
the FRC, effective stewardship through following the principles of Stewardship Code, 
benefits companies, investors and the economy as a whole. The common objective of UK 
asset managers is to maximise and protect the interest of their owners. Moreover, the 
Stewardship Code (2012) emphasised that institutional investors should apply the 
Stewardship Code to enhance and preserve the value for the ultimate beneficiary or client. 
One way of analysing the impact of the Stewardship Code on the institutional investors is to 
determine whether this guideline has been successful in fulfilling its proposed aim through 
obtaining some indications of the equity fund’s performance following the application of 
this Code. In other words, if the implementation of the Stewardship Code through improving 
monitoring and voting activities of the investors could positively affect the financial 
performance of the UK equity funds, it could be argued that the Stewardship Code was 
successful in reaching its proposed aims.  
As aforementioned, among UK asset managers, this study focuses on those that manage UK 
equity funds. To collect the financial performance of UK equity funds, the individual fund’s 
fact sheets were used, which are publicly available from asset managers’ websites. Also, the 
Morningstar website includes important information related to UK equity funds, including 
their financial performance. When the equity funds’ data could not be found, the 
Morningstar website was used as a substitute source. Looking at a number of the funds’ 
factsheets, it was found that the factsheet did not use the same definition to present the 
annual performance of the funds. For example, Vanguard Asset Manager’s factsheets 
defined the annual financial performance as the growth of net asset value (NAV). Whereas, 
the HSBC Asset Manager outlined the annual financial performance as the discrete 12-
month returns.  
The Morningstar database used the same definition to present the funds’ financial 
performance: the standardised performance is defined as the rolling 12 months total return 
on a bid to bid basis. Therefore, to have the same definition of the financial performance in 





○ Measuring financial performance 
This study did not have access to financial performance for all the asset managers. Instead, 
the financial performance of the funds managed by each asset manager was readily 
available using the morningstar website. To measure the financial performance for each 
asset manager, first, the financial performance of all UK equity funds was collected between 
2013 to 2017. The stewardship data was only available for 2016, as signatories only 
published one stewardship statement, restricting the inclusion of financial performance 
data for the three years from 2015 to 2017. It is, however, likely that the stewardship 
approach would be consistent over this period (i.e. 2015 to 2017). Second, the size of each 
fund, representing the total assets in 2017, were collected using the same data source (i.e. 
morningstar website). Third, the average funds’ size was calculated by adding all the funds’ 
size divided by the number of funds. Fourth, the weight of the size for each asset manager 
was calculated by dividing the size of each UK equity fund by the total amount of assets 
under the control of the asset manager. This weight of the size was used as a basis to 
calculate the financial performance of the asset manager. The fifth step was to calculate the 
weighted average financial performance for each fund by multiplying its average of financial 
performance to the weight of size. The final step was adding up all the weighted average 
financial performance of the funds resulting in a figure representing the financial 
performance for asset managers. Using the weighted average provides one figure showing 
the financial performance of asset managers for all the funds. Using this figure allows this 
study to compare the firm-average financial performance with the average firm-level 
stewardship approach. Hence instead of comparing all the funds’ performance with the 
whole firm stewardship approach, we are able to compare the firm-level financial 
performance with the firm-level stewardship approach. This study is not aware of any 
empirical study using this approach to measure the financial performance of the funds.  
● Independent Variables 
According to the Stewardship Code (2012), exercising voting rights, monitoring the investee 
corporates and having a purposeful dialogue with companies are considered as the 
important stewardship activities of institutional investors. Among those stewardship 




interests. The voting rights have been accepted by many academics as a fundamental 
shareholder right within corporates, allowing them to either support corporate policies or 
oppose them (e.g. Goranova & Ryan, 2014; Gifford, 2010; Mallin, 2010; McCahery et al., 
2016). Despite academic interest in voting by institutional investors, FRC emphasised that 
the signatories of the Stewardship Code should include monitoring and engaging with 
companies on matters such as strategy, performance, risk, capital structure, and corporate 
governance. The FRC (2012) defined the engagement as the purposeful dialogue with 
companies on those matters as well as on issues that are the immediate subject of votes at 
general meetings.  
During the first stage of this study, monitoring and voting activities of asset managers in 
their investee corporates will be analysed as independent variables, to determine their 
impact on the financial performance of asset managers through running a regression 
analysis. The independent variable is a variable that is measured or observed to assess the 
effect of the manipulation on the dependent variable (Burns & Burns, 2008). This variable is 
also known as the predictor variable, the experimental variable or the explanatory variable 
(Frenz et al., 2011). Monitoring and voting activities represent the application of the 
Stewardship Code by the institutional investors through following the proposed guidelines 
of this Code. While this study considered these two as the representatives of the application 
of the Code, monitoring and voting could have occurred among non-signatories as well as 
the signatories of the Code. This represents one of the limitations faced when conducting 
this research. The Stewardship Code devoted four out of its seven principles to monitoring 
and exercising voting rights, suggesting the importance of these stewardship activities by 
institutional investors. The FRC has required asset managers to disclose their monitoring 
and voting activities in their stewardship statements. Therefore, institutional investors’ 
stewardship statements provide a framework that describes an investor’s approach to 
stewardship (FRC, 2017). To measure the proposed independent variables, this study has 
developed a rating system based on the Stewardship Code guidelines. The next section has 
explained the rating system in more detail.  
o Measuring Stewardship Activities 
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To measure the quality of monitoring and voting activities of institutional investors, a rating 
system is developed in this study. To develop this rating system, first, the guidelines of the 
Stewardship Code (2012) were used as a benchmark to determine the highest and lowest 
score. The lowest score (i.e. zero) was assigned to asset managers who did not clearly 
specify their stewardship approach in line with the Stewardship Code. On the other hand, 
the highest score (i.e. 3) was given to asset managers who disclosed a detailed approach of 
their stewardship activities, in line with the Stewardship Code guidelines. Figure 4.3 
presents how asset managers were rated.  
Figure 4.3 Rating System 
Fifty stewardship statements of asset managers were analysed to rate the quality of 
stewardship activities. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate two examples of this rating approach: 
SVM Asset Management, a Tier 2 signatory and Black Rock, a Tier 1 signatory. 
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Table 4.3 Stewardship Rating of SVM Asset Management (Tier 2) 
Variables Stewardship Code guideline Stewardship Statement of SVM (2016) Rate 
Monitoring 
1. Compliance with CG
Code 
2. Attending AGM
3. Monitoring the 
stewardship activity
4. Consider material risks
including ESG 
1. Meetings with the Chairman and 
other Board members of the investee
companies to satisfy themselves that 
the company’s Board and 
committees adhere to the spirit of 
the UK CG Code. 
2. Attend the General Meetings of
companies in which they have a 
major holding, where appropriate 
and practicable. 
3. Maintain a detailed database of
contact with companies. 
4.  Evaluate how companies manage 
the material ESG risks to their 
businesses and may engage when 
there is an indication of a lack of 
operational excellence in this regard.
1. SVM engage with companies where a company report 
raises concerns, and usually do this in writing or at a 
meeting with management or directors. They examine their 
compliance with the UK Code on CG and will carefully 
consider any reasons put forward for non-compliance with 
any aspects of the Stewardship Code. SVM does not actively
seek to be made inside as that will affect our ability to trade 
in the investment. 
2. They do not normally attend general meetings as they 
find that this is not the most effective method of engaging
with company boards or management. SVM prefers to 
make direct contact with management when it feels the 
need to clarify a company’s policy. 
3. Did not specify any database in their stewardship
statement. 
4. SVM began managing Socially Responsible Investment 
(SRI) products in 2006. Since then, the SRI screening service
has expanded to include engagement with companies on 







1. Disclose voting records
2. Consider voting against
management proposals 
1. Institutional investors should 
disclose publicly voting records and 
disclose the use made, if any, of 
proxy voting or other voting advisory
services. 
2. Institutional investors should not 
automatically support the Board. If 
they have been unable to reach a 
satisfactory outcome through active
dialogue, then they should register 
an abstention or vote against the 
resolution. 
1. Where clients require them to disclose details of voting 
activity this is provided. For all other clients this information
is available upon request. 
2. Unless a client requires an alternative process, SVM will 
instruct its custodians to always vote in favour of 
resolutions backed by the management of a company. This 
standing instruction will be overridden if they believe that it




Table 4.4. Stewardship Rating of BlackRock (Tier 1) 
Variables Stewardship Code guideline Stewardship Statement of BlackRock (2016) Rate 
Monitoring 
1. Compliance with CG
Code 
2. Attending AGM
3. Monitoring the 
stewardship activity
4. Consider material risks
including ESG 
1. Meetings with the Chairman and 
other Board members of the investee 
companies to satisfy themselves that 
the company’s board and committees 
adhere to the spirit of the UK CG Code.
2. Attend the General Meetings of 
companies in which they have a major
holding, where appropriate and 
practicable. 
3. Maintain a detailed database of
contact with companies. 
4. Evaluate how companies manage 
the material ESG risks to their 
businesses and may engage when 
there is an indication of a lack of 
operational excellence in this regard.
1. According to this asset manager’s statement BlackRock
will engage with the company and/or use their vote to 
encourage a change in practice, where company 
reporting, and disclosure is inadequate, or the approach 
taken is inconsistent with their view of what is in the best 
interests of shareholders. 
2. BlackRock attends AGMs in person only when they 
believe they will be able to obtain information material to
make their vote decision which could not otherwise be 
obtained. 
3. BlackRock maintains a record of their voting,
engagement and other stewardship activities. 
4. It is stated that BlackRock evaluates how companies
manage the material ESG risks to their businesses and 
may engage when there is an indication of a lack of 






1. Disclose voting records
2. Consider voting against
management proposals 
1. Institutional investors should 
disclose publicly voting records and 
disclose the use made, if any, of proxy
voting or other voting advisory 
services. 
2. Institutional investors should not 
automatically support the Board. If 
they have been unable to reach a 
satisfactory outcome through active 
dialogue, then they should register an 
abstention or vote against the 
resolution. 
1. BlackRock maintains and publicly reports a record of 
their voting, engagement and other stewardship activities.
2. BlackRock will vote in favour of proposals where they 
support the approach taken by a company’s management 
or where we have engaged on matters of concern and 
anticipate management will address them. BlackRock will 
vote against management proposals where we believe the 
Board or management may not have adequately acted to 
protect and advance the interests of long-term investors. 
 3 
 3 
According to Table 4.3, SVM, which is a Tier 2 signatory, received a score of 1 for disclosing 
its voting activities. The Stewardship Code requires institutional investors to publicly 
disclose their voting records for the use of both internal and external users. However, SVM 
decided not to follow this guideline and only publishes voting records for its clients, if they 
require them. SVM’s approach towards the publication of voting records received a score of 
1 since they did not comply with the FRC’s guideline and the explanation given was 
inadequate. Compared to SVM, BlackRock as a Tier 1 signatory received a score of 3 since 




report of their stewardship activities, including their voting records. Considering the last 
guideline on voting activities, SVM has also received a score of 1. Based on the SVM’s 
stewardship statements, this signatory will not consider voting against unless their clients 
ask them. Also, it did not provide an acceptable reason for following this approach. In 
contrast to SVM, BlackRock’s statement makes it clear that they follow the Stewardship 
Code’s guideline and consider voting against management proposals. BlackRock also 
provided some examples of the situations where they would vote in favour or against 
proposals. According to the rating system, Blackrock received a score of 3. 
 
In addition to monitoring and voting, the total rate of the stewardship activities is also 
included as an independent variable. This variable is the sum of voting and monitoring 
activities of asset managers achieved in our rating system.  
● Other Variables 
In addition to monitoring and voting variables, size and age of the equity funds are also 
entered in the statistical analysis as the control variables, to address the impact of general 
fund characteristics on their performance. These variables have been applied in previous 
studies which investigated fund performance (Chen et al., 2004; Dahlquist et al., 2000; 
Ferreira et al., 2012; Pollet & Wilson 2008; Thomas & Tonks, 2001; Yan 2008). Fund size is 
one of the most studied variables among the researchers who investigated the fund 
performance. Ferreira et al. (2012) proposed that larger funds have some advantages over 
smaller funds, including having access to more resources, more ability to negotiate with 
their investee corporate due to their size. Despite these advantages, larger funds might face 
management challenges. For instance, while smaller funds can focus on a few investment 
positions, managers of larger funds must continue to look for excellent investment 
opportunities. Besides, smaller funds are more active compared to larger funds who are 
more likely to follow a market index such as S&P 500 (Cremers & Petajisto, 2009). 
Considering the above arguments, the academic evidence relating to this variable is not 
conclusive. For example, Grinblatt and Titman (1994) found mixed results on the 
relationship between fund returns and fund size. Whereas, Ferreira et al., (2012) found a 




Thus, their finding indicates that smaller funds performed better than larger funds. But in 
this study, it was found that for non-US funds (e.g. Indonesia, Portugal, and Belgium and 
lower in the UK, Australia, Canada, France), this relationship is significantly positive. Ferreira 
et al. (2012) proposed that the reason behind this finding is that funds that performed 
better were large family funds with economies of scale, enabling these funds to share the 
research and administrative expenses among funds. Based on the above findings, it is 
important to control for the fund size as it might affect the financial performance of the UK 
equity funds which are included in our sample.  
Previous studies also considered the maturity of the funds to explore their performance. 
According to Ferreira et al. (2012), fund age represents the fund’s longevity and the 
management’s ability. They proposed that in comparison to older funds, younger funds are 
more motivated to enhance their performance. On the other hand, these funds face more 
expenses and might suffer from a lack of experience compared to older funds. Hence, it is 
essential to include this available in the regression analysis. 
Thomas and Tonks (2001) examined whether the characteristics of pension funds, including 
the fund size and fund maturity, had an impact on their performance. These authors 
proposed that large funds, due to the size of assets in their portfolios faced less freedom 
compared to smaller funds, which can take advantage of investing in a wide range of 
securities. To incorporate the size, this study investigated the sensitivity of the fund returns 
to the addition of a size premium. They found a significant result for smaller funds. This 
result was in line with their initial proposition, indicating that it is more difficult for larger 
funds to take advantage of investing in smaller companies as they have concerns about the 
liquidity of their investments. Considering the age of funds, this study could not find any 
difference in the performance between mature and immature funds. In line with them, 
Ferreira et al. (2012) found no relationship between the age and performance of US mutual 
funds. In line with the previous studies, total assets of the fund is used to measure the 
fund’s size, and the launch date of the fund is used to measure the age (e.g. Ferreira et al., 
2012; Thomas & Tonks, 2001). Including these variables helps to control their effect on the 
financial performance to only explore the impact of the Stewardship Code on the financial 




In addition to the above variables, dummy variables were used to analyse the relationship 
between financial performance and application of the Stewardship Code. A dummy variable 
is a numerical variable, representing subgroups of the sample in the study. Including a 
dummy variable in the regression analysis helps to have multiple groups in a single 
regression equation. Tier of the statements which are determined by FRC is included as a 
dummy variable, representing two groups of funds in the study; one with high-quality 
stewardship statements categorised as Tier 1 by the FRC, and another group with lower 
quality statements categorised as Tier 2.  If an asset manager is grouped as Tier 1, it will 
receive a value of 1 and 0 otherwise.  
Another variable used in the statistical analysis is the categories of the funds, including 
Small-Cap and Large-Cap. This variable, representing another characteristic of funds, found 
in previous studies investigating the fund performance (e.g. Ferreira et al., 2012; El Ghoul & 
Karoui, 2017; Gorman, 2003; Thomas & Tonks, 2001). For example, Ferreira et al. (2012, 
p.523) used Large-cap as “a dummy variable that equals one if a fund total net asset is 
below the median SMB (i.e. the difference between the returns on a diversified portfolio of 
small and large stocks) factor loading, and zero otherwise”. These authors hypothesis that 
for large-cap funds, there should be less of an adverse fund size on performance compared 
to small-cap funds. Their findings were in line with this hypothesis, indicating that US 
international funds which invest more in large stocks (large-cap funds) have more 
investment opportunities and consequently facing fewer liquidity constraints as they can 
invest anywhere in the world, which they called liquidity constraint hypothesis. The morning 
star has clearly stated if the fund is categorised as small-cap or large-cap. Hence, we did not 
have to do any calculations. Including this variable will help to analyse the impact of 
application the Stewardship Code on the funds’ financial performance based on their 
categories. So, in another analysis, only the Small-Cap funds were included in the regression 
analysis to determine if the application of the Stewardship Code has influenced their 
performance. 
iv) Data Collection 
Following determining the dependent and independent variables and developing the rating 




available resources. First, the financial performance of UK equity funds along with their size 
and age gathered by using the funds’ factsheets and Morningstar website. In total, the 
financial performance, size and age of 209 UK equity funds were gathered. Then, each 
stewardship statement was analysed to rate monitoring and voting activities of the asset 
manager based on our rating system. The 209 UK equity funds included in the sample, were 
managed by 50 asset managers. Therefore, it was necessary to examine the stewardship 
statements of all 50 asset managers, including both Tier 1 and Tier 2 statements. The 
financial performance and the age of equity funds were available from 2013 to 2017, 
whereas the data related to the stewardship activities of asset managers were only available 
for 2016. This is because asset managers published one stewardship statement and only 
update this if they change their stewardship policies. The latest version of the Stewardship 
Code published by FRC goes back to 2012, and it has not been updated to date. This leads us 
to assume that the same level of stewardship activities was followed for three years before 
2016. Fact sheets of the equity funds give access to the latest size of the equity funds, being 
based on 2016 data. 
v) Data Analysis 
There is a range of quantitative analysis techniques, helping to examine, understand, 
describe and present the numerical data such as graphs, tables and statistics. After 
collecting the data, Excel was used to store the data. SPSS was used to run a regression 
analysis and determine the relationship between the application of the Stewardship 
Code and the financial performance of asset managers as the signatories of this 
guideline. The existing studies that investigate the financial performance of funds also 
applied regression analysis (Choi et al., 2016; Cuthbertson et al., 2016; Ferreira et al., 
2012; Thomas & Tonks, 2001). 
Applying regression analysis calculates the regression coefficient and the regression 
equation using the independent and dependent variables. This helps in the 
determination of any causal relationship between variables, as well as discovering the 
strength of this relationship (Smith, 2017). All the findings achieved from running the 
statistical analysis are explained in the next chapter. The following section describes the 




4.2.4 Qualitative Method 
As aforementioned, conducting a statistical analysis during the quantitative stage would 
help this study to find the relationship between the application of the Stewardship Code and 
financial performance of asset managers who are following the Stewardship Code. On the 
other hand, using qualitative data helps to develop a theory by getting close to actors in 
order to examine and understand complex practices (Shah and Corley, 2006). Relying only 
on the quantitative data does not help to find an answer for the following research 
questions: 
 
“Question 2. To what extent has applying the Stewardship Code provided non-financial 
benefits to its signatories?” 
 
“Question 3. To what extent has the Stewardship Code been successful in enhancing the 
quality of engagement between investors and their investee corporates?” 
 
“Question 4. To what extent has the Stewardship Code been successful in achieving the aims 
that are proposed by FRC?” 
 
Interviews with signatories of the Stewardship Code were conducted to answer the above 
questions. Undertaking interviews would help to contextualise understanding by providing 
opinions on the strengths and weaknesses of the Stewardship Code as well as its impact on 
the quality of engagement with investee corporates. Also, interviews with signatories assist 
in exploring the statistical result further (Bryman, 2006). The following sections present the 
sample, the process of recruiting the interviewees as well as the data analysis approach, 
which is employed within the qualitative method. 
i) Choosing the Sample 
In line with the quantitative method, the qualitative approach also includes asset managers 
in the sample as the most appropriate group of institutional investors for the interviews. 




findings of both quantitative and qualitative methods. The FRC categorised stewardship 
statements into two groups:  Tier 1 and Tier 2. Among all asset managers’ stewardship 
statements, 69% of them are classified as Tier 1, and 31% are classified as Tier 2. 
Considering the different qualities of the stewardship statements, this study was intended 
to include both Tier 1 and Tier 2 statements in the qualitative sample.  
The FRC asked signatories to provide details of a responsible body, in their stewardship 
statements, which should provide further information about the stewardship activity of 
their institution. Those who were listed as the contact points in the stewardship statements 
have various responsibilities including Environmental, Social and Governance risks (ESG) 
analysts, Head of investment stewardship and Head of CG. These contact details were used 
to contact the individuals who were responsible for applying the Stewardship Code in their 
institution and invited them for the interview.  
ii) Ethical Consideration 
The second methodology stage of this study involves human participants. Therefore, it is 
essential to anticipate and address ethical issues that may arise when undertaking the 
study. The ethical issues may occur at different stages of the research including during the 
design of the study, recruiting the participants, data collection, processing and storing the 
data as well as analysing and reporting the data (Saunders et al., 2015). First, the researcher 
assessed the potential risk for the participants of the study as well as recognising any 
conflict of interests when designing the study. This study is, however, low risk as 
participants were being interviewed within a work or business context over non-sensitive 
issues. Second, when inviting the participant, they should be fully informed about the study 
by providing a participant information sheet (see Appendix A). Third, when the researcher is 
collecting data, it is essential to address ethical issues that may occur by giving the right of 
removal to the participants. In other words, the participants should be able to withdraw 
from the study without giving any explanation. Also, the participant should be ensured 
about privacy/anonymity rights. Fourth, when storing and analysing the data, the 
confidentiality and anonymity of the participants should be guaranteed. These matters were 
emphasised in the participant information sheet. Prior to conducting interviews, this study 




Committee, helping to anticipate and reflect on the potential ethical issues related to this 
study. The approved ethics form is provided in Appendix B. 
iii) Recruiting Interviewees 
The first approach to find the interviewees was to contact the individuals directly. In this 
approach, the invitation emails were sent to the potential participants, explaining the aim of 
the research and the interview procedure. This was followed by sending reminder emails to 
those who did not reply to the first invitation email. Besides, the SRI CONNECT website was 
used for advertising the study and inviting more participants. This website provides an 
online platform for institutional investors and quoted companies which are involved in 
sustainable development, providing a good source of contact for this study.  
 
The initial aim was to interview between 10 and 15 signatories of the Stewardship Code, 
depending on the responses received by the participants. After sending all the invitation and 
reminder emails, thirteen asset managers agreed to participate in the interviews. Among 
the different recruitment techniques, directly contacting the individual was the successful 
approach leading to finding nearly all of the participants for the interviews. Only one of the 
participants was found using a snowball sampling technique. Only one of the participants is 
classified as Tier 2, meaning their stewardship reporting is good, but it still needs some 
improvements. The rest are categorised as Tier 1, showing a high-quality reporting of their 













Table 4.5 List of Participants 
Participant Position Tier AUM* Country  
A Head of Investment Stewardship 1 £337 bn UK 
B Head of Ethical and Responsible Investment 1 £574 m UK 
C Head of Corporate Governance 2 £4.09 bn UK 
D ESG Analyst 1 £621 bn UK 
E Head of Corporate Governance 1 £3376.78 bn USA 
F Principal in Responsible Investment Team 1 £182.03 bn USA 
G Head of Governance Research 1 £45.9 bn UK 
H Stewardship Analyst 1 £26.2bn UK 
I ESG Integration 1 £36.73 bn UK 
J ESG Analyst 1 £4.38 bn UK 
K Head of Corporate Governance and responsible investment 
team 
1 £238342.96 m Canada 
L Head of Stewardship 1 £655.63 bn Switzerland 
M Head of Research and leads the integration of sustainability 
analysis 
1 £115 m UK 
*AUM: Total Asset Under Management
These participants were responsible for following the proposed guidelines of the 
Stewardship Code and preparing the stewardship statements within the institutions they 
represent. As a result, they should have a thorough understanding of the Stewardship Code 
as well as the shareholder responsibilities in their investee corporates.   
It is notable that the saturation point was reached as no new data emerged from the final 
interviews. Hence, the sample size was appropriate for this study. The next section provides 





iv) Data Collection  
After receiving the approval for the interview, the participant information sheet and consent 
form were sent by email to the interviewees. Then, a follow-up email was sent to arrange 
interview dates and venues. For the convenience of participants, in addition to the face to 
face interviews, Skype and telephone interviews were also offered. Face to face interviews 
were held at participants’ offices.  
Interviews can be highly structured by asking specific questions per participant or they could 
be informal, using unconstructed conversations (Saunders et al., 2015). Reviewing the 
existing papers that investigate shareholder engagement revealed that most of them rely on 
quantitative data and mainly focus on the relationship between shareholders engagement 
and the performance of investee corporates (e.g. Cziraki et al., 2010; Filatotchev & 
Dotsenko, 2015; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Judge et al., 2010; Tihanyi et al., 2003). Only a 
small number of studies applied qualitative methods to explore institutional investor 
engagement (e.g. Coffee & Black 1994; Hendry et al., 2007; Tilba & McNulty; 2013). For 
example, Tilba and McNulty (2013) used 35 in-depth semi-structured interviews to examine 
the ownership behaviour of pension funds in relation to investee corporates. In line with 
these, this study used semi-structured interviews, permitting the creation of a list of key 
questions to be included in each interview. These questions were specifically designed to 
focus the discussions towards answering the research questions. Despite having this list, the 
researcher was free to change the order of questions as well as to add or omit a question, 
depending on the flow of the conversation (Saunders et al., 2015). Answering the interview 
questions helps to explain the impact of the application of the Stewardship Code on its 
signatories (i.e. asset managers). To create the first draft of the interview questions, the 
structure of interview questions found in Tilba and McNulty (2013) was followed. In line 
with this structure, we included some questions allowing the participants to introduce 
themselves as well as their institutions. Then a few questions were included to add a history 
behind the institutions’ compliance with the Stewardship Code. After that, the questions 
were more specifically related to the application of the Stewardship Code, including the 




guideline, any difficulty that demotivated them from a complete application of the 
Stewardship Code. The statistical findings were also considered to develop some of the 
interview questions. Following this approach was important as it enabled the researcher to 
explore the quantitative findings. Below are those questions inspired by the quantitative 
stage of this study:  
a. Are you aware of any difficulties in applying the Stewardship code that prevents you 
from thoroughly following the guidelines? 
b. When performing stewardship activities which activities do you believe are more 
costly for your institution to accomplish? 
c. According to FRC, applying the Stewardship Code has a positive impact on investors. 
Since being the signatory of the Stewardship Code, what are the positive 
achievements for your institution, both financial and non-financial? 
d. How do you measure the success of your stewardship activities? 
All the interview questions are provided in Appendix C. 
Each interview lasted approximately thirty minutes to one hour. The interviews were held 
between October 2017 and April 2018. All the interviews were voice-recorded with the 
participants’ permission. Six of the interviews were face to face, three were telephone 
interviews, and four conducted through Skype. Following the data collection, the interviews 
were transcribed and subjected to thematic analysis to explore the interview results, which 
is explained in the next section. 
v) Data Analysis 
After completing the 13 interviews, the thematic analysis approach was followed to search 
for themes that appeared across the dataset concerning the research objectives (Saunders 
et al., 2019). Thematic analysis is a generic approach used to analyse the qualitative data. 
The main aim of this approach is to look for themes, emerging from the data set (Saunders 
et al., 2019). The researcher is required to code the qualitative data to find the themes for 
further analysis, relating to the main research questions. In applying thematic analysis, the 
focus was in participants’ opinion about the Stewardship Code and their experience as the 




responses. Conducting thematic analysis involved four steps, including coding the data, 
searching for themes, defining themes and describing the findings.  
The first step of data analysis began with transcribing the recorded interviews. In total, 425 
minutes of interviews were conducted, resulting in 124 pages of transcription. One of the 
transcribed interviews is attached in Appendix D. After transcription, reading and 
familiarising with the content of the dataset was the next important data analysis step. The 
researcher found this as an essential phase to identify what the data entails and to notice 
the emerging pattern across the dataset. After familiarising with the data, the coding was 
applied to organise the responses and categorise the data that has a similar meaning. Due 
to lack of prior academic studies, the researcher followed a comprehensive coding approach 
to identify any relevant data to fulfil the main aim of this study within the dataset (Braun & 
Clarke, 2013). For coding and analysing the interview data, NVivo qualitative data analytics 
was used (Gibbs, 2002). Using the NVivo enables the qualitative data to be analysed using 
codes, keywords, word frequencies and theme cross-comparison (Tilba & McNulty, 2013). 
Following a complete coding approach, any data that potentially addresses the research 
objectives were given a code. It is notable that when familiarising with the data, the most 
occurring patterns were recorded and used later as the initial list of codes. Also, the 
interview questions were used as a basis to add to the initial list of codes for further analysis 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). In line with the complete coding approach, the researcher believed 
that all the interview responses were essential to answer the research questions thoroughly, 
therefore, more codes were added when necessary.  
When coding was finished, the themes were grouped into six categories, including Asset 
Manager, Client, Stewardship Code, Exploring Quantitative Findings, Important Response 
and others. These six categories were considered as the main codes, and the sub-codes 
covered different aspects of their parent codes. For example, the asset manager’s sub-code 
included the investment strategy of the institutional investor, the role of the participant, the 
main objective of the institution when managing assets, the date when the asset manager 
became a signatory of the Stewardship Code and the resources of the asset manager. 
Compared to the asset manager category, more sub-codes were related to the stewardship 




achievements, history, performance, stewardship activities, centralisation, formalisation and 
inspiration. Notably, some of the sub-codes were broken into smaller codes when 
necessary. For example, the stewardship activities as a sub-code categorised into ten codes 
including engagement, voting, dialogue, ESG consideration, monitoring, cost, topics, 
consistency, collective action and measurement. On the other hand, some of the main 
codes, such as exploring quantitative findings, did not have any sub-codes. Appendix E 
shows all the main codes and sub-codes developed during the first step of data analysis.  
At the end of this stage, all the codes were reviewed again to ensure there was no overlap 
between these codes. Following this approach helped to extract meaning from all the 
available data for an in-depth data analysis. After coding all the data, the main themes 
within the interview transcripts were identified, which will be explained in the next chapter. 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter outlined the research methodology of this study. The first section explained the 
researcher’s worldview (realism), which shaped the research methodology, and provided 
justification for the adoption of mixed methods. The second section describes the mixed 
methods, including the explanatory research design and the rationale for choosing this 
approach, being an attempt to better understand the application of the Stewardship Code 
and to explore the quantitative findings further. The third section of this chapter contains 
details of the sampling approaches and techniques that will be used to analyse both 
quantitative and qualitative data (i.e. regression analysis and thematic analysis).  
The next chapter presents the findings from running a statistical analysis of the quantitative 
data to determine the relationship between the application of the Stewardship Code and 
financial performance of asset managers as the main signatories of the Stewardship Code. 
This is then followed by the results from conducting interviews to determine the impact of 
the Stewardship Code on the quality of engagement between investors and companies as 






The Stewardship Code has been recognised as the first guideline in the world, promoting 
higher quality engagement between shareholders and their investee corporates. According 
to the FRC, compliance with the Code positively affects signatories, financially and non-
financially. There is a lack of empirical evidence around the effectiveness of the Stewardship 
Code in reaching its proposed aim. Completing the quantitative methodology phase will 
help to determine the financial benefit from the application of this Code for its signatories. 
Having access to the financial performance (i.e. dependent variable) and the stewardship 
activities (i.e. the independent variable) of asset managers who have followed the 
Stewardship Code allows this study to run a regression analysis between these two 
variables. This study is not aware of any academic research that investigates this 
relationship statistically. In addition to applying the statistical analysis, interviews with 
signatories of the Stewardship Code were conducted to determine any non-financial 
achievements from the application of this guideline. Combining the findings of both 
quantitative and qualitative methods enables this study to determine the success or failure 
of the Stewardship Code in achieving its proposed aim in relation to its signatories.  This 
chapter starts by presenting the results from the statistical analysis and then the qualitative 
findings from conducting interviews with a sample of those investors described in this 
chapter. 
5.1 Quantitative Findings 
The quantitative analysis initially assesses whether there is a relationship between asset 
managers’ financial performance and their application of the Stewardship Code.  
5.1.1. Sample Description  
Table 5.1 displays the sample description across the 50 asset managers included in the 
sample. According to the FRC (2016), Tier 1 signatories have provided good quality and 
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transparent description of their stewardship activities, whereas Tier 2 signatories have 
reported less transparently on their stewardship activities. According to Table 5.1, the mode 
for the tier of the stewardship statement is Tier 1 indicating the majority (78%) of asset 
managers within the sample are categorised as Tier 1 signatories, and the remainder (22%) 
Tier 2. This result suggests that most asset managers within the sample should receive the 
highest score for their stewardship activities. Based on the applied rating system applied, on 
average, asset managers received 11/18 points available on their stewardship activities, 
meaning they received 60% of the overall score. This result is in line with the fact that most 
asset managers are considered as Tier 1 by the FRC. Besides, the mode for voting scores is 6, 
indicating that most asset managers received the highest voting score by following the 
Stewardship Code’s guidelines thoroughly. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Mode 
Valid Missing 
Performance 50 0 3.6 18.26 8.45 3.60 
Tier of statement 50 0 0 1 0.78 1 
Sum of stewardship rate 50 0 1 17 11.48 12 
Total monitoring 50 0 0 11 7.48 10 
Total Voting 50 0 0 6 4.06 6 
Average of Size (Mil) 50 0 0.99 5,280 760.37 0.99* 
Average of Age 50 0 5.00 46.00 17.19 11.00 
*Multiple modes exist, the smallest value is shown
To better understand the data, Figure 5.1 illustrates the total stewardship rates of Tier 1 
asset managers and Tier 2 asset managers. This chart confirms that asset managers with Tier 
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1 stewardship statements have higher stewardship scores compared to asset managers with 
Tier 2 stewardship statements. 
Figure 5.1 Total Stewardship Rate by Tier 
5.1.2 Regression Analysis 
The first stage of this study aims to determine the relationship between the financial 
performance of asset managers and their stewardship activities, including monitoring and 
voting through the application of the Stewardship Code. Running the regression analysis will 
allow predictions to be made on the possible values of financial performance as the 
dependent variable from the known values of the monitoring and voting activates as the 
independent variables in a linear simple or multiple regression. Multiple Regression used in 
this study is given by: 
WAAP= β0+ β1 TV+ β2 TM+ β4 T+ β5 S+ β6 A +ε 
Here, the dependent variable is weighted average annual financial performance (WAAP) and 
the independent variables are total voting (TV) and total monitoring (TM). Also, tier of the 




(A) which are added as the controlling variables. In this formula ε is the error term. The 
exact definitions of these variables were discussed in the fourth chapter (section 4.3.3). In 
addition to multiple regression, we also investigate the correlation between each 
Independent Variable and the WAAP by using a simple linear regression. 
Before running the regression analysis all the assumptions that applied to the simple 
regression analysis including multicollinearity were met. Pearson correlation table in the 
SPSS was used to check the multicollinearity between the independent variables. 
Multicollinearity suggests correlation or multiple correlation that has the power to affect 
the regression estimates adversely: as the degree of multicollinearity increases the 
regression model estimates of the coefficients become inaccurate and over inflated.  Results 
are shown in Table 5.2.  Correlations greater than 0.7 were identified between the 
Independent Variables, suggesting the existence of multicollinearity among the Independent 
Variables. Given that Total Stewardship Rate is the sum of total monitoring and total voting 
rates (hence the multicollinearity between these variables), when total stewardship rate 
was included in the regression analysis the other two variables (i.e. total monitoring rate 
and total voting rate) were excluded. 
In addition, a variance inflation factor (VIF) test was undertaken to check for collinearity 
(Table 5.3). Any variable whose VIF values are greater than 10 may merit further 
investigation. To test for collinearity the independent variables were entered separately as a 
dependent variable to check the VIF among variables. Based on the obtained results, all of 






















Total Monitoring Rate Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .579** -.175 .736** -.736** .949** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .229 .000 .000 .000 
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Total Voting Rate Pearson 
Correlation 
.579** 1 -.102 .674** -.674** .800** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .484 .000 .000 .000 
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 
WAAP Pearson 
Correlation 
-.175 -.102 1 -.204 .204 -.176 
Sig. (2-tailed) .229 .484 .159 .159 .227 
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Tier 1 Pearson 
Correlation 
.736** .674** -.204 1 -1.000** .799** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .159 .000 .000 
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Tier 2 Pearson 
Correlation 
-.736** -.674** .204 -1.000** 1 -.799** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .159 .000 .000 
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Total Stewardship Rate Pearson 
Correlation 
.949** .800** -.176 .799** -.799** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .227 .000 .000 
N 49 49 49 49 49 49 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 5.3 Collinearity Test 
Collinearity Statistics 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF 
Age 1.172 1.154 1.213 - 1.225
Size 1.034 1.062 1.082 1.086 - 
Monitoring Rate 2.364 - 1.589 2.255 2.342 
Voting Rate - 2.041 1.651 1,978 1.970 
Tier 2.225 1.849 - 2.759 2.778 
Dependent Variable Voting Rate Monitoring Rate Tier Age Size 
The rest of the regression analysis assumptions are explained in Appendix F. The following 
section describes the result from running simple, and multiple regression analyses are 
reported. 
i) 1st Model
In the first regression model, weighted average annual financial performance (WAAP) was 
included as the Dependent Variable in the multiple regression. Then total voting (TV) and 
total monitoring (TM) were added as the Independent Variables. The Tier of the 
Stewardship statements was transformed into a dummy variable. Moreover, the age and 
size were included as the controlling variables to ensure that they did not affect the financial 
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performance of asset managers. Applying a hierarchical multiple regression would help to 
predict the value of financial performance while controlling for these two potential 
variables. While the size and age of funds represent the characteristics of the sample, their 
impact on the financial performance is unwanted. Hence, these two variables are called 
confounding-covariate variables. To run the hierarchical multiple regression, the function 
was applied in the SPSS. as well as the age and size which were included as the controlling 
variables. The result of this multiple regression is presented in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 First Model 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression with controlling variables (Age and Size) 












Monitoring Rate -0.210 0.351
Voting Rate 0.242 0.250
Tier  -0.130 0.591
Sig. 0.523 0.548 
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Adjusted 𝑅!  -0.014 -0.020
R Square Change 0.027 0.057
Sig. F Change 0.523 0.441
Model A only includes the size and age of the funds as the predictor variables. The p-value 
(p=0.523) of this model in the ANOVA table indicates that these two variables cannot 
predict the value of the financial performance. This finding is in line with Ferreira et al., 
(2012) who could not find any relationship between the age of the funds and their 
performance. This is in contrast with other previous studies which identified fund age as a 
predictor variable in their model (Ferreira et al., 2012; Thomas & Tonks, 2001). Model B 
includes the Independent Variables as well as the size and age of the funds. According to the 
p-value of this model (p=0.548), none of the predictor variables made a statistically
significant contribution to predicting the outcome (i.e. WAAP of the funds). This finding is
the same as the previous articles which doubted the success of the Stewardship Code in
achieving its proposed aims (i.e. to benefit institutional investors) (e.g. Arsalidou, 2012;
Roach, 2011; Tilba & McNulty, 2012).
ii) 2nd Model
The second simple regression analysis was conducted between WAAP as the Dependent 
Variable and the total stewardship rate as the Independent Variable. This model aimed to 
determine whether the value of the Dependent Variable can be predicted by the 
Independent Variable. The results are presented in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 Second Model 














According to the table 5.5, 1% of the variability in the Dependent Variable (WAAP) can be 
accounted for by the Independent Variable (Stewardship rate) (i.e. Adjusted R Square= 
0.01). The ANOVA table, however, illustrates that the 1% association between the 
Dependent Variable and Independent Variable is not statistically significant (F= 1.50, p-
value=0.227). This result suggests that it is not possible to predict the value of Dependent 
Variable (WAPP) by the Independent Variable (total stewardship rate) through applying this 
simple regression model. The correlation coefficients table represents the same result, 
suggesting that there is not a significant correlation between the Independent Variable and 
the Dependent Variable (beta= - 0.176, p-value=0.227). In other words, by increasing or 
decreasing the stewardship rate (i.e. Independent Variable), the WAAP of the UK equity 
funds (i.e. Dependent Variable) will not change. This result indicates that a thorough 
application of the Stewardship Code did not provide any financial benefits for asset 
managers as signatories of this guideline. This finding is in contrast with the aims of the FRC 
proposing that applying the Stewardship Code will benefit institutional investors. Total 
stewardship rate is the sum of the monitoring rate and voting rate. The next two models 
include these two variables to run simple regression analysis explained in the following 
section. 




The third and fourth simple regression analysis run between the same Dependent Variable 
(i.e. WAAP) and total monitoring and total voting scores as the IVs. The results from running 
these two models are presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. 
 
Table 5.6 Third Model 
Simple Regression Analysis - Total 
Monitoring 
 




Constant - 0.000  






Adjusted 𝑅!  0.010   
 
 
Table 5.7 Fourth Model 
Simple Regression Analysis - Total 
Voting 
 




Constant - 0.000  







Running these models illustrate that none of the above simple regression models were 
statistically significant at p<.05 (3rd model: p-value=.229, 4th model p-value=.484). 
Therefore, there is no significant relationship between the Dependent Variable and 
Independent Variables, suggesting that the variance of the WAAP of UK equity funds cannot 
be accounted for by the monitoring or voting scores of asset managers as the signatories of 
the Stewardship Code. In other words, disclosing a transparent report on the stewardship 
activities does not illustrate a better performance among the signatories of this guideline. 
Hence, asset managers should not expect that applying the Stewardship Code would make 
any difference in their financial performance, at least over a short period of time. In 
addition, finding no financial benefit is in contrast with the FRC’s claim. Proposing an 
outcome which is not achievable by institutional investors would discourage them from 
complying with this guideline. It is notable that these statistical results are in line with the 
first regression model.  
vi) Dummy Variables
In the fifth regression model, the Tier of the stewardship statements transformed into a 
dummy variable. Then a regression analysis was conducted to determine the impact of this 
variable on the WAAP.  The regression results are presented in Table 5.8.  
Table 5.8 Fifth Model 














Adjusted 𝑅! 0.003 
The FRC developed a tiering system in 2016 by focusing on the signatories’ statements to 
determine the best stewardship reporting against the Stewardship Code. Based on this 
tiering system, it could be argued that Tier 1 asset managers practice their stewardship 
activities more effectively when compared to Tier 2. On the other hand, the FRC believes 
that effective stewardship, through following the principles of Stewardship Code benefits 
companies, investors and the economy as a whole. In contrast with this proposition, the 
statistical results do not indicate a significant relationship between the Tier of the 
stewardship statements and the WAAP of UK equity funds (F=1.150, P=0.289). Therefore, 
Tier 1 asset managers who practised effective stewardship through following the 
Stewardship Code did not experience better financial performance when compared to Tier 2 
asset managers. This result could suggest that some asset managers might disclose a high-
quality stewardship report but not practice a high-quality stewardship activity in their 
investee corporates. Therefore, only relying on stewardship statements alone does not 
provide a comprehensive measurement of stewardship activities of asset managers. 
v) Small-Cap Funds
Another regression analysis was run to only include the Small-cap funds in the sample. This 
has reduced the sample size from 50 to 19 asset managers who held small-cap UK equity 
funds in their portfolios. In this regression analysis, WAAP of the funds incorporated as the 
DV. Also, due to the small sample size, the total stewardship rate was used as the
Independent Variable (Table 5.9).
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Table 5.9 Sixth Model 













In this model, the p-value (p=0.525) presented in the ANOVA table indicates that the total 
stewardship rate cannot predict the value of the financial performance. Similar to the above 
analysis, the application of the Stewardship Code cannot predict the value of the WAAP for 
the Small-Cap funds. Therefore, the category of the fund does not make any difference in 
the final quantitative finding. This finding is in contrast with the previous studies that found 
a significant relationship between the characteristics of the funds and their financial 
performance (e.g. Ferreira et al., 2012). 
5.1.3 Summary of Quantitative Findings 
According to the UK Stewardship Code (2012), effective stewardship activities “benefits 
companies, investors and the economy as a whole”. To investigate the Stewardship Code, 
this study focused on asset managers, managing UK equity funds to identify the benefits of 
applying this guideline. Hence, the relationship between the WAAP of asset managers and 
their application of the Stewardship Code was statistically analysed. As explained above, 
there was not any significant relationship between applying the Stewardship Code and the 
WAAP of asset managers. Considering the main objective of asset managers (i.e. to protect 
and enhance the value for their clients through improving their returns), the obtained 
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statistical result indicates that asset managers could not benefit from applying the 
Stewardship Code financially in the short term. This finding is against what the Stewardship 
Code aimed for, specifically benefiting companies, investors and the economy as a whole.  
It is notable that the Dependent Variable only measured the WAAP during three years 
before 2017. The FRC, however, emphasised on the long-term impact of the Stewardship 
Code by proposing that “the Code aims to enhance the quality of engagement and help to 
improve the long-term returns to shareholders”. Long-term financial performance data, 
therefore, could produce different statistical trends to those indicated here. Besides, this 
study is aware of the limitations when conducting a statistical analysis, including the sample 
size or missing any important variables in the regression models. By only having asset 
managers in the sample, the study has limited the generalizability of the findings to other 
groups of institutional investors, including asset owners and service providers (Creswell, 
2014). 
Moreover, the financial performance of asset managers was measured using the weighted 
average performance of their UK equity funds. Hence, using other measurements might 
provide different results. Besides, to measure the financial benefit of the Stewardship Code, 
we only focused on the annual financial return, whereas exercising the stewardship 
activities could result in a reduction of risk. In other words, applying the Stewardship Code 
could lower the volatility faced by investors. The available data did not allow this study to 
investigate this relationship further.  
In conclusion, focusing on the financial benefit is not enough to determine whether the 
Stewardship Code has been successful in achieving its proposed aims, including enhancing 
the quantity and quality of the engagement. Therefore, conducting interviews with asset 
managers is essential to better understand the Stewardship Code and to fulfil the following 
aims: i) the interviews would help to find an explanation for the statistical results and to 
explore them further; ii) interviews help to determine the non-financial benefits of applying 
the Stewardship Code, which could not be included in the statistical analysis; iii) it is 
essential to find the motivation of asset managers behind applying the Stewardship Code. 
The interview findings are presented in the following section. 
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5.2 Qualitative Findings 
Invitation emails were sent for signatory of the Stewardship Code and invite them to 
participate in this study.  Based on the quantitative findings, applying the Stewardship Code 
has not brought any positive financial results for its signatories, in a short period, despite 
the promise of the FRC. This raises the importance of conducting interviews with signatories 
of the Stewardship Code to investigate further the quantitative findings as well as 
determining any non-financial outcome achieved from applying this guideline by them. In 
total, thirteen individuals agreed to participate. After recording and transcribing the 
interviews, they were analysed in detail to identify the main emerging themes. Thematic 
analysis was applied to determine these themes, which is explained in the following section. 
5.2.1 Main Themes 
Analysing interview responses revealed four main themes: 
i)Motivation
ii)Impact of Applying the Stewardship Code on Engagement
iii)Benefit of applying the Stewardship Code
iv)Quality of the Stewardship Code.
The first theme (Motivation) emerged when asset managers were explaining the catalyst for 
applying the Stewardship Code and engaging with investees corporates in general. The 
second key theme emerged when the asset managers were asked about the impact from 
applying the Code on their engagement. Analysing this theme revealed that a majority of 
asset managers (80%) emphasised that no significant change in practice had resulted from 
applying the Stewardship Code in their institution, financially and non-financially. After 
finding that most of the signatories did not notice any significant difference from applying 
the Stewardship Code, it was essential to focus on the responses that revealed the 
“Benefits” from applying this guideline. The final key theme that emerged from the 
interviews was the “Quality” of the Code from asset managers’ point of view. All of these 
key themes are explained in more detail in the following sections.  
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i) Motivation
Given that the statistical results indicated no significant relationship between applying the 
Stewardship Code and the financial performance for asset managers, it was essential to 
investigate further asset managers’ motivations for applying the Stewardship Code. The 
central theme of motivation is divided into “motivation in engaging with investee 
corporates” and “motivation for applying the Stewardship Code”.  Themes, sub-themes and 
frequency of occurrence are illustrated in table 5.10. 
Table 5.10 Motivation Sub-Themes 
Sub-themes 1 Sub-theme 2 Frequency of 
occurrence 
Engagement Motivation ● Understand the business
● Agency problem












● Not to be an outlier
● Easy to comply







Respondents were asked to explain their motivation in engaging with investee corporates 




“Understanding the business”, “Agency problem”, “Being a responsible investor”, “Helping 
the investee corporates” and “Clients”, as the sub-themes. All of these sub-themes are 
explained in more detail below: 
○ Understanding the business 
More than half of the respondents expressed their engagement motivation as a way to 
understand the business of the investee corporates better. For example, when participant H 
was asked about their motivation in engaging with their investee corporates, the answer 
was: 
“... hopefully gains like a deeper understanding of the company-specific issues that may or 
may not be financially material”.  
 
This participant mentioned the corporate culture as an example of using the engagement to 
understand the business of their investee corporates and stated that: 
“The values around corporate culture … So, things like are people happy? Are people giving 
the right training? Do they feel like they’re in an environment that they want to stay in? You 
can really find these things out by engaging in companies to an extent” (participant H). 
 
Participant L emphasised building a good relationship with their investee corporates and 
developing a deeper understanding of the business as a motivational reason for 
engagement: 
“The main aim of our engagement is to get to know some of our companies better. That’s 
the first approach that we take. We want to know the companies in which we invest and 
understand as much as we possibly can about and not just about their financial results but to 
build a relationship with those companies over time”.  
 
Understanding business operations and strategy was also considered a key reason for 
engagement by participant I, who highlighted that this was central to their investment 
approach: 
“... we’ve always been an active investing house, so that means that we do not follow the 




different companies. So that means also to get a better understanding of companies also 
makes it quite important that you meet with them on a regular basis.” 
 
Like participant I, participant M referred back to their investment approach:  
“We have a relatively long holding period for stocks in our portfolio, so we tend to hold 
companies, I think on average at the moment around six years that we hold companies.  So, 
if you are going to hold the company for that length of time, it makes sense to understand 
them”. 
 
Based on this theme, some asset managers found that engagement is necessary to 
understand the business of their investee corporates better, to help inform investment 
decisions and provide additional information beyond that which can be determined from 
the financials.  This was deemed particularly important if holding periods are medium to 
long term.  
○ Helping investee corporates  
The next key theme that emerged was to help investee corporates. A majority of 
respondents (6 out of 13) stated that they engage with investee corporates in order to help 
investee corporates improve their CG practices and perform better. For example, participant 
G reported that: 
“I don’t want you to leave thinking now our stewardship approach is about scrutiny and 
monitoring, no, we want companies to do well. Companies are not the enemy.  We need the 
return, we back these people, we love them, yeah, and that’s good. Sometimes these 
conversations can dwell on the negatives, that’s not what (name of the institution) is about, 
that’s not why we invest in the company, we are active, we are not activist”. 
 
On the other hand, while participant K stressed delivering long-term sustainable 
shareholder values, he added that: 
“… those companies that have either poor practices or higher risk if we reach out to talk with 
those companies, alert them to the risk, make suggestions sometimes to how they might 
change or improve their practices”. 
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This sentiment was echoed by participant J: 
“So mainly it is that the better run the company, hopefully, the better the company will do. 
And so, we would like to engage with companies in order for that to happen”. 
In summary, nearly half of asset managers believe that through engagement they can help 
investee corporates to perform better and consequently benefit themselves through 
improving shareholder value in the long term. It is notable that although the financial 
benefits have not been directly quoted: these returns have been implicitly mentioned by 
participants (e.g. J and G) when they were explaining engagement motivation.  
○ Agency Problem
Reviewing previous academic studies that investigate shareholders engagement revealed 
that shareholders could help to reduce the agency problem through closing the existing gap 
between investors and their investee corporates (Mallin, 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Solomon, 2013; Stapledon, 1996). In line with these academic findings, 4 out of 13 
participants referred to reducing the agency problem as one of their motivations behind 
engaging with their investee corporates. For example, participant E mentioned aligning the 
interest of shareholders and the investee corporates as the reason behind their engagement 
and stated that:  
“Corporate governance is about the agency problem. How do I know if I give my money to 
you that you manage it in my best interest and not yours …. So, our job, our fiduciary duty is 
to make sure that the businesses we invest in are being run in the best interest of their 
owners, our clients, and not the managers”. 
Participant D also addressed the agency problem in his interview and added that: 
“When we identify gaps, or we believe that there is a risk that can have a potential credit 
quality impact. And as a fixed income investor, we are concerned about things that can 
impact credit quality, and we will ensure that one way we mitigate that risk is by 





Moreover, when participant H was explicitly asked “When you are engaging with investee 
corporates do you find any gaps between your expectations and your objectives from the 
investee corporates’ objectives or management objective?” he responded that: 
 
“… to an extent investor expectations and company expectations haven’t been in line, but 
they’ve been brought more closely together because now investors are engaging in these 
topics of companies getting a bit of new answer on talking about these issues and also 
where engaging we are kind of learning how to approach these issues” [sic] . 
 
Participants found engaging with the investee corporates helpful to resolve the agency 
problem through closing the existing gap between their interest and the investee 
corporates’ interest. This finding is inline with the traditional academics literature, 
proposing that  institutional investors, as the largest group of UK shareholders could ensure 
the managers are following the same interest as the shareholders and help to reduce the 
agency problems that may exist in their corporates (e.g. Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
○ Clients 
In addition to the above motivations, 30% of the respondents highlighted adding value for 
their clients as the motivation behind engaging with their investee corporates. Participant C, 
for example, stated that: 
“... the reason that we engage with these investment companies and try to promote 
responsible CG and best practice of CG is because we do think that we can make more 
money for our clients that way”. 
 
This was also reflected by participant K, who stated that: 
“... we think that we can use our position as a shareholder to really improve corporate 
practices and as a result, deliver better long-term shareholder value…”. 
 
Solomon (2013) argued that institutional investors, to some degree, engage actively with 




interested in competing with other institutions to win clients through having effective 
engagement strategies rather than worrying about other intuitions benefiting from their 
activities (i.e. free rider problem). This key theme suggests that the asset owners are aware 
of the importance of shareholder engagement in the investee corporates and keep asset 
managers accountable for their stewardship activities. This appeared to be particularly so 
with regards to engagement on social responsibility and corporate governance issues, as 
voiced by participant I:  “…our clients, I think, also have a large demand for an asset 
manager who is really looking to sustainability practice, CG issues, etc., also from a 
reputational issue”. 
 
This theme indicates that asset managers do not only publish their stewardship statements 
to meet the requirements of the FRC. Instead, they also have to show to their clients how 
they are exercising their stewardship activities. 
○ Social Media 
Finally, two asset managers mentioned the increasing impact of social media when 
explaining their motivation behind engaging with the investee corporates. For example, 
participant E stated that: 
“… I think social media, 24 hours of news, is much higher: to do bad stuff around the world 
and get away with it compared to 10, 20, 30 years ago. So, there is a lot more profile and 
more visibility around these issues”. 
 
Also, the second participant (I) stated that: 
“… a lot of the pension funds can basically, they get a lot of heat from the media and from 
their beneficiaries about how they’re invested, and why on a variety of topics on 
controversial weapons or sustainability matters etc.”.  
 
These responses suggest that asset managers are concerned that not engaging in the 
investee corporates could attract negative attention from social media and adversely affect 





Finding from the above sub-themes indicates that asset managers emphasised non-financial 
factors over financial factors when explaining their motivation in engaging with their 
investee corporates. These included understanding the business of their investee corporates 
better, reducing the agency problem, meeting client expectations and finally, responding to 
pressure from social media.  
 
In summary, the engagement motivations stated by participants revealed that only two 
participants mentioned value creation for clients. It is notable the emphasis of those 
participants was on long-term value creation for their clients. Since the application of the 
Code is linked with engagement, this finding is in line with the statistical result where no 
significant relationship between applying the Stewardship Code and the financial 
performance of asset managers was identified. After finding the engagement motivations, 
the interviews were investigated to find the reason behind applying the Stewardship Code, 
which is explained in the following section. 
● Motivation of applying the Stewardship Code 
In addition to the above themes that explained the motivation behind engagement with the 
investee corporates few participants specifically explained the motivation behind applying 
the Stewardship Code. When participant E stated that the Stewardship Code did not help 
their fund to improve their stewardship responsibilities he was asked: What is the point in 
being a signatory of the Stewardship Code if you were doing the same thing before?”. This 
participant categorised the motivation behind applying the Stewardship Code into a public 
recognition, requests by existing clients, attracting new clients, not wanting to be an outlier, 
easy to comply and to be a signatory of the CG Code. Participant E stated that: 
 
“I think we have also had a growing subsidiary of clients who are specifically asking about 
things like the UNPR, the principles of responsible investment, you know do you sign to these 
principles, which we do by the way and, are you a stewardship signatory?” 
 
More importantly, this participant discussed attracting new clients by following the best 





“…there is a huge industry around matching clients to asset managers. So, clients with a pool 
of capital all do a search for a fund manager... The first point of contact you get, I think, with 
an RFP (i.e. request for proposal) refer of the proposal, which is like a big questionnaire 
which a client or a consultant will be sent to us and say on a whole bunch of issues about 
your investment process and your compliance … and increasingly they are asking about ESG 
and the Stewardship”. 
 
Another interesting explanation found in the response of participant C, who raised two 
reasons for implementing the Stewardship Code including to encourage responsible 
behaviour amongst asset managers and to demonstrate best practice to clients: 
 
“And the reason we signed up to the Stewardship Code was because we want to encourage 
other investors to take the same responsible attitude…. we also wanted to be able to 
demonstrate to our clients, you know, that we follow the best practice and to demonstrate 
that we are signed up to all the best practice documents”.  
 
When explaining the motivation behind applying the Stewardship Code, asset managers did 
not mention improving the quantity or quality of their engagement. This finding indicates 
that the Stewardship Code has not been successful in achieving its primary aim proposed by 
the FRC (i.e. to enhance the quality of engagement between institutional investors and 
investee corporates). 
 
ii) Impact of Applying the Stewardship Code on Engagement 
The next key theme was evident in more than 80% of the interviews where asset managers 
highlighted that applying the Stewardship Code did not have any significant impact on their 
engagement behaviour, or their engagement policies. For example, when respondent B was 
asked whether applying the Stewardship Code helped to improve engagement practices the 
answer was:  “…the Stewardship Code coming along did not really change that commitment 





Also, participant A stated that: “… the Code did not actually change any of our behaviours 
because we were doing it anyway”.  
 
Participant C provided another example of no significant change: 
“I would not say it helped to improve it, no. We’ve always been quite hard on our 
engagement with boards, and that aspect of things has not changed. You know since the 
Stewardship Code was introduced and promoted”. 
 
Based on the latest review of the Stewardship Code by FRC (2017), it was concluded that 
“the quality and quantity of stewardship has improved since the Code was introduced in 
2010”. This theme, however, illustrates that the majority of participants agreed on finding 
no impact on their engagement activities from the application of the Stewardship Code. 
Following the appearance of this focal theme, it was essential to look at the reasons given to 
explain why the Stewardship Code has not changed engagement policies or behaviours. 
That led to the following sub-themes (Table 5.10). 
 
Table 5.10 Engagement in the Stewardship Code: Sub-Themes 
Sub-themes 1 Frequency of occurrence 
Already doing it 84% 
Good access already exists 23% 




○ Already Doing it 
Most of the signatories surveyed could not find a significant change from applying the 
Stewardship Code to their engagement since they have always been committed to 
performing their stewardship responsibilities. When participant E was asked about the 
impact of the Stewardship Code on their engagement policy, the answer was: 
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“It did not change anything that we were already doing.” 
In fact, the participants emphasised on their long history of engagement, which goes back to 
the time before the publication of the Stewardship Code. According to respondent L, the 
Stewardship Code could not help them to improve their engagement to a great deal and 
added that: 
“... we have been engaging with investee companies here in the UK since 1997, so we have a 
long history of knowing the companies in the UK in which we invest for our clients and 
engaging with these companies. We published our first responsible investment document in 
2002. So, we’ve got quite a history”. 
Also, participant J included their history of engagement when explaining the impact of the 
Stewardship Code, saying that: 
“I think we probably knew and had been doing a lot of engagement … prior to sort of having 
the Stewardship Code as a thing … that we would...look at in a company”. 
In line with that, participant C emphasised on their history of voting and stated that: 
“No, I think we’ve always done this certainly I mean (name of the institution) has run 
ethically aware mandates for 40 years we’ve been making active use of proxy votes in all 
markets at least since 1984 when the famous Avon letter was published in the US which 
defined voting rights as an asset and made it an obligation of asset managers to exercise 
those votes”. 
When most asset managers could not name any significant change from applying the 
Stewardship Code, a majority of them (84%) highlighted their long history of engagement 
that goes back before the publication of this guideline. This finding suggests that the 
respondents of this study have practised an effective engagement in their investee 
corporates, resulting in not finding a significant change from applying the Stewardship Code 
on their quality of engagement. It is notable that this finding is in contrast to the existing 
evidence, proposing that shareholders have not acted as responsible owners in their 




was one of the main reasons behind the publication of the Stewardship Code. Hence, finding 
this theme could challenge the validity of the Stewardship Code.  
It was assumed in this study that by including both Tier 1 and Tier 2 a range of approaches 
to engagement would be investigated given the different qualities of stewardship reports. 
To find the participants for interviews a self-selection sampling method was adopted, 
resulting in having mainly participants with Tier 1 statements. Due to these limitations, it is 
difficult to generalise this finding to the whole signatories of the Stewardship Code. 
Therefore, this finding could be different among asset managers with lower quality 
statements (i.e. Tier 2).  
○ Good access already exists 
In addition to talking about the history of engagement, some of the respondents discussed 
good access as the reason behind finding no significant impact from applying the 
Stewardship Code. According to participant E: 
 
“We are very lucky because we are who we are, and we are as large as we are, we have very 
good access. We never found it to be problematic to see whomever we want to see because 
we are very often large shareholders”. 
 
Therefore, participant E believed that the Stewardship Code could have been helpful for 
smaller investors with limited access to their investee corporates. He explained that: 
“collective engagement under a number of different groups happening now …  collective 
engagement for smaller shareholders is getting easier to do as a result of the Code because 
it encourages under the principles via as it is. So that is how it helped smaller managers”.  
 
Participant H, who came from a small institution, stated that the Stewardship Code had 
helped to improve engagement through collaborative engagement. While participant H 
highlighted a history of engagement, he argued that: 
“We got to fill this principle, so we signed up to this collaborative engagement, and since we 




maybe much bigger … investors … companies do have to take you seriously, and I think that 
improves the quality of dialogue and then also we learn from each other”. 
 
Previous academics emphasise that the size of institutional investors is key when explaining 
engagement practices. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) found that size and 
ownership of the large shareholders provide sufficient incentive for them to monitor their 
investee corporates. Also, Micheler (2013) posited that asset owners are unlikely to engage 
in their investee corporates or receive enough attention from their investee corporates if 
they have small investments. In line with these articles, 23% of asset managers in this study 
highlighted fund size as an explanatory variable regarding why applying the Stewardship 
Code has not changed their engagement activities. According to these participants, the size 
of their investments already provided good access to the Board of directors, facilitating 
accountability when necessary. 
○ Lack of fundamental change in proposed principles 
Among all the participants, participant A referred back to the origin of the Stewardship Code 
and stated that: 
“And the UK Code was born out of an existing Code called the Institutional shareholders’ 
committee...the ISC and those principals evolved from that. So, it has been a long-standing 
set of principles for a number of large institutional investors.” 
 
According to this participant, the Stewardship Code could not change their engagement 
because it has been developed from an existing Code (i.e. ISC, 2002), which existed even 
before the financial crisis happened in 2008. This statement is in line with Roach (2011) who 
argued that the Stewardship Code could not make a dramatic change in the institutional 
investors since it is based on a prior guideline (i.e. ISC), however, was not hugely popular 
among the investors. Compared to the ISC, the Stewardship Code has more regulatory 
power. In fact, the Walker review asked the FRC to be responsible for the new Code for the 
institutional investors as it was believed that FRC as an independent regulatory would be 
more successful in encouraging the investors in applying the Stewardship Code. Still, the 




difference between the ISC and Stewardship Code is that the FRC provided more details on 
how to exercise the stewardship activities, which were very brief in the ISC Code. While the 
FRC has been more successful in attracting the institutional investors to apply this guideline, 
only complying with a guideline does not guarantee a high-quality engagement. 
Furthermore, seven main principles of the Stewardship Code are the same as the ISC Code, 
so it can be argued that if the ISC was not successful in encouraging active engagement, how 
could the FRC ensure that the Stewardship Code would be any more effective? 
 
Findings around this theme illustrate that the Stewardship Code did not encourage asset 
managers to increase the quantity or quality of their engagement activities. This finding is in 
contrast with Arsalidou (2012) who proposed that the importance of the Stewardship Code 
is to assist investors in performing their stewardship duties effectively by enhancing their 
monitoring and engagement in their investee companies which makes the Stewardship 
Code a pioneering regulation. The participants of this study generally stated that their long 
history of exercising the stewardship activities, having good access to the investee 
corporates and the lack of innovation developed within the Stewardship Code are the 
reasons behind not finding a significant change in engagement since applying the 
Stewardship Code. This finding is in contrast with the FRC, which proposed that the 
Stewardship Code will help to enhance the quality of engagement between investors and 
their investee corporates. On the other hand, this finding raised the question of “why apply 
the Stewardship Code if asset managers are already engaging in their investee corporates?” 
This question will be investigated in the following section. 
iii) Benefits of applying the Stewardship Code 
According to the previous theme (i.e. Engagement), most of the respondents have not 
changed their engagement behaviours or policies due to applying the Stewardship Code. 
Therefore, it was essential to investigate the benefits (financial and non-financial) of 
applying the Stewardship Code for asset managers. Although a few respondents found it 
difficult to address any direct achievement from applying the Stewardship Code, some 
positive changes were recognised from being a signatory of this Code. The main themes that 
emerged from reviewing the answers are included in table 5.11. 
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Table 5.11 Benefit: Sub-Themes 
Sub-themes 1 Sub-themes 2 Frequency of occurrence 
No Direct Benefit NONE 30% 












● No Direct Benefit
4 out of 13 participants believed that although they considered their engagement beneficial, 
they cannot directly associate that to be a signatory of the Stewardship Code. For example, 
participant B stated that their engagement activities are driven by their clients’ 
requirements and not the Stewardship Code. According to this Participant: 
“So, I can talk lengthily about how our engagement has made meaningful change happen. I 
just don’t think that is driven by the Stewardship Code. It is driven by what our clients want 
to see. It is driven by the firm commitment of this company, as the active ownership and 
dialogue all lead to the right outcome”. 
In line with that, the participant I explained that: “I am not sure if I can directly relate back 
our achievements to be very different since the inception of the Code to be fair. I think what 
we typically do is we try to meet the expectation of our clients with our investment’s needs”. 
Participant D went even further and reflected that the Stewardship Code had not brought 
any achievements for their institution since they were already doing that. This participant 
believed that the Stewardship Code is not relevant to the current industry environment 




explanation around the Stewardship Code being irrelevant for asset managers and stated 
that: 
 
“The Code, as it exists today, is not relevant to the issues that we are facing as an investor 
community: the risks are going to be more relevant aren’t necessarily so clearly included in 
the Stewardship Code. The other issue we are facing is that it is too focused on equity 
investors. So arguably, the Stewardship Code is too narrowly focused and that is probably 
why it is ineffective for a house like (name of the institution) because we are a fixed income 
house”.5 
To investigate the reason behind applying the Stewardship Code, this participant was 
explicitly asked if they apply the Stewardship Code because they do not want to be an 
outlier. It is notable that this response did not provide any reason behind applying the 
Stewardship Code, which was claimed to be irrelevant to their business. Instead, he 
emphasised on the Stewardship Code not being relevant again and stated that: 
 
“The Code as it exists today is not relevant to the issues that we are facing as an investor 
community. The risks that are going to be more relevant are not necessarily so clearly 
included in the Stewardship Code. The other issue we are facing is that it is too focused on 
equity investors. We are fixed income house as I mentioned and we have not disclosed our 
voting activities which is fine cause there is some voting. But there is so much weight put 
towards being an equity investor that it fails to consider these whole other asset classes.” 
 
Notably, these four participants are categorised as Tier 1, meaning they have followed the 
guidelines of the Stewardship Code thoroughly and provided transparent stewardship 
statements. Although asset managers emphasised on the benefits of stewardship activities, 
they proposed that those benefits are not due to the application of the Stewardship Code. 
Finding this theme is in line with the previous finding where the majority of asset managers 
stated that applying the Stewardship Code has not improved the quality or quantity of their 
 
5 This study did not explore signatories' responses with different asset classes. But it is notable that the newest 
version of the Stewardship Code (2020) has expanded its policies to address this issue. Principle 12 of the Code 





engagement with the investee corporates. Besides, this theme has a close connection with 
the motivations behind applying the Stewardship Code which was discussed before (i.e. 
Public recognition, Clients, Do not want to be an outlier, Easy to comply & Encourage 
responsible behaviour). Those motivations can be used to explain why these asset managers 
still apply the Stewardship Code even if it is not considered to provide any tangible benefits 
for their institution. On the other hand, this finding could suggest that the legitimacy of the 
Code has encouraged institutional investors to apply the Code, despite not recognising any 
direct benefit from its application. 
○ No Financial Benefit 
Exploring the responses revealed that all of the participants highlighted to some extent a 
lack of any direct positive financial benefits arising from applying the Stewardship Code. For 
example, participant C added: 
“We have had reasonably good performance over the last five years. We are ...in the top 
quartile. I am not sure if I put that down to the fact that we are a signatory of the 
Stewardship Code. It is the fact that we’ve carried on doing what we’ve always done, and it’s 
been effective”. 
 
Similar thoughts were raised by participant E: 
“But whether our fund performances improved as the result of the Code? Probably not. 
Because I think it is an activity, we’ve always been doing, it predates the Code actually”. 
 
Participant G emphasized the difficulty in finding a causal relationship between the financial 
performance of the fund and acting as a responsible investor. This participant specifically 
highlighted a lack of adequate information to explain this causal relationship: 
 
“It would be very difficult to spill that out …  without asking them (i.e. fund’s clients) … when 
they are buying your funds asking how much of this money you are giving us is because of 





Participant H argued that although applying the Code should have a positive impact, it 
would be difficult to attach it to the Stewardship Code specifically. He stated that: 
“From a financial point of view, I think ...the relationship doesn’t break down because it’s a 
little bit hard to distinguish, I think if you do carry out your stewardship activities effectively, 
I think it does have financial returns. By fundamentally understanding your companies 
better, you can make better investment decisions and that if you make better investment 
decisions if you are good investors that results in better financial returns”. 
 
The FRC proposed that the Stewardship Code aims to help improve long-term risk-adjusted 
returns to shareholders through improving the quality of engagement between investors 
and companies. This theme is in contrast to the FRC’s claim, indicating that asset managers 
have not seen any positive relationship between applying the Stewardship Code and their 
financial performance. In fact, these asset managers find it difficult to attribute their 
enhanced performance to be a signatory of the Stewardship Code. This result is in line with 
the initial statistical finding where no significant relationship between applying the 
Stewardship Code and the annual financial performance of asset managers was confirmed.  
● Non-financial Benefits 
Most of the participants (70%) agreed on the non-financial benefits from applying the 
Stewardship Code such as better reporting of their engagement activities to their clients, 
improving the engagement culture and inspiring other countries to publish their 
Stewardship Code which are explained below:  
○ Reporting 
Reporting emerged as one of the positive non-financial benefits of applying the Code by 
most asset managers. The interviewees stated that the Stewardship Code improved their 
stewardship reporting and made them more transparent about their stewardship activities. 
For example, respondent E said that: 
“We did not have a public engagement policy which we now build around Stewardship Code 





This response shows the positive changes in reporting as a result of applying the 
Stewardship Code. In line with that, participant C stated that their reporting has improved 
after being a signatory of the Stewardship Code: 
“... we are very clear about, and how investors should report periodically on stewardship 
activity, so I think this is an area where prior to the stewardship coming out you know we 
probably were weak, and that is the part of our business that we have strengthened as the 
result of the Stewardship Code”. 
 
Some of the participants stated that the Stewardship Code enabled them to explain their 
stewardship activities to their clients. For example, participant F stated that: 
“...when our clients ask us, what are we doing, yeah, we are able to respond positively. So 
that has some benefit. But it is hard to quantify”. 
 
Asset managers found applying the Stewardship Code beneficial in reporting their 
stewardship activities to their clients. This finding suggests that applying the Stewardship 
Code has helped asset managers to improve communication around the stewardship 
activities and how they exercised their stewardship responsibilities to protect the interests 
of their clients. Therefore, the Stewardship Code has helped asset managers to build a 
better relationship with their clients. Hence, it was successful to partially fulfil some of its 
purposes.  
○ Other 
The other non-financial benefits mentioned by participants included providing a framework 
for engagement, encouraging other countries to publish their version of the Stewardship 
Code and to raise awareness among investors. For example, participant E stated that: 
“It provides a framework for us to talk about how we thought about these issues and it is a 
recognition publicly that we are doing the stuff that we were always doing”. 
To summarise, almost all of the participants emphasised that they cannot find a direct positive 
relationship between applying the Stewardship Code and financial performance of their 
institution. On the other hand, the participants stressed the non-financial benefits of applying 




of the Stewardship Code for asset managers provided support for the initial statistical result 
where a significant relationship between the annual financial performance of asset managers 
and their stewardship activities was not found (F= 1.50, p-value=0.227). Based on this theme, 
asset managers do not think about financial benefits when applying the Stewardship Code. 
Besides, asset managers only found the Stewardship Code helpful as a framework to organise 
their stewardship activities and in preparing a better report for their clients.  
vi) Quality of the Stewardship Code 
After finding that some of the participants could not find any direct benefits from applying 
the Code, they were asked about their opinion on the quality of the Stewardship Code. In 
doing so, the participants were asked to discuss their opinion on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Stewardship Code. After reviewing the participants’ responses, four sub-
themes were identified (see table 5.12). 
 
Table 5.12 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Stewardship Code: Quality Sub-Themes 
Sub-themes 1 Sub-themes 2 Frequency of occurrence 
Strength ● Not 
prescriptive/Comply or 
Explain 




Weakness ● Box-ticking approach 




● Not prescriptive/Comply or Explain  
To discuss the strengths of the Stewardship Code, only one theme emerged: that the 
Stewardship Code is not prescriptive and permits a comply or explain the approach. For 
example, according to participant G: 
“I think it is what highlights the engagement under the Stewardship Code. It is not defined 
very sort of prescriptively, and that a deliberate design. The idea is to ensure that there is an 
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open step dialogue … the FRC did find a checklist of ... issues against which the investor 
should be engaging, and we certainly see that as one of the strengths of the stewardship 
Code”. 
While participant K mentioned not being prescriptive as a strength, he explained that this 
feature allows a level of freedom for the shareholders to decide about their stewardship 
activities:  
“I really think it is important to allow shareholders to figure out what works best for them 
you know in light of the particular asset class or the particular fund’s mandate, so I think 
that is really a strength that I would not want to see that change”. 
Participant E emphasised not being prescriptive as a positive feature of the Stewardship 
Code. He proposed that this feature has allowed adaptation of the Stewardship Code by 
other countries: 
“I never thought in my career we would see much material change, you know Japanese 
board never had independent directors, let alone female directors, you know it is 
unthinkable, and that is starting to change now. And that is the result of a lot, but it is partly 
the results of Stewardship Code, proliferating around the region. They are not too 
prescriptive, they just encourage and formalise your obligation to do what you were going to 
do anyway”. 
The focus of this study was on UK asset managers. Therefore, this is an interesting finding 
suggesting a positive impact from the application of the Stewardship Code on CG of foreign 
corporates. According to this participant, although the impact of the Stewardship Code on 
their engagement practices is insignificant, it might have been successful in making 
significant improvements on the ownership behaviour of foreign investors. Participant E 
believed that following a non-prescriptive approach could help to encourage foreign 
investors to follow the guidelines of the Stewardship Code. This approach allows investors 
to apply those principles that are relevant to their business and explain those that are not. 
This finding is in contrast to the existing studies that criticised the Stewardship for having a 




2015). It is notable that the positive change on CG of foreign corporates could have been 
driven by UK investors investing in those corporates. Although this is an interesting finding, 
it is difficult to conclude that applying the Stewardship Code has changed the ownership 
behaviour of foreing investors.  
According to 23% of the participants, not being prescriptive is one of the strengths of the 
Stewardship Code, providing freedom for the signatories to exercise their stewardship 
activities based on their own institutions’ interest. It is notable that this positive feature of 
the Stewardship Code is enhanced by the ‘Comply or Explain approach’. This means that 
asset managers do not have to follow all the principles of Stewardship Code but may explain 
why they did not comply. As aforementioned, participant D stated that although the 
Stewardship Code is not relevant to their institution, the comply or explain approach allows 
their institution to follow the Stewardship Code and publish their stewardship statements. 
In line with this argument, participant E stated that: 
 
“The beauty of the Code is that it is not too prescriptive, it’s seven broad principles saying 
this is what you should do, it is on comply or explain basis which is the cleverest thing that 
Cadbury did, you know if it is not appropriate to your business model don’t do it but tell us 
why and let your clients decide what they want to do as a result. So that is the reason it 
gained attraction. I think a big detailed rule book would be problematic”. 
 
After reviewing this theme, it was revealed that some of the respondents emphasised on 
the “comply or explain” approach as one of the strengths of the Stewardship Code, 
permitting freedom to follow the principles of Stewardship Code relevant to business needs. 
This finding is in contrast with some of the previous studies which criticised the “comply or 
explain” approach affecting the quality of the stewardship report adversely. For example, 
Solomon (2013) proposed that shareholders feel that it is better if companies report on 
positive ways that they are following the governance principles instead of disclosing 
examples of non-compliance. Also, Arsalidou (2012) argued that firms do not use the 
comply or explain model effectively to adjust their governance to their changing 
circumstances and instead focus simply on the choice of whether or not to comply. In an 
article by Masters and Burgess (2010), the director of corporate governance and reporting 




would motivate some asset managers to get involved even if this engagement was not in 
the best interests of their clients. It is notable that in the latest review of the Stewardship 
Code (2017), the FRC has some concerns over the quality of the stewardship statements 
indicating that asset managers did not follow this approach effectively. Therefore, all the 
above arguments challenge not being perspective, specifically the “comply or explain” 
approach as the strength of the Stewardship Code. 
● Long term focus 
Another strength of the Stewardship Code, mentioned by participant A, was that it 
encourages long-term focus:  
“The strengths are that it just … emphasise the responsibility of investors to manage capital 
for the long-term and what that it entails”. 
 
This finding is in line with the primary objective of the Stewardship Code, which was to 
promote shareholder engagement and create a long-term investment culture on behalf of 
institutional investors (Arsalidou, 2012).  
● Being Reviewed by a Regulatory Body 
Reviewing the participants' responses revealed the final strengths of the Stewardship Code, 
being that it is reviewed by a regulatory body. According to participant K: 
 
“It is good that it is overseen by the regulator, and there is some bonus to demonstrate how 
you’re applying it you know as opposed to just signing it and doing nothing to implement the 
principles, so I think it’s good that signatories are expected to at  least file a general 
statement describing how they are implementing the principles”. 
 
Therefore, this participant believed that being reviewed by the FRC is one of the strengths of 
the Stewardship Code. In the latest review of the Stewardship Code, the FRC emphasised 
that they are not able to review each individual engagement and rather they reviewed asset 
managers’ stewardship statements. This review resulted in the tiering system developed by 





In addition to the strengths, the following themes emerged as the weakness of the 
Stewardship Code described below: 
○ Box-Ticking Approach 
Nearly half of the respondents emphasised on the box-ticking approach either directly or 
indirectly as one of the weaknesses of the Stewardship Code. Participant L directly talked 
about the box-ticking approach and stated that: 
 
“...And I think the downside of the Stewardship Code is potentially it leads to an exercise in 
box-ticking, I don’t think it does that, but that’s the potential of the areas that could be of 
concern”. 
 
Participant (E) explained how some participants followed a box-ticking approach:  
“I know for a fact that plenty of people who are saying that they are doing a lot, but their 
activity is something rather different. So that’s, those same issues are actually weaknesses, 
you know the fact that you can opt out of it, the fact that some people you know sign up and 
do nothing”. 
 
It was an interesting answer indicating that some signatories do not practise the same 
stewardship activities that they disclose in their stewardship statements. This finding could 
be applied to explain the statistical finding where no significant relationship was found 
between the financial performance of asset managers and the Tier of their stewardship 
statements. Based on this statement, some asset managers may provide a high-quality 
stewardship statement to protect their reputation among their rivals and clients. On the 
other hand, this finding suggests lack of an effective compliance audit by the FRC, 
representing a weakness of the Stewardship Code. Participant E later identified the meaning 
of stewardship by asset managers as the reason behind following a box-ticking approach 
and stated that: 
“I think it is very easy to pick up the phone and talk to a company and ask them some simple 




stewardship as ongoing dialogue and an ongoing relationship, it’s not about saying I picked 
up the phone, I’ve made a phone call, therefore, I made my responsibilities we see it as much 
more than that”. 
 
In line with this, participant M observed potential issues concerning the potential low-
quality application of the Stewardship Code: 
“… there might be a reputational risk. Then you will fulfil the requirements of the 
stewardship Code as soon as cheaply as you can because it is just compliance”.  
 
This participant believed that: 
“...the way that the whole Code is presented, constructed is very much a kind of compliance 
thing which helps raise the bottom, raise the floor, but it doesn’t help raise the ceiling. So, I 
think that’s a weakness, A major weakness”. 
 
The box-ticking approach was also raised as a concern in the FRC report (2014). The FRC 
report commented that after the growth in the number of signatories, they received some 
reports that accused proxy advisors of following a “box-ticking” approach in the absence of 
effective engagement with companies. According to FRC (2014), investors should not just 
tick the box but commit to adopt and report against the principle of the Stewardship Code 
with appropriate explanation. To address the poor quality of the statements, the FRC 
developed a tiering system which rated the statements into Tier 1 and Tier 2 and 
subsequently deleted Tier 3 signatories from the list of the signatories. Emerging this theme 
within the dataset indicates that this issue has not been resolved since the latest review by 
the FRC in 2017.  
○ Measuring Success 
The Stewardship Code (2012) sets out the principles of effective stewardship by investors. 
Therefore, the outcome of applying the Stewardship Code should be an improvement in 
stewardship activities. Notably, the interviewed asset managers included measuring the 
success of the stewardship activities as one of the weaknesses of the Stewardship Code. In 




measuring the success of their engagement with the investee corporates. For instance, 
participant B stated that: 
 
“What’s much more interesting is that actually how do you take what it is that you are really 
trying to achieve for a company and then measure the progress that you are actually having 
with that. So, what are the outputs of your stewardship programme and I don’t know if the 
Stewardship Code really does that I don’t quite know how they could do that”. 
 
Based on the above comment, the Stewardship Code has not made it clear for the 
signatories how they can make sure whether the outcome of their stewardship activities 
have been successful or not. Participant F stated that: 
“...But certainly, from the ‘weakness’ point of view, the enforcement side of it is getting more 
specific about what is expected as far as best practice or good practice, that it is the 
principle, so we do that kind of assessment. But we just made up our own approach for this”. 
 
Participant H argued that although providing a guideline for investors has been one of the 
strengths of the Stewardship Code. It could also suggest a weakness as well: 
“...it does not offer really any guidelines on ... what good stewardship looks like or what 
effective stewardship looks like. So, while we do explain the conceptual framework that’s 
good it doesn’t explain what’s out in the field and what’s out in like practice work...should 
they really be telling you what’s good stewardship, I think they should, but some people 
might say they shouldn’t.”  
 
In line with the above findings, one-third of the respondents posited that they find it difficult 
to measure the success of the stewardship activities. For example, participant A stated that: 
“...I think there’s no single clear metric that you can look at, so, you have to look at ... 
underlying indicators and there are a few of them. So, we would look at our voting record, 
and we would see to what extent our companies are improving over time ... And we try to 
track the number of times that we requested something from a company, and they’ve gone 





While participant D emphasised the difficulty of measuring the stewardship activities, he 
explained that: 
“We are not looking for a binary result such as the company is responding or it’s not, and we 
can turn that up … we don’t really see it as success or failure because even if we don’t get 
information from a company that’s still useful information. The aim of doing our 
engagement is to get confidence on risk”.  
 
Later this participant added that their goal of stewardship activities is not measurable since 
they aim to enhance their decision making and reduce the risk of their investment.  
 
Compared to the above respondents, 60% of asset managers stated that they developed 
their system of measuring the stewardship activities. It is notable that all of these measuring 
systems incorporate qualitative measurement through monitoring and tracking engagement 
activities. Only respondent C mentioned using the performance to measure the success of 
the stewardship activities: 
“...ultimately we measure it by our investment performance. ...we perform well or whether 
we perform badly. Because for us our stewardship activities are an important means by 
which we add value for our clients. So, if we are underperforming … obviously, things are 
going wrong, and one of the things that could go wrong is the fact that our stewardship 
engagement is not achieving what it should achieve.” 
 
In contrast, participant E stated that although the financial performance could be a good 
measurement, it is difficult to measure the success of stewardship activities:  
“So, the visible output is the financial performance, and that’s quite a hard thing to evidence 
on its own because it is mixed with many other factors and it’s longer-term issues as we said 
… But other than that, it is quite hard to assess to quantify its success”. 
 
In summary, this theme indicates that the Stewardship Code has not provided a clear 
guideline either on defining or on measuring the success of the stewardship activities for its 
signatories. This theme could explain the previous finding where the four out of 13 
participants believed that although they considered their engagement beneficial, they 




asset managers are not able to measure the success of their stewardship activities, it would 
also be difficult to determine any benefit from exercising those activities. On the other 
hand, lack of measuring guidelines might make it difficult for the signatories to monitor and 
improve their stewardship activities when necessary.    
 
Furthermore, some of the signatories stated that they do not look for measuring the success 
of their stewardship activities by analysing their financial performance. According to these 
asset managers, financial performance is a result of many factors and not only the 
stewardship activities. These findings correctly address the statistical outcome where there 
was no relationship between applying the Stewardship Code and the financial performance 
of asset managers. 
5.3 Summary 
According to the FRC website, the UK Stewardship Code aims to enhance the quality of 
engagement between investors and companies to help improve long-term risk-adjusted 
returns to shareholders. During the second methodology stage, asset managers were asked 
to discuss their opinion on the application of the Stewardship Code which helped to 
investigate whether the Stewardship Code has been successful in reaching its proposed aim 
(i.e. enhancing the quality of engagement by institutional investors). After analysing the 
interview responses, the majority of the participants stated that the Stewardship Code did 
not help them to enhance the quality or quantity of their engagement with the investee 
corporates. This finding indicates that the Stewardship Code has not been able to reach its 
proposed aim claimed by the FRC. According to the respondents, having a long history of 
engagement before being listed as a signatory of the Stewardship Code was the main reason 
behind this finding.  
Later, the participants were asked about their achievement by applying the Stewardship 
Code, which they found difficult to explain. While these participants acknowledged the 
importance of engagement with the investee corporates for their institutions, they did not 
think it was directly due to the application of the Stewardship Code. According to the FRC 
(2012), effective stewardship through applying the guidelines of the Stewardship Code will 




interviews, asset managers do not believe that the Stewardship Code has provided any 
significant benefits to them. Notably, all participants emphasised that they are not aware of 
any financial benefits from applying the Stewardship Code. This finding is in line with the 
initial statistical result of this study. Some of the participants explained the non-financial 
benefits of the Stewardship Code, specifically that it encourages them to prepare better 
stewardship reports for clients and provides a framework for engagement activities.  
The other important finding related to specific motivations that drive asset managers to 
apply the Stewardship Code. Most participants referred to their clients when explaining the 
reasons, as well as pressure from social media and not wanting to be an outlier. This 
response suggests that these asset managers apply the Stewardship Code to protect their 
reputation which unfortunately leads, at times, to a box-ticking approach (i.e. where the 
signatories only follow the guidelines to tick the box without practising effective 
stewardship activities). Many interviewees recognised the box-ticking approach as a 
weakness of the Stewardship Code, a finding that is in line with the primary concern 
proposed by FRC (2016) in the latest review of the Stewardship Code. In 2016, the FRC 
attempted to deal with this issue by developing a tiering system. Whereas, the finding of 
this study illustrates that the issue still exists. 
Furthermore, no signatories interviewed mentioned any financial motivation behind 
applying the Stewardship Code, indicating that these asset managers do not look at the 
Stewardship Code as a guideline to improve their financial performance. In fact, some of the 
signatories argued that they intended to improve their decision making and to reduce the 
risk when applying the Stewardship Code. This result is also in line with the statistical finding 
where there was no relationship between applying the Stewardship Code and the annual 
financial performance of asset managers.  
In addition to the above findings, one-third of the respondents declared that they do not 
know how to measure their stewardship activities and determine whether their actions 
have been successful or not. Some participants blamed the Stewardship Code for not being 
clear on giving guidance around measuring the stewardship activities. Based on this finding, 
if asset managers cannot measure their stewardship activities, it would be a challenge for 
them to identify the achievements of applying the Stewardship Code. This argument can 
explain the previous finding where four asset managers could not find a direct benefit from 





Among the 13 participants only one of them is categorised as Tier 2. Analysing this 
participants’ interview revealed that his responses were generally the same as the other 
participants who are listed as asset managers with Tier 1 stewardship statements. Still, the 
fact that the majority of the participants interviewed were categorised as Tier 1 makes it 
difficult to generalise the above findings to those asset managers with Tier 2 stewardship 
statements. This limitation, along with the important qualitative and quantitative findings, is 








In light of the financial crisis, the Stewardship Code was published, emphasising on the 
importance of institutional investors’ role in their investee corporates. The Stewardship 
Code provides a set of principles for investors on how to conduct their stewardship 
responsibilities effectively. The Stewardship Code claims to be the first of its kind in the 
world and has inspired other countries (such as Japan, Malaysia and South Korea) to publish 
their own stewardship policies. The FRC states that the aim of the Stewardship Code is to 
enhance the quality and quantity of the engagement between investors and companies, 
benefitting investors, companies and the economy as a whole. As the responsible body, the 
FRC reviews the Stewardship Code and its application by the institutional investors regularly. 
In the first review of the Stewardship Code (2011, p1), the FRC was impressed with the 
number of signatories stating that “the sign-up to the Stewardship Code by over 230 asset 
managers, asset owners and service providers in its eighteen months of life was beyond our 
expectations”. Three years later, the FRC review (2014) confirmed that the Stewardship 
Code was going in the right direction to fulfil its main objectives including encouraging a 
higher number of investors to engage in their investee corporates, increase the quality and 
quantity of engagement and to increase the accountability of the investors towards their 
clients. The review of the Stewardship Code for the period 2015 - 2016, raised concerns over 
the quality of stewardship reports. In particular, it concluded that statements describing the 
stewardship approach taken by the businesses producing the reports did not in fact provide 
sufficient information to enable readers to understand what steps were being followed by 
the signatories. According to the FRC review (2015, p.12): 
“Overall the quality of reporting against the Code does not give a clear enough picture of the 
approach to stewardship. Insufficient clarity by signatories can make it difficult for clients to 




This concern has resulted in developing a tiering system where the stewardship statements 
categorised in Tier 1 (i.e. reported good quality and transparent description of their 
stewardship activities) and Tier 2 (i.e. reported less transparently on their stewardship 
activities).  
 
Apart from the FRC review, there are no empirical studies that have reviewed the 
Stewardship Code independently to determine its success in fulfilling its initial aims. 
Moreover, the FRC reviews did not illustrate the impact of the Stewardship Code on the 
quantity or quality of the investors’ engagement. To close the existing gap, this study aimed 
to understand the impact of the Stewardship Code on the financial performance of asset 
managers as well as their engagement behaviour. The obtained results found in this study 
are discussed in this chapter.  
6.1 Description of Quantitative & Qualitative Findings 
This study found that there was no significant relationship between applying the 
Stewardship Code and financial performance of asset managers as the main group of 
signatories. Besides, asset managers proposed that their engagement behaviour has not 
changed as a result of applying the Stewardship Code. These results obtained by applying a 
mixed methods approach. First, a statistical analysis was run between the WAAP of asset 
managers and their application of the Stewardship Code. Then, asset managers, as 
signatories of the Stewardship Code, were interviewed to explore their opinion on the 
application of this guideline. The results indicate that although applying the Stewardship 
Code has brought some non-financial benefits (e.g. better reporting to clients), it has not 
enhanced the financial performance of asset managers. These results are discussed in the 
following section in light of the existing academic literature. 
6.2 Discussion of Quantitative Findings 
Determining the financial benefits of exercising stewardship activities is very important. 
According to Reisberg (2015), difficulty in measuring the value of engagement return is one 
of the factors that demotivates investors from effective engagement. After comparing the 
firm average financial performance with the average firm-level stewardship approach, it was 
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found in this study, that there was not a significant relationship between WAAP of asset 
managers as signatories of the Stewardship Code and their stewardship activities. The 
statistical analysis illustrates that asset managers who invested more effort into their 
stewardship activities did not find a higher performance compared to asset managers who 
invested less effort. In other words, applying the Stewardship Code did not cause a 
significant financial benefit during the last three years for its signatories. To compare the 
finding of this study with the existing academic evidence, the empirical evidence around 
shareholder activism were reviewed. shareholder responsibilities and their impact on the 
governance of corporates has been a popular and widely debated topic among academics 
and policymakers (Bebchuk, 2005, 2007; Becht et al., 2002; Cadbury Code, 1992; Greenbury 
report, 1995; Micheler, 2013; Myners Review, 2001). According to Tihanyi et al. (2003), 
institutional investors, due to their significant ownership, have the incentive to monitor the 
management as well as having the power to impose their desired changes that they think is 
beneficial in their investee corporates. In line with this, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
proposed that institutional investors prefer to increase activism as a method to exercise 
their power in corporates since it is not easy for them to follow a divestment approach due 
to the size of their investment. Reviewing the existing academic studies, it was found that 
the majority focused on firm-level outcomes of shareholder activism. It is notable that the 
results of these studies are not conclusive. While the first group of authors found no link 
between shareholder activism and performance (e.g. Black, 1998; Carleton et al., 1998; 
Gillan & Starks, 2007; Karpoff, 2001; Karpoff et al., 1996; Prevost & Rao, 2000; Smith 1996; 
Wahal, 1996), the second group reported a positive link between the two variables (e.g. 
Becht et al., 2009; Brav et al., 2008; Greenwood & Achor, 2009; Klein & Zur, 2009, 2011). 
The quantitative finding of this study is in line with the first group of authors who found no 
link between shareholder activism and financial performance of their investee corporates. 
The financial performance of investors depends on the financial performance of their 
investee corporates. Therefore, the finding of this study also suggests that signatories of the 
Stewardship Code could not have a positive impact on the performance of their investee 
corporates through performing their stewardship responsibilities. For example, Wahal 




Although he found that active pension funds could change the governance structures, 
activism could not create a significant improvement in share returns or performance of 
investee corporates. The efficiency of institutional investor activism was also challenged by 
Karpoff et al. (1996), who reported that investor proposals had a small and insignificant 
effect on share value and operating returns. The findings of these studies indicate that 
institutional investors could not enhance the financial performance of their investee 
corporates through their active engagement. Accordingly, if institutional investors were not 
successful in enhancing the performance of their investee corporates, they were not able to 
enhance shareholder returns (i.e. did not improve their own performance). 
This quantitate finding is in contrast with the second group of authors who reported a 
positive link between shareholder activism and outperformance of the invested funds. 
Betcht et al. (2009) explored the shareholder activism of Hermes UK Focus Fund, a UK 
pension fund, and found a positive link between this fund’s good performance and its 
activism. That study only included one fund, making it difficult to generalise the findings to 
others. It is notable that other studies which reported a positive link between shareholder 
activism and financial performance faced criticism. Goranova & Ryan (2014) reviewed 
shareholder activism studies found that those that reported a positive impact on 
performance mainly focused on hedge fund activism (e.g. Becht et al., 2009; Brav et al., 
2008; Greenwood & Schor, 2009; Klein & Zur, 2009; Klein & Zur, 2011). Hence including 
other types of funds could result in a different result. 
In addition to the above limitation, it was found that existing studies of shareholder activism 
mainly focused on one type of engagement: specifically shareholder proposals (e.g. Carleton 
et al., 1998; Cziraki et al., 2010; Gillan & Starks, 2000; Hadani et al., 2011; Karpoff et al., 
1996; Prevost & Rao, 2000; Smith, 1996). This finding was also observed by Filatotchev and 
Dotsenko (2015), who also highlighted that most of the prior studies investigated 
shareholder activism in the US.  Consequently, if other countries were investigated, the 
result could be different.  
The current study has addressed these limitations through considering different types of 
stewardship activities (i.e. voting, monitoring, and having a purposeful dialogue with 
investee corporates) and including different types of UK equity funds. Still, the final results 
illustrate no link between performing stewardship activities and improved financial 




Despite the popularity of shareholder responsibilities among academics, evidence on the 
application of the Stewardship Code is very limited. A small number of academic studies 
were found which tried to explain the potential impact of the application of the Stewardship 
Code for its signatories (Çelik	& Isaksson, 2014; Cheffins, 2010; Michealer, 2013; Reisberg 
2016; Tilba & McNulty, 2013;). It is notable that these studies did not address any financial 
benefits and mainly focused on non-financial benefits. The conclusion of these studies 
indicates that fostering a better quality engagement by investors after the launch of the 
Stewardship Code would be unlikely. For instance, Reisberg (2016) argued that to perform 
an effective engagement, investors have to develop a careful design and arrange some 
procedures for monitoring, meeting and intervening in investee corporates when necessary. 
Reisberg stated that there are some traditional barriers such as engagement cost, 
preventing the success of the Stewardship Code to enhance the quality of engagement. The 
impact of the Stewardship Code on the quality of engagement will be discussed later when 
explaining the qualitative findings of this study. 
  
The final sources to compare the quantitative findings of this study are the FRC reports. FRC, 
as the official regulator, stated that effective stewardship benefits investors, companies and 
the economy as a whole. According to the FRC, applying the Stewardship Code will result in 
better returns to shareholders by encouraging a higher quality engagement between 
investors and companies. The statistical findings of this study suggest that the Stewardship 
Code has not been successful in enhancing the quality or quantity of investor engagement 
by applying the Stewardship Code. The Walker Review (Walker, 2009) asked the FRC to 
review the application of the Stewardship Code annually and publish a report to present its 
findings. Analysis of the FRC’s annual reports from 2011 to 2018 revealed that they had 
focussed on the quality of stewardship statements rather than the extent to which the 
Stewardship Code has fulfilled its proposed aims (i.e. whether the application of the 
Stewardship Code has benefited its signatories). Developing the tiering system by FRC in 
2016, which categorised the signatories’ stewardship statements into Tier 1 and Tier 2, has 
been the result of this focus. Despite claiming a higher financial return for its signatories, 
reviewing the FRC reports did not help to determine the success in reaching this aim. A lack 
of focus on the financial impact could be due to difficulty in measuring the financial benefits 




Stewardship Code thoroughly, if they know that this would bring positive financial benefits 
for their institutions (Raisberge, 2015; Michealer, 2013). According to Michealer (2013), 
difficulty in measuring the financial benefit of active engagement as one of the reasons 
behind the lack of interest in active ownership as well as lack of demand by asset owners. 
Therefore, FRC as the responsible regulator should seek to measure and report the financial 
return for the signatories who perform effective stewardship. This might increase the 
number of signatories of the Stewardship Code as well as encouraging more effective 
practice of stewardship activities by the existing applicants of this guideline.  
Notably conducting a statistical analysis does not reveal the reason behind finding no 
relationship between the application of the Stewardship Code and financial performance of 
asset managers. Besides, focusing on the financial impact of the Stewardship Code alone 
does not help us to fully understand the success of this guideline in reaching its proposed 
aims. The next section will discuss the qualitative findings which help to address these 
concerns.  
6.3 Discussion of the Qualitative Findings 
To further investigate the statistical findings and to determine the non-financial outcomes 
from applying the Stewardship Code, this study conducted interviews with asset managers 
as the main signatories of the Stewardship Code. The participants were asked about 
benefits from applying the Stewardship Code, specifically the impact of the Stewardship 
Code on their engagement activities.   
i) Engagement 
When the Stewardship Code was published in 2010 the FRC proposed that it aimed to 
enhance the quality and quantity of engagement between investors and companies. In 
contrast to the FRC’s proposition, a majority of the participants (80%) agreed that applying 
the Stewardship Code has not changed their engagement with investee corporates 
significantly. This finding implies that the Stewardship Code has not been successful in 
fulfilling its initial aim. This finding contrasts with the Stewardship Code review in 2016, 
which claimed that both the quantity and quality of the engagement had improved since the 




a sample of signatory statements. But the Stewardship Code has been associated with some 
issues that might negatively influence the success of this guideline. The Box-ticking approach 
adopted by institutional investors has repeatedly been raised as an issue by the FRC, 
concerned that some signatories followed a “box-ticking” approach without performing 
effective engagement. Following a box-ticking approach is not a new phenomenon, and it 
has been raised as a concern since the CG guidelines have been introduced. For example, 
Lord Young (1995) proposed that although improving accountability and transparency are 
essential for companies, the additional rules developed by Cadbury (1992) could result in 
box-ticking exercise rather than genuine commitment to implement the spirit of the 
Cadbury Code. Nearly half of the respondents of this study emphasised on the box-ticking 
approach as a key weakness of the Stewardship Code. This finding indicates that the box-
ticking approach is still an issue affecting the quality of stewardship reports. This was 
predicted by Arsalidou (2012) given that stewardship is not the main concern of investors. 
This argument challenges the FRC’s finding reported in its reviews (i.e. positive impact of the 
Stewardship Code on the quality and quantity of the investors’ engagement). 
Apart from the FRC report, there is a lack of academic literature evaluating the Stewardship 
Code, exploring stewardship statements or that has directly interviewed signatories of this 
Code. After a close review of the existing academic literature, a small number of studies 
found which explored the Stewardship Code by applying existed arguments and secondary 
data (e.g. Çelik & Isaksson, 2014; Cheffins, 2010; Gilson & Gordon, 2013; Reisberg, 2015; 
Tilba & McNulty, 2013). In line with the finding of this study, all the previous studies failed to 
find a significant impact from the Stewardship Code on the engagement behaviour of 
institutional investors. For example, Reisberge (2015) explored the achievements of the 
Stewardship Code by analysing the arguments which were advanced before as well as the 
issues related to this Code. According to Reisberg, there are some significant obstacles 
preventing the success of the Stewardship Code, such as engagement cost and dismissing 
overseas investors as one of the major groups of shareholders. In line with Reisberg, Cheffin 
(2010) criticised the Stewardship Code for not considering the shift in the ownership pattern 
from domestic to foreign investors. In contrast to this argument, one of the participants of 
this study (i.e. Participant E) praised the Stewardship Code for making improvements in the 




companies. Cheffins (2010) concluded that transforming the passive behaviour of the 
shareholders by applying the Stewardship Code is not very likely. Besides, Çelik and Isaksson 
(2014) argued that active engagement by investors depends on their business model. They 
proposed that if the engagement does not fit within the business model of investors, public 
policies and voluntary standards are likely to have little impact on institutional investors. 
Çelik and Isaksson (2014) also stated that ignoring foreign shareholders when developing 
the policies could affect the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code. The finding of this study 
is inline with concerns of the existing literature, indicating that applying the Stewardship 
Code has not changed the engagement behaviour of asset managers significantly.  
It is notable that the reasons provided by participants for reporting no significant impact 
from applying the Stewardship Code are different from the above studies. The first 
important theme emerged when looking at the reasons was “already doing it”. The majority 
of the participants (84%) specified their long history of engagement to illustrate they were 
already engaging in their investee corporates before the publication of the Stewardship 
Code. This unexpected finding is in contrast with most of the empirical studies criticising the 
institutional investors for their passive ownership behaviour, specifically during the financial 
crisis (Robert & Monks, 2011; Solomon, 2013; Crespi & Renneboog, 2010; Monks & Sykes, 
2002; Myners, 2001, 2009). Lord Myners (2009) addressed this issue in his speech shortly 
after the banking crisis and described the institutional investors as the “absentee landlords” 
who contributed to “ownerless corporations”. In line with that, Walker (2009) stated that 
failures of the Board and directors might have been addressed effectively if major investors 
had acted as responsible owners and had been engaged in their investee corporates. Also, 
Arsalidou (2012) proposed that lack of monitoring the Board by the pension funds and 
insurance companies was one of the main reasons for the failure of companies during the 
financial crisis. In line with the above academic findings and as a response to criticism 
around ineffective shareholder engagement during the financial crisis, the FRC published the 
Stewardship Code in 2010. Therefore, finding that the participants of this study have always 
engaged in their investee corporates could suggest that publication of the Stewardship Code 
was not based on a valid reason.  
There are some arguments that might challenge the validity of this finding. First, 
participants of this study mainly emphasised on the quantity rather than the quality of their 




that asset managers were actively engaged in their investee corporates. This argument is in 
line with Mallin (1996) who found that, although most of the fund managers voted on all 
issues, it does not mean that they were acting responsibly. Mallin found that some of the 
fund managers followed a box-ticking approach and voted without considering the issues 
carefully. Second, 4 out of 13 participants stated that they have good access and resources, 
helping them to deliver effective engagement in their investee corporates. According to the 
FRC report (2011), lack of resources is one of the barriers for the shareholders to perform an 
effective engagement. Also, Micheler (2013) posited that asset owners are unlikely to 
engage in their investee corporates or receive enough attention from their investee 
corporates if they have a small investment. Therefore, finding that participants of this study 
had a good level of engagement in their investee corporates could be due to their resources 
and level of access. 
In conclusion, finding that the Stewardship Code has not been successful in enhancing the 
quality of engagement between institutional investors and investee corporates indicates 
that the Stewardship Code has failed to fulfil one of its significant objectives. This finding 
suggests that the FRC did not consider the abilities and resources available to different 
groups of all investors when developing its principles. According to the participants of this 
study, high quality engagement has always been practised by them in their investee 
corporates, although this opinion may be taken with some skepticism. Consequently, for 
Tier 1 investors, not being able to notice a difference in their engagement practices could 
negatively affect their future stewardship activities. The current version of the Stewardship 
Code (2012) gives these investors a signal that they are doing well, which might demotivate 
them to make further improvement in their investee companies. It is notable that on the 
30th of January 2019, the FRC published a consultation on a new draft of the Stewardship 
Code and received over 100 responses from the stakeholders. On the FRC website, it is 
stated that:  
“To ensure the Code will drive distinctive and high-quality stewardship reporting, we are 
undertaking targeted outreach to test changes to our proposals on activities and outcomes 
reporting before publishing the revised Code later in 2019”.   
 
Based on this statement, it seems that the focus of the FRC is again on the quality of 




quality engagement practices (Participant E; Under the box-ticking approach theme). One 
way of addressing this issue is that the FRC get involved and closely monitor the exercising 
of stewardship activities by a sample of investors, both Tier 1 and Tier 2. Also, the FRC needs 
to have a constructive discussion with such investors and update its principles to address 
any shortcomings they faced as a result of their investigations.  Following these approaches 
would make the FRC demand stronger and more effective engagement, helping both Tier 1 
and Tier 2 investors to improve their practices constantly.  Accordingly, the participants of 
these studies did not find significant improvements on the quality of engagement since 
becoming a signatory of the Stewardship Code. This then raises the question “why these 
investors still follow the Code?” i.e. what is their motivation?   
ii) Motivation 
After finding that the Stewardship Code has not helped investors to improve engagement 
behaviours, it was important to determine the motivation behind applying the Stewardship 
Code. Five of the participants stated that they apply the Stewardship Code because clients 
are aware of the Code and demand it. Therefore, asset managers could use their 
stewardship statement to show that they are actively engaging in their investee corporates. 
This finding is in line with Hendry et al., (2007) who interviewed UK and EU fund managers 
and found protecting client investment, as well as meeting their demand, were motivators 
behind engaging in activism. On the other hand, the FRC report (2011) recognised the lack 
of client demand as a barrier to practising active engagement. Hence, in contrast to FRC 
(2011), the findings of this study provide some evidence that clients are aware of the 
stewardship responsibilities of asset managers and explicitly demand these.  
In line with the statistical findings which revealed no significant relationship between the 
application of the Stewardship Code and financial performance, asset managers who 
participate in the interviews did not mention any financial motivation behind engaging in 
investee corporates through applying the Stewardship Code. Moreover, when the 
participants were asked to explain any financial benefits derived from applying the 
Stewardship Code, no participant provided any compelling evidence. This finding is in 
contrast with Hendry et al., (2007), who concluded that the main motivation behind 




position in the investment market. Hendry et al. (2007) interviewed fund managers, 
whereas this study conducted interviews with the individuals responsible for applying the 
Stewardship Code and preparing the stewardship statements. Therefore, the difference 
between the responsibilities of these two groups could result in different findings.6 
iii) Explaining the statistical results 
Finding no financial motivation helps to explain the initial statistical results when there was 
no relationship between applying the Stewardship Code and the WAAP of the asset 
manager (F= 1.50, p-value=0.227). Participants of this study explained that they are not 
aware of any financial benefits from applying the Stewardship Code. These participants 
argued that financial performance is influenced by many factors and attributing it to only 
one factor (i.e. engagement) was not a convincing argument. In line with this finding, asset 
managers find it difficult to explain how they measure the success of their stewardship 
activities. Five of them blamed the Stewardship Code for not providing adequate guidance, 
whereas four respondents proposed that the engagement is a long-term process making it 
difficult to measure.  
 
The current version of the Stewardship Code (2012) has provided a brief definition of 
stewardship activities without providing any guidelines on measuring them against the 
principles of this Code. This could demotivate the signatories of the Stewardship Code as 
they are not able to assess their success in applying this guideline. Although the current 
tiering system has been a good effort by FRC to address this issue, the main focus of this 
system is on the quality of stewardship reporting rather than the quality of stewardship 
activities. One approach to address this issue is to require the investors to provide detailed 
reports on their engagement activities, including some real examples showing both 
successful and unsuccessful outcomes. The investors’ stewardship report should reflect on 
those engagement practices to determine the factors that lead to success or failure in 
 
6 The fund managers that were interviewed by Hendry et al. (2007) were senior managers (chief investment 
officers, heads of UK or European equities, heads of research and senior fund managers) from eleven of the 
twenty largest UK asset management companies. These senior fund managers were responsible for corporate 
governance activities. However, this does not imply that they would be directly involved in engagement 
activities of their institutions. In fact, these senior managers could have a team of corporate Governance 




exercising shareholder responsibilities. As aforementioned, the FRC just proposed a revision 
to the UK Stewardship Code (2019) based on the consultation with the stakeholders:   
“successful engagement is not a requirement of disclosure against this Provision, but 
signatories should be able to indicate their perceived success and how this has been 
measured against stated objectives” (FRC, 2019, p.16).  
 
The FRC has still not provided a guideline on how the investors should measure their 
stewardship activities. Instead, the signatories of the Stewardship Code are encouraged to 
measure and report their success in engagement themselves. This is the first time that FRC 
included measuring the achievement from an application of the Stewardship Code in its 
report. In the future, it would be interesting to see institutional investors reporting 
measures of stewardship activities. Future research could then evaluate these reports to 
determine whether the FRC has been successful in reaching its aim. 
iv) Agency Problems 
Around 30% of the interviewees stated that they exercise their stewardship responsibilities 
to reduce agency problems that exist between investors and corporates. Therefore, these 
respondents claimed they act as owner and used their engagement as a tool to align their 
interest with the investee corporates. This finding is in line with Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
who investigated the free-rider problem, suggesting that large shareholders, due to the size 
of their investment, have enough incentive to monitor their investee corporates. Therefore, 
institutional investors as the largest group of UK shareholders could ensure the managers 
are following the same interests as shareholders and help to reduce the agency problems 
that may exist in their corporates. In line with this, when participants were asked about 
finding an agency gap between their own interests and the interests of their investee 
corporates, the majority of the respondents agreed on the existence of such a gap. But, at 
the same time, they emphasised that it is getting better compared to a few years ago. This 
finding indicates that asset managers who follow the Stewardship Code are not only aware 
of the agency problems but also act as a responsible owner to reduce or eliminate them. 
This finding is in line with the traditional empirical studies which conceptualised relationship 




in line (Anabtawi, 2006; David et al., 2001; Gillian & Starks, 2000; Hoskisson et al., 2002; 
Johnson et al., 2010; Mallin, 1994; Myners, 2003; Ryan & Schneider, 2003 ). Accordingly, 
institutional investors as the principals are motivated to engage in investee corporates to 
ensure accountability of the managers as the agents. More recently, the academics began to 
question the validity of this description (e.g. Tilba & McNulty, 2013; Hendry et al., 2007; 
Davis, 2008, 2009; Jackson, 2008). For example, Tilba and McNulty (2013) found that only a 
very small number of well-resourced and internally managed pension funds behaved as 
owners in investee corporates through exhibiting engaged ownership behaviour. As 
aforementioned, most of the participants of this study mentioned that they have a good 
level of access and resources, helping them to perform their engagement responsibilities 
effectively. Therefore, the ownership behaviour of asset managers interviewed for this 
study may not be in line with other asset managers. This will make it difficult to generalise 
the behaviour of this study’s participants to all the groups of institutional investors. Besides, 
nearly all of the respondents agreed that most of the investee corporates usually cooperate 
with them when they are performing their stewardship responsibilities.  
These findings indicate that both investors and companies are aware of the potential agency 
problem that may exist in their relationship and are working together to minimise any 
conflicts that may arise due to the agency problem. Therefore, the relationship between 
investors and companies has evolved from a simple agent-principal relationship to a 
relationship which is based on engagement, discussion, and understanding each other’s 
expectations. In the current period, even the small institutional investors can raise their 
voice through collective engagement, introduced by the Stewardship Code. It is very likely 
that this improvement in the agent-principal relationship happened over time as the 
awareness of accountability raised among both investors and their investee corporates. The 
publication of the Stewardship Code might have played a role in increasing this awareness 
among institutional investors. Even so, it is difficult to link this outcome to the publication of 
the Stewardship Code. Specifically, after finding that application of the Stewardship Code 
has not enhanced the quality of engagement between participants of this study and their 
investee corporates.  
Hence, this study does not investigate the relevance of agency theory, but that the push for 




houses. This study found the engagement of investors in their investee corporates has 
played a significant role to eliminate the agency problem. Nevertheless, since the history of 
engagement goes before the publication of the Stewardship Code, this study cannot directly 
relate reduction in the gap between investors and corporates to the publication of the 
Stewardship Code.  
v) Reporting 
Although the participants emphasised that no financial impact was evident from applying 
the Stewardship Code, most of them agreed that the Stewardship Code had improved their 
stewardship reporting. This finding indicates that asset managers use the Stewardship Code 
as a framework to report and explain their stewardship activities to their clients. This finding 
is in line with the FRC review (2014) indicating that the Stewardship Code is going in the 
right direction to improve the accountability of the investors towards their clients. It is 
notable that the low quality of stewardship reporting, which is raised as an issue by FRC 
itself could negatively affect the accountability of the investors towards their clients. 
According to the FRC, providing transparent stewardship reporting by institutional investors 
is likely to benefit clients as well as the investee corporates of institutional investors. Having 
access to a high-quality stewardship statement enables the client to make a more informed 
decision in relation to choosing a suitable institution with a management approach that is in 
line with their requirements. In addition, investee corporates are able to see the subjects 
that are important for their major shareholders and make them more likely to practice their 
ownership responsibilities. Furthermore, driving a stewardship statement by the asset 
owners makes asset managers aware of the expectations of their clients.   In conclusion, the 
Stewardship Code has been successful in helping asset managers to provide better 
stewardship reporting for their clients. 
6.4 Summary  
Statistical analysis revealed that there was no significant relationship between applying the 
Stewardship Code and weighted average annual performance (WAAP) of asset managers. 
Looking at the FRC reviews, it is not clear how the application of the Stewardship Code could 




Stewardship Code in 2010, it is essential for the FRC to investigate and report the financial 
benefits of exercising effective stewardship activities.  
Focusing on the financial impact during the statistical analysis did not distract this study 
from exploring the non-financial benefit from applying the Stewardship Code for its 
signatories (i.e. enhancing the quality of engagement between investors and companies). 
After undertaking interviews with signatories of the Stewardship Code and analysing the 
results, this study could reach two main findings:  
 
1. It was found that the Stewardship Code did not enhance the quality or quantity of 
engagement by asset managers who are applying this guideline, specifically asset 
managers categorised as Tier 1 by FRC. The participants proposed that before being 
a signatory of the Stewardship Code, they were already engaging in their investee 
corporates. Hence the Stewardship Code was not successful in achieving the primary 
aim proposed by FRC (i.e. enhance the quality of engagement between investors and 
companies). This finding indicates that developing of the stewardship policies were 
rushed after the financial crisis by relying on the ISC guidelines while only 
considering institutional investors who did not have a high-quality engagement in 
their investee corporates. Considering all the time and resources that the signatories 
put into complying with the Stewardship Code, it is important for them to see and be 
able to measure their achievements from the application of this guideline. 
Therefore, the FRC should review the policies again to set more ambitious 
requirements that would inspire all institutional investors to enhance their level of 
engagement.  
2. Most participants found that preparing a more transparent stewardship report for 
their clients was the main benefit of applying the Stewardship Code. This finding 
suggests that applying the Stewardship Code has helped asset managers to improve 
their communication with their clients around the stewardship activities. Apart from 
a positive impact on their reporting, asset managers found it difficult to talk about 
other benefits from applying the Stewardship Code, specifically financial benefits. 




relationship was found between applying the Stewardship Code and their 
institution’s financial performance.  
 
Through mixing both qualitative and quantitative findings, this study proposes that, if asset 
managers cannot see the benefits of applying the Stewardship Code, they would not devote 
additional resources and effort into improving engagement practices but instead comply via 
a signatory to tick the box. Given the uptake in the number of signatories, asset managers 
do not want to remove themselves from the list of the signatories as this would identify 
them as an outlier among their competitors and disappoint their clients. In order to improve 
engagement with the principles of the Stewardship Code, the tangible benefits identified by 
the FRC (i.e. enhancing the quality and quantity of engagement) need to be easier to 
measure and monitor. Currently, this is problematic as most participants failed to identify 
such benefits. To overcome this problem, the FRC should conduct a thorough review of 
signatories’ application to determine the outcome and benefits of the Stewardship Code for 
institutional investors. Currently, the FRC reviews the Stewardship Code based on the 
stewardship statements. Although this issue was not directly explored in this study, some 
respondents claimed that they know a number of signatories whose statements do not 
represent their stewardship activities. Therefore, the FRC should not only rely on the 
investors’ statements when reviewing the Stewardship Code. It is essential that the FRC as a 
responsible regulator to review the application of the Stewardship Code more closely by 
talking to the investors and investee corporates, observing the engagement between 
investors and corporates and monitoring the preparation of the stewardship statements. 
This will help the FRC to identify what they have achieved from introducing the Stewardship 
Code and what has missed that need to be achieved. The next chapter presents a conclusion 








The FRC, as the responsible regulator, has provided an annual review of the Stewardship 
Code and published a series of reports which are publicly available on its website. Reviewing 
these reports revealed that the stewardship reporting of the signatories varies significantly, 
which has been raised as the main issue by FRC in all of the published reports. Notably, 
these reviews could not provide a thorough investigation of the application of the 
Stewardship Code. On the other hand, the academics have not paid enough attention 
towards this guideline as this study found very little evidence around the outcome of the 
effectiveness of the Stewardship Code. Nearly a decade after the publication of the 
Stewardship Code, it is essential to review the application of this guideline to assess its 
success or failure in reaching the proposed aims. To close the existing gap, this study aimed 
to explore the implementation of the Stewardship Code to determine its outcome for the 
institutional investors both financially and non-financially. The main aim of this study was to 
investigate the success of the Stewardship Code in reaching its proposed aims, including 
benefiting its signatories both financially and non-financially. To reach this objective, four 
research questions were developed, and these are discussed in turn below.  
7.1 Research Question 1 
 Research Question 1. “Has applying the Stewardship Code provided any financial benefits to 
its signatories?” 
The first research question was developed to determine the financial benefits of applying 
the Stewardship Code for its signatories. A quantitative method was conducted to 
determine the relationship between applying the Stewardship Code and weighted average 
financial performance of asset managers with UK equity funds in their portfolio.  The 
statistical analysis provided no evidence of financial benefits for signatories sampled: being 




period 2014-2017.  In line with the previous academic studies that investigated the 
institutional investors’ financial performance, size and age were also included in the 
statistical model to control for their impact (e.g. Ferreira et al., 2012; Thomas & Tonks, 
2001; Yan 2008). Since the emphasis of the FRC is on the long-term impact of the 
Stewardship Code, running this analysis in a few years could bring a different result.  
7.2 Research Questions 2 & 3 
Research Question 2 “To what extent has applying the Stewardship Code provided non-
financial benefits to its signatories?” 
Research Question 3 “To what extent has the Stewardship Code been successful in enhancing 
the quality of engagement between investors and their investee corporates?” 
To explore the non-financial outcome of the Stewardship Code, the second and third 
research questions were developed. To answer these questions, a qualitative methodology 
was applied in the second phase of this study. During this phase, interviews with asset 
managers who are following the Stewardship Code were conducted. These asset managers 
were asked to give their opinions on the application of the Stewardship Code and explain 
the impact of this guideline for their institution both financially and non-financially.  
To answer the second question, the participants were asked about the non-financial benefit 
of applying the Stewardship Code. Twenty three percent of the participants stated that 
applying the Stewardship Code has helped them to provide a transparent report on their 
stewardship activities to their clients. Other participants mentioned non-financial benefits 
include promoting long-term investment approach, inspiring other countries to publish their 
Stewardship Code as well as providing a framework for investors to engage in investee 
corporates. Investigating other themes revealed that the compliance approach of the 
Stewardship Code (i.e. comply or explain approach) allows the investor to be active 
shareholders as long as it suits their business model. Therefore, while the Stewardship Code 
provided a set of principles for the investors on how to engage in their investee corporates, 
in the end, it is the investors' decision to follow these guidelines or not. According to 
participants E, this approach has motivated foreign investors to follow its guidelines, which 




is encouraging long-term investment culture among the institutional investors, which was 
started by participant A.  
 
The answer to the third research question is negative, as 80% of the participants stated that 
applying the Stewardship Code did not have any significant impact on their engagement 
behaviour or their engagement policies. The majority (84%) of these participants stated that 
the Stewardship Code had not changed the quality of their engagement since they were 
already committed to perform their stewardship responsibilities before being a signatory. 
The sample of this study, which mainly includes Tier 1 asset managers, could explain this 
finding. Twenty three percent of these participants added having good access to necessary 
resources helped them to stay as an active investor even before the publication of the 
Stewardship Code. Therefore, this finding could be different for smaller asset managers with 
access to fewer resources. One of the participants (participant A) blamed the principles of 
Stewardship Code for lack of a significant change in their engagement practices. According 
to this participant, these principles are mainly adopted from the ISC Code (2002), and hence 
have not changed to represent the current business environment in which institutional 
investors are performing.  
7.3 Research Question 4 
Research Question 4 “To what extent has the Stewardship Code been successful in achieving 
the aims that are proposed by FRC? 
Answering the last question requires mixing the quantitative and qualitative findings to 
determine the success of the Stewardship Code in reaching its proposed aim (i.e. the 
financial benefit for signatories of the Stewardship Code and enhancing the quality of their 
engagement). Although the application of the Stewardship Code has brought some non-
financial benefits for its signatories (e.g. better stewardship reporting to clients and 
encouraging better engagement by foreign investors), it has failed to enhance the quality of 
engagement as well as to bring any financial benefit for asset managers. Based on the 
statistical findings, there was no relationship between the WAAP and the stewardship 




participants could not provide any example of their financial benefit from applying the 
Stewardship Code. 
According to the participants of this study, a lack of guidelines in measuring the success of 
the stewardship activities, not having a financial incentive when engaging with the investee 
corporates and, the difficulty in linking the financial performance to engagement were 
found as an explanation for the statistical findings. The participants found it hard to explain 
how they measure the success of their stewardship activities. This finding illustrates that 
participants of this study are applying the Stewardship Code without realising its outcome 
for their institution. Hence, it would be very likely that they tick the box without exploring 
how they can make a change in their existing engagement approach in order to enhance 
their existing practices. In addition, asset managers of this study engage in their investee 
corporates to protect and enhance value for their clients. Moreover, they mentioned the 
importance of engagement to understand the business in which they want to make an 
investment to reduce any potential risk. 
 
Furthermore, the majority of the respondents stated that they did not find any 
improvement in the quality of their engagement as a result of being a signatory of the 
Stewardship Code. Looking back at the statistical and interview findings, this study 
concludes that while the Stewardship Code has been partially successful in making an 
improvement in some areas of asset managers’ engagement (e.g. stewardship reporting) it 
has failed to fulfil its main objectives. 
7.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
Investigating the first research question allows this study to contribute to the existing 
academic studies that investigated the determinants of shareholder financial performance. 
The statistical findings of this study indicate that shareholder engagement cannot predict 
the value of their financial performance. In other words, institutional investors do not 
engage in their investee corporates with financial motivation. Conducting interviews with 
signatories of the Stewardship Code also resulted in the same finding. Majority of the 
investors found it difficult to mention any financial achievements as a result of their 




investee corporates, reducing the agency problems and helping the investee corporates to 
improve its CG system are among the popular answers for the main motivation behind asset 
managers’ engagement. Considering limited academic evidence around the financial impact 
of adopting an active engagement approach, the finding of this study firstly contributes to 
the understanding of the shareholder engagement on their financial performance.  
Answering the second and third question contribute to the existing academic studies in 
relation to the motivations behind being actively engaged in the investee corporates and 
the outcome of this engagement on asset managers.   
At the time of writing the author was unaware of any academic literature investigating the 
application of the Stewardship Code by its signatories. Therefore, the answer to the last 
question of this study contributes to understanding the impact of the Stewardship code as a 
guideline for the institutional investors who are following this Code. Since asset managers 
with UK equity funds are the primary audience of the Stewardship Code, these findings can 
be attributed to other signatories as well. The findings of this study therefore have great 
potential to make a practical contribution, helping the policymakers who are responsible for 
developing and reviewing the guidelines. This has been explained in more details in the 
following section. 
 
Finding a theme around the agency problem revealed that while asset managers are aware 
of this problem, they apply their ownership responsibilities to close the agent-principal gap. 
According to agency theory, shareholders can act as an important CG mechanism to close 
their interest with the managers. This theory assumes that managers are self-interested 
individuals who are very likely to follow their own interests rather than the interests of their 
shareholders. In this study, there is no evidence to support this assumption about 
management behaviour. Instead, a significant majority of asset managers agreed that 
managers of their investee companies usually cooperate with them to resolve concerns. 
They stated that both the investors and investee corporates are aware of the importance of 
shareholder engagement. Hence exercising stewardship activities by institutional investors 
is expected and taken into account by the managers. This finding is in contrast with the main 
assumption of agency theory. During the interviews, managers of investee corporates are 




their stewardship activities. On the other hand, this finding is inline with Stewardship 
Theory, which assumes that directors can be trusted to act as stewards of shareholder 
interests (Clarke & Branson, 2012). Hence, while signatories of the Stewardship Code 
monitor and control managers’ activities, they were able to trust managers to act on their 
behalf. On the other hand, shareholders would like to help investee corporates to perform 
better through their engagement. This relationship between investors and managers is a 
constructive relationship based on trust and understanding. Therefore, while the finding of 
this study does not deny the importance of Agency Theory, it is more towards the 
Stewardship theory which considers managers as less opportunistic and more as a trustee of 
shareholders (Mallin, 2010). It is notable that the Stewardship theory does not consider 
directors as completely unselfish and this is where the exercise of stewardship activities 
become important for institutional investors.  
7.5 Implications for policymakers 
Looking at the current reviews by FRC, the outcome of the Stewardship Code for its 
signatories is not clear. More importantly, the participants of this study stated that it is not 
clear for them how to measure the success of their stewardship activities through the 
application of the Stewardship Code. Therefore, it could be argued that if the FRC proposes 
a guideline to measure stewardship activities, institutional investors could realise the impact 
of applying the Stewardship Code in their institution. Providing this guideline enables 
investors to compare their engagement activities with what is expected from them, 
encouraging them to enhance the quality of their engagement.  
The current FRC reviews are completed mainly by focusing on a sample of stewardship 
statements. Whereas, some of the participants of this study mentioned that they know 
some asset managers whose stewardship reports are not the same as their engagement 
activities. This is in line with the box-ticking approach followed by some signatures which 
are raised as a concern by the FRC. This would challenge the reliability of the findings within 
the FRC reports. Hence, it is crucial for the FRC to change its current approach in reviewing 
the application of the Stewardship Code. For example, the FRC could run regular meetings 
with signatories of the Stewardship Code to get their opinions on the strengths and 




engagement between investors and companies to make a comparison between stewardship 
activities and stewardship reporting of the Investors. One of the participants in this study 
has not found the Stewardship Code relevant as he believed it is mainly focused on investors 
with equities in their portfolios. Another suggestion to enhance the quality of the current 
Stewardship Code (2012) is to expand its principles to cover other asset classes. More 
importantly, asset managers of this study made it clear that Stewardship Code could 
become more ambitious as most of these investors didn’t have to change their ownership 
behaviour after becoming a signatory. 
Very recently, the FRC has published a consultation on the draft 2019 UK Stewardship Code 
on 30 January 2019. The updated version of the Stewardship Code will be released late 
2019. On the FRC website, it is stated that the new Stewardship Code aims to “increase 
demand for more effective stewardship and investment decision-making which is aligned to 
the needs of institutional investors and clients”. This movement by FRC shows that the 
policymaker is aware of the current issues, and it would be interesting to see if they have 
addressed them in the new version of the Stewardship Code.  
7.6 Limitation  
This study has faced a number of limitations. Firstly, the Stewardship Code is a relatively 
new guideline making it difficult to assess any long-term impact at present. In a few years 
when longer-term financial data of the Stewardship Code’ signatories are available, it would 
be interesting to perform this study again to determine if the result changes or stays the 
same.  
Secondly, during the statistical analysis, the selection of variables will have a significant 
impact on the findings in determining the relationship with the financial performance of 
asset managers. Care was taken to review the extant literature to ensure that appropriate 
variables were selected, however, some important variables may have been overlooked.  
Thirdly, due to lack of resources, this study had to rely on the stewardship statements to 
measure the application of the Stewardship Code. On the other hand, there is a possibility 
that asset managers report high-quality stewardship activities in their report without 
performing them effectively. This is in line with the box-ticking approach raised as a concern 




Fourthly, although this study contacted all the UK asset managers, only 13 of them agreed 
to participate in this study. One issue with this self-selected sampling technique is that these 
participants, who decided to participate in the study themselves, could be very passionate 
about this guideline or equally may have a strong dislike towards it. Therefore, their 
responses could result in a bias. Increasing the sample size could enhance the reliability of 
the final result and help to explore the Stewardship Code more thoroughly.  
Fifthly, among the 13 participants, only one of them was categorised as Tier 2 (i.e. reported 
less transparently on their stewardship activities). Most of these participants stated that 
they had good access and resources, helping them to practice their responsibilities in their 
investee corporates effectively. Hence, including interviews with more signatories with Tier 
2 stewardship statements would allow this study to generalise the findings to all signatories 
of the Stewardship Code more confidently. Besides, participants volunteered themselves to 
be interviewed. So, it is possible that we only surveyed the most progressive asset managers 
who do not portray all the signatories of the Stewardship Code. 
Finally, the signatories of the Stewardship Code only published one stewardship statement 
on the FRC website. As this study did not have access to previous reports a comparison of 
the quality of the reports since the publication of the Stewardship Code was not 
permissible.  
7.7 Future Research 
To address the above limitations, any future study investigating the Stewardship Code 
should try to include a more balanced sample, including both Tier 1 and Tier 2 signatories. 
This would allow future studies to have access to a wide range of views around the 
Stewardship Code and focus on the inclusion of other types of signatories, such as asset 
owners and service providers. It would also be interesting to run an interview with the 
policymaker (i.e. FRC) to incorporate their views on the application of the Stewardship Code 
and provide a thorough analysis of this guideline.  
This study was mainly focused on UK asset managers. As aforementioned, other countries 
such as Japan and Malaysia have introduced similar guidelines as to the Stewardship Code 
for their institutional investors. So, the same study could be run in other countries with 




proposed aims. Publication of the new version of the Stewardship Code will provide an 
opportunity for academics to investigate this subject again. To investigate the financial 
impact of applying the Code, this study has used risk adjusted returns which were available 
for UK asset managers. However, through the interviews, some participants (e.g. participant 
D) mentioned that engagement with the investee corporates had helped them to minimise 
their investment risk. Hence, the impact of applying the Code to minimise the risk for its 
signatories is another aspect that could be investigated in future studies. Besides, 
considering the regression analysis results, the adjusted R squared figures were low. 
Increasing the sample size might help to overcome this problem in future studies. 
The new Stewardship Code (2020) has provided a clear definition for Stewardship which was 
missing in the previous version of the Code. According to the FRC, Stewardship is defined as 
“the responsible allocation, management and oversight of capital to create long-term value 
for clients and beneficiaries leading to sustainable benefits for the economy, the 
environment and society” (FRC, 2020). As aforementioned, the FRC mainly relied on the 
stewardship statements to assess the success of the Code. However, the FRC proposed that 
its main focus now turns away from stewardship statements towards the stewardship 
activities and their outcomes. Another key change in the new version of the Code is the 
process of adding an institutional investor as a signatory. The FRC website makes it clear 
that being accepted as a signatory of the Code is not as easy as it was before. The FRC has 
developed an assessment framework, helping them to decide whether an organisation has 
met their expectation to be added to the list of signatories. Considering these new changes, 
conducting the same study in future will help to determine whether the new Stewardship 
Code could address the problems associated with the previous version of this guideline such 
as the box-ticking approach, a lack of guidelines on measuring stewardship activities and 





Participant Information Sheet 
 “An analysis of the relationship between the Stewardship Code and financial performance of UK equity 
funds” 
You are being invited to take part in a research study to investigate the UK Stewardship Code. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully to understand why the research is being done and what it 
will involve in more detail. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The Stewardship Code was launched by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in 2010 to promote better 
quality of engagement between institutional investors and their investee corporates. The FRC posited that 
effective stewardship benefits companies, investors and the economy as a whole. The aim of this PhD study 
is to determine whether the application of the Stewardship Code could affect the institutional investors 
both financially and non-financially. 
As a part of the study, I have analysed data about the financial performance of selected UK equity funds to 
assess the impact of the processes that they have put in place to comply with the Stewardship Code. 
Interviews with representatives of institutional investors will help me to contextualise this study by 
providing opinions on strengths and weaknesses of the Code and how it has or could help them to improve 
engagement with investee corporates. The whole process of this study will last for three years (2015 to 
2018). 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
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You have been invited to take part in this study because your company has signed up to the Stewardship 
Code and you are listed as the contact point in the stewardship statement. Your contribution to this study 
helps to further my understanding of Stewardship Code and how it affects institutional investors. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is your decision whether or not to take part in this study. If you decide to be part of this research, you will 
be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you 
are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide to take part you will be invited to participate in a face to face semi-structured interview, via 
invitation email. The interview will be arranged at a time that is convenient to you and will be either at your 
office premises or a public place. Although we aim for a face to face interview, we can also consider a skype 
interview. The interview will last no longer than an hour and is a one-off event. At the beginning of the 
interview some general questions will be asked such as sharing a bit about your background, your role and 
responsibilities in your institution. During the interview, you will be asked to provide your views on your 
experiences of working with the Stewardship Code. 
With your permission, the face to face interview will be voice recorded and any information that you 
provide will be anonymised. Like the face to face interviews, the Skype interview will only be audio 
recorded, using the available programme on the computer (QuickTime Player), and a voice recorder with 
your permission. The interview transcript will be sent to you for approval, upon your request. When the 
study is completed, a summary of the final findings will be sent to you upon your request via email. 
Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
All your personal information including your name will not be recorded on the interview and will be kept 
strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations). The researcher will ensure the participants’ personal 
information remains confidential through the de-identification of data during the coding process. The 
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interviews will be voice recorded for the purpose of this study and will be kept securely at all times. A 
transcript of the interview will be sent to you for approval, upon your request. If you prefer, we would be 
happy to take notes instead of voice recording. The interview data will be stored in Google Drive, for which 
the University has a security agreement, and the researcher’s laptop will be encrypted to secure the data. 
The data collected will only be used for the purpose of dissemination of research. 
The data generated during the research will be retained in accordance with the University's policy on 
Academic Integrity and kept securely in paper or electronic form for a period of ten years after the 
completion of a research project. 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be asked to sign a 
consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason 
and any unprocessed data collected will be withdrawn from the study. If you would like to participate in this 
research project, or need further information, please get in touch by replying to the email address below. I 
will contact you in order to arrange an interview at a time that is convenient for you. 
samaneh.elmi-2015@brookes.ac.uk 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of this research will be prepared and analysed to complete a doctoral degree at Oxford Brookes 
University. The completed dissertation will be stored at Oxford Brookes University library. It is the intention 
of researchers to present papers at doctoral conferences and publish journal papers from the findings of this 
study. A summary of the final results will be provided to participants upon request. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
This research is being conducted by Sameneh Elmi, PhD student, Accounting, Finance and Economics 
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Department, Oxford Brookes University. The researcher has been awarded an Oxford Brookes University 
150 Research Studentship. The PhD is supervised by Dr. Samantha Miles svmiles@brookes.ac.uk, Dr. Sandra 
Einig, seinig@brookes.ac.uk and Dr. Rebecca Hawkins, rhawkins@brookes.ac.uk. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The research has been approved by the University Research Ethics Committee, Oxford Brookes University. 
Contact for Further Information 
Please do not hesitate to use the following contact details for further information: 
Researcher 
Samaneh Elmi, Email: samaneh.elmi-2015@brookes.ac.uk 
Supervisors 
Dr. Samantha Miles, Email: svmiles@brookes.ac.uk 
Dr. Sandra Einig, Email: seinig@brookes.ac.uk 
Dr. Rebecca Hawkins Email: rjhawkins@brookes.ac.uk 
Also, if you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, you should contact 
the Chair of the University Research Ethics Committee on ethics@brookes.ac.uk or the supervisory team on 
the email addresses above. 












Interview transcription (participant B) 
1. So, could you please tell me What is the main aim and strategy of your institution when
managing assets on behalf of your clients?
We are asset managers, we manage about 8 million pounds sterling of both long- and
short-term monies for UK’s charities, churches and local authorities and principally, you
know we are here to deliver the best possible risk adjusted return for our clients. You
know they give us the money to manage to kind of fund their activities, so we are
fundamentally here to do that. I guess what we believe is that embedding environmental
and social and governmental factors in a meaningful way, they can genuinely alter
portfolios will help us do that. So, we do that firmly through the lens of this will deliver
better shareholder returns and we see embedding ESGS also including stewardship factors
so actually going to ask to talk to companies again is a standard part of our approach.
2. How does your institution ensure that it protects and enhances value for its clients?
Sorry what in particular?
3. Because the stewardship Code states that when you are performing the stewardship
activity you should do it in line with the object that you protect and enhance value for
your clients at the same time?
So, we fundamentally believe that, like what I said, the stewardship will lead to better risk
adjusted returns over the long term, but we also recognise that actually a lot of these
things are long-term gains. So, it’s very difficult to measure short-term incremental
performance gains from the back of it. So, our stewardship work has kind of two aims of
up to it; one we work with companies with the risk issues that they face today and two we
want to try, to some extent it sounds naive: build the future that we believe will stay with
the company, jump right ? in the future. So, for example we found a firm that firmly
believes that limiting temperature to below a (?) certain degree is the right thing to do for
asset management reasons is not for my own reasons. Of course, that is true as well. So,
going back to your question, we believe fundamentally that is what we are accounted to
do. we also recognise that actually, stewardship is a resource like any other and our clients
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are paying for that resource and that means that we have to deal to demonstrate that our 
engagement has been meaningful. And has led to changes in behaviour. We might not 
necessarily be able to argue that it’s link to financial change behaviour like as I said these 
are long-term issues but fundamentally we want to demonstrate that we spoke to a 
company about label standard, they’ve gone away, and we pointed out where we want 
the change to happen and then they are gone away with those change and improve their 
approach. So, we want to be able to say we’ve done this, led to this impact and that’s 
what I think we can demonstrate that we are delivering value to our clients. 
4. When you said that it will have an impact on your long-term performance, how long does
it?
Again, we don’t measure that. And fundamentally we think you know to require (?) it is
anonymous, I think a lot of this short term out of stuff for ESG is a complete waste of time.
Because actually fundamentally what we are saying is that sustainable market and
sustainability is fundamentally important delivering long-term investment return and
therefore to be quite frank we are not particularly interested in whatever one quarter of
return was better than the second course of return and whether the stewardship to
present had any ability to do that. What we do really is that if we can see when the
companies have fallen down and be able to help them readdress that issue and that
should help them perform better than the long-term.
5. What is your role in your institution and how it relates to Stewardship Code?
Ok, so I head up our responsible stewardship investment team, our report to our chief
investment officer who you just met, and I have a team of 4 people beneath me. We were
pretty poorest team. We were a cross better kind of marketing team as you would expect
but our investment management team to make sure embedding these issues that we
want to but fundamentally our role and our specialism is stewardship.
6. How long have been in this role?
I’ve been here 7 and a half years.
7. Are you aware of your institution's first response to publication of the Code in 2010 by
FRC?
Yes, I am. I was here yes we did publish our first response and it was a very positive
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experience. 
8. So, you started in 2010?
No, we were doing stewardship a long time before that. You know the ESG, the history
goes back to 50 odd years, active ownership and engagement has been a huge part of
what we do for a very long time. Our clients have values and we usually try to take our
clients values into the Boardroom in the companies that we invested in. What the
stewardship Code did was make sure that we start building proper policy governance (?) a
while we did it. So, the first response that we had which lived for, the aim was to update it
annually, lived for about 5 was our first attempt to codify how we do this and Why do we
think it relates to investment management.
9. Considering the recent engagement policies of your institution, do they differ significantly
from the engagement policies before following the Stewardship Code?
I think they grow in sophistication.  I am not sure if that’s the Stewardship Code who's
done that. Stewardship Code has helped us, but it is not a driver how we change things. So
we have recognise that actually meaning for engagement that change practices you know
the stewardship engagement the CCLA ,USB so be able to continue to stand out of our
competitors we had to invest in it, we had to professionalise in it, and there is a huge
areas that are still not good enough and quite clearly that relates to reporting, we’re not
good enough in reporting how we’ve got on, we’re not good enough to telling our story to
how we prioritise the companies to engagement, not, and we will see that’s the pieces of
the work that we have to do. So, the stewardship report, the stewardship code response
very helpful codifying has not necessarily been the driver in changing what we do. so,
we’ve already been doing lots of this stuff in the way that they wanted us to do it.
10. What is the main motivation of your institution in engaging with investee corporates?
To help our businesses develop a more sustainable business model. So, you know that
ranges from taking long-term issues like climate change, making sure that the companies
we’re interested in we engage in, we invest in are addressing the challenges that the
transitions to the current economy will have also noting saying where things like poor
corporate governance, poor approaches to managing kind of label practises, etc. could
lead to the company underperforming and helping them fix those issues but also you
know I am head of responsibility investment function we do, our investment team do a
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huge amount of stewardship in company meetings and trying to address strategy and 
performance where we find something wrong strategy or performance we absolutely will 
be working with company but like many active managers we tend to use, you know we 
tend to ? company very quickly when we have a problem with strategy 
11. You know it’s historically been argued that there is a gap between the director’s interests
and shareholder interest. So, I am just wondering if you still see, you know, compared to
the previous years, have you seen a development, or do you still see the gap or whether
the Code has helped you to close this gap?
I don’t know. I think what we have seen much more is the use of executive pay schemes
that absolutely align the shareholder value with directors, and you know you may (?) what
we have seen in this graph of variable pay has done exactly the opposite of that. It is
incentivised by a very short-term performance structure. It is incentivising completely the
wrong behaviour or maybe we would see alignment as being much more plot going back
to something like salary as you may (?) because that would lead to better holistic decision
making. So again, I don’t think sitting here at CCLA, sort of pretty unique case, that really
changes the way that we see the world. If I were sitting somewhere else, one of our I
could be arguing the exact opposite.
12. Did applying the Stewardship code help to improve your engagement with investee
corporates? How?
Again, I don’t think it’s really made much difference to the way we engage with
companies.
13. OK, why do you think it didn’t help?
Because again you know, I mean the stewardship code you’re quite wright it came into
effect through realise that there is an agency gap in between companies and directors,
people who run the companies and also recognise that actually what was happening goes
to the key report was that active managers were selling rather than telling companies that
they had problems with strategy. Now for us we’ve always been a long-term investor,
we’ve always believed having a partnership with the companies that we’re investing in we
see them as usually beneficial relationship because what’s good for us is good for them
and what’s good for them is good for us and therefore we’ve always see sought to have




not really change that commitment if that makes sense. It's great other people doing it, 
but it just meant that we continue to do what we’ve always done of talking to the 
companies about the risk that we see and saying when we think they are falling behind 
the best practice 
14.  So when you go to the FRC website or when you read the Stewardship Code you get the 
idea that the Code was published to you know enhance the engagement to improve the 
engagement but so far most asset managers, head of the CG  they told me that it hasn’t 
changed their engagement? 
I think obviously no one likes admitting that someone else has made them change 
something. But what I think what the stewardship code is saying and what I think is the 
case here is that you have a leadership group who were a leadership group before. So, the 
people who were doing the good thing before the stewardship Code are now doing the 
better stewardship but the people who were not doing very much in stewardship before, 
still aren’t doing very much. So, you have a leadership group, you basically just help the 
best get better. 
15.  When following the guidelines of the Stewardship Code, what do you see as the strengths 
and weaknesses of the Stewardship code? 
I think yeah the Code is very difficult, because what the code measures, well it is not 
particularly measures but the tiering measures, is what your process is doing so what are 
the model that you go through and quite frankly if you start like a speaker system if you 
start off with a rubbish record and put it through a really great speaker, it’s still rubbish. 
So, if you don’t have a great process, you don’t have good people or very good 
commitment to stewardship then actually you still are going to have rubbish stewardship 
and the stewardship Code doesn’t really help with that. What’s much more interesting is 
that actually how do you take what it is that you are really trying to achieve for a company 
and then measure the progress that you are actually having with that. So, what are the 
outputs your stewardship programme and I don’t know if the stewardship Code really 
does that I don’t quite know how they could do that but if you look at say the principle for 
responsible investment  annual survey what annual assessment process that the investors 
need to go through, then it’s much more based upon how good is your stewardship as 




16.  Are you aware of any difficulties in applying the Stewardship code, preventing you to 
thoroughly follow the guidelines? 
Not here. No, if you are being honest. I think one of the problems that active managers 
face broadly is whether stewardship is a selling point or not. Because one of the points, it 
is not necessarily in the stewardship code, but one of the points that affect the 
stewardship is great collaboration with other investors and quite frankly if you are trying 
to use your stewardship as a way of selling who you are as an organisation and why you 
are better than the last thing you want is to work with your competitors who are also 
trying to do that. So, there is a competitive tension issue here but at the same time if 
stewardship becomes part of why people choose different asset managers you create a 
kind of race to the top should lead better engagement being done so I can say that 
collaboration point a difficulty for managers who are competing against each other who 
might see the stewardship as one of the things that their best asset managers competitors 
differentiator means the collaboration can be difficult sometimes. 
17.  When performing the stewardship activities, which activity do you believe is more costly 
for your institution to accomplish? I mean voting, monitoring the investee companies, 
having continuous dialogue with them. 
I think all of those things are relatively easy. I mean you can deal with all of those things 
on the cheap as it were (?). What is expensive and what is difficult is having the (?) of 
people who can build up genuine relationships with companies to the point when the 
companies trust them to make changes to what their strategy is. So actually, yeah 
fundamentally our approach to voting is that we have voting policies, our voting policies 
are applied by voting provider ISS, they create the Board (?) research for us. So, in essence 
that is very cheap. What cost of money is having somebody whose very good at voting, 
who understands the actual (?) of why a tick box approach might not suits for certain 
company, so why you know we might say a joint chairman and chief executive is bad 
practice why absolutely might work for certain company and altering our process then 
being able to talk to that company about that. That’s what is expensive, it’s not voting, it is 
doing it well. But again, it's a problem because fundamentally if people were saying tick 
box approach to voting to try to suit a kind of Stewardship Code box then you are actually 
driving inappropriate behaviour, because people are really starting to (?) properly. 




where the company is going. But again actually what takes time and what’s more 
expensive is that we be able to pick up on the new answers on the different way that the 
managers team to talk you out to what is it they trying to achieve and therefore being 
able to articulate back us to that progress or not to progress and what we have to do. So, 
it’s actually, on paper, is actually, on paper the code is easy to fulfil. In practice if you get 
to do it well it takes very high-quality people and high-quality people cost a lot of money. 
But again, it’s going to the point of what you are trying to achieve. If you are trying to 
achieve compliance with the stewardship code, it’s very easy to do if you are trying to 
genuinely change the corporate behaviour that's a very different kettle of fish. 
18.  So does the FRC concern that? 
The FRC, again I am telling very naively the stewardship is a great thing, it’s a great thing 
that exists but the FRC do not have the resources to do it properly. So, the FRC, you know 
if you compare the FRC to the PRI, the PRI is much better staffed and still they don’t have 
the ability to do as the FRC has got to look at what’s going on across every piece and every 
company and therefore their ability to actually do this in a meaningful way is really 
diminished. Again, like us if you are going to do the stewardship properly you have to 
build the resources to be able to have the relationship. The FRC just don’t have the ability 
to get the resources to have the relationship to look at all the asset managers or all the 
stewardship code signatories objectively. I think what the tiering did was hugely beneficial 
but what we are saying again is because it’s basically issues to paper, people who care 
grow irritating back up to those with the first tier. Because we need to get an output 
based on the base model rather than a policy base model. 
19.  So how do the investee corporates usually cooperate with you in applying the 
Stewardship engagement activities? 
Really interesting. I mean so again I come out this ESG side as opposed to performance 
and strategy. what we find is that always there is always someone in the company who is 
working on what it is that we want to be working on and again the first point is that we 
are investors and therefore we want the company to do well, and therefore there is an 
inherent alignment between we never tell the company to do something that we think is 
backward for the business because ? face. So we have inherent alignment they are going 
back to that point that we always find that there is someone in the business whose trying 




then part of our work is to build a relationship with that person and then trying to help 
that person to get the buying the company to do that. So what we find is that cause we 
are relatively small (?) high profile organisation that we have the ability to attract the 
intention of CEOs and chairs and when we attract the ability of CEO and chairs, we can 
champion a piece of work that can move up the agenda (?) what’s going on and we had 
that’s how we build a relationship and trying to make sure we continuingly being there 
seeing on the side as a critical friend. 
20. So it is written on the FRC website that the FCA (Financial Conduct Authority) requires you to 
publish your statement, is there anyone else, for example clients any other organisation that 
requires you to publish your stewardship statement? 
A lot of our clients ask us to see our stewardship statement in RFPs. And again, that’s part 
of it because we’ll have clients that are looking for that. But no not necessarily. I must say 
the FCA thing is on one hand very good but on the other hand again drive this tick boxing 
approach cause the FCA as far as I am aware brought us into coming back to the fact that 
stewardship was going to be (?) premade  mandatory by the EU, so that (?) us to creating 
this FCA provision that you had to give a response to the stewardship Code your response 
can be, we don’t think that stewardship applies to our business, so we do not have to do 
anything. So, you know it works both ways. 
21. I think you already answered this, but I am going to ask this again; According to FRC, applying 
the Stewardship Code has a positive impact on investors. Since being the signatory of the Code, 
what are the positive achievements for your institution, both financial and non-financial? 
Yeah, I do think that I already answer this. Again, I can talk about the positive 
achievements that our engagement (?) and our engagement also you know is the ESG 
factor but also what our clients want to do. and you know our clients are big, producing 
the living wage for instance, they think that the living wage is very important so we over 
the period of five years talk to over thirteen FTSE 100 companies (?) doing about the wage 
at the end of that engagement programme 11 of them become a (?) to the living wage 
employer so we manage to drive that change. Similarly if we are concern about carbon (?) 
we took for years and years and years we’ve taken what’s the carbon disclosure project 
now called CDP climate change rankings that used to rank companies from A to Es now A 
to D, under the old model we engage with any FTSE 350 company who haven’t scored C 




at the time there was about 76 FTSE 350 companies who genuinely companies (?) with the 
investment trust who had not got that C grade the university that we worked with split 
those two, split those 76 companies to test the control group we did not engage with and 
a test group we did, about 56 companies that we engaged with during the period of test 
about 26, 27 of the FTSE 350 companies that we engaged with improved their CDP score. 
The university was able to say 94% of the confidence rate that change wouldn't happen 
without us. So, I can talk lengthily about how our engagement has made meaningful 
change happen. I just don’t think that is driven by the stewardship code. It is driven by 
what our clients want to see, it is driven by the firm commitment this company has as the 
active ownership and dialogue all lead to the right outcome. And that sounds a bit wishy 
washy but fundamentally it’s what we believe. 
22. How do you measure the success of your stewardship activities? 
So, we try and have a very clear ask of companies. So, we are trying to know exactly what 
it is that we want the company to do and when we know that we can say whether the 
company is done it so or not. So, like what I said with the CDP piece of work, is the case 
that whether the objective's third party assessment process, then rank the company from 
A to E basis, now A to E. And we could actually say if you had a D now got a C and that’s 
the engagement success. Severally we did an engagement piece of work that we did with 
our clients’ values is very clear (?) from which foundation it is. If you hadn’t got there it 
wasn't a successful engagement if you had got there it was a successful engagement. So, it 
is a case of being upset with the (?) expectation that we are trying to achieve and then see 
if the companies have done better.  That’s it. Because lots of our work, trying to kind of 
make the sustainable future for the companies, we need to, you know we are not 
necessarily testing the performance outcome we think that’s slightly separate from what 
we follow. so that you know we are not interested in (?) performance but it is very 
interesting academic evidence that you are trying to suggest that engagement does. (?) 
our paper for instance. 
23. How do you ensure all the funds within your institution follow the same engagement policy 
and perform their stewardship activities effectively? 
Because we are a relatively small company, it’s all done by my team. So, you know we do 
everything essentially so it’s not particularly hard for us to work , if we were to grow then 
that’s a different thing but you know for us it’s pretty easy monitoring data making sure 
 238 
we are doing things that we should be doing reports on. So, we do have a responsible 
investment committee that might just progress across everything that we do (?) 
stewardship to make sure that things are happening in the way that they said would 
happen. 
24. Ok, that was the end of questions. Do you have other things to add or anything that I haven’t
asked you?
Well it depends. Ok, so what's your research question? 
25. It is analysing the impact of the stewardship Code on financial and non-financial performance
of the asset managers.
Ok, I don’t think so. I think it is interesting that you have a selection of people like us that 
you want to talk about it, people who do it and what we really interested is to find out 
why people aren’t doing the stewardship well, 
26. The people who haven’t applied the code?
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Assumptions of the Regression Analysis 
The following points explain how this study meets all the essential assumptions of the 
regression analysis: 
○ Sample Size: The first assumption that was required to consider before running
the regression was to have at least 15 records for each independent variable
included in the regression analysis. This assumption has been met in this study
since the sample size is 50 and the maximum number of independent variables
that could be included in the regression is 3. It is notable that this assumption is
applicable if the dependent variable is normally distributed. The next section
presents the distribution of the dependent variable.
○ Distribution of the Dependent variable: To check whether the performance is
distributed normally or has a skewed distribution, the ratio of skewness to the
standard error of skewness is applied. The closer the ratio to zero, the more
confident we are that we have a reasonable approximation to normality. Using
the value of 2.58 as the cut-off between the marginal acceptability of normality
and non-normality. Considering the skew ratio of 3.63, the annual financial
performance of the equity funds is not normally distributed since the skew ratio
is well above 2.58.
Table A.1 Skew Ratio 





WAAP 50 1.223 .337 3.63 
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To transform skewed distributions to normality, a square root transformation was 
applied in the SPSS. After the transformation, the normality test was run. The result 
of the normality test is presented in the following table: 
Table A.2 Normality Tests 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
performance .092 50 .200* .970 50 .239 
The null-hypothesis of this test is that the population is normally distributed. Thus, 
on the one hand, if the p-value is more than the chosen alpha level (0.05), then the 
null hypothesis is rejected and there is evidence that the data tested are not from a 
normally distributed population. Here P-value (0.239) is more than 0.05 so the null-
hypothesis is accepted, and WAAP is normally distributed. 
○ Outliers: Then, the normal distribution of the DV was considered to look for any
outlier (i.e. a score that is very different from the rest of the scores) that could
negatively affect the distribution of the data. Based on the following histogram,
there are some data that could be considered as outliers.
Figure A.1 Normal Distribution 
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To identify the outlier, Z scores of the Dependent Variable were calculated using the 
SPSS. Z scores are standard scores and therefore can be directly compared with each 
other as they represent comparative positions on the same scale. Since we have not 
used the same range of rating scores for all these variables, using Z scores enable us 
to compare them across different distribution. In addition, using Z score helps to 
identify the outliers for the age of equity funds. The Z scores should be between -3 
to 3 and  any score outside this range is identified as an outlier. One outlier case (12) 
was identified and deleted from the dataset.  
○ Linear Relationship: To check the assumption that there is a Linear relationship
between the Dependent Variable and IV, the probability plot was used. Based on this
plot, although there are some deviations here the points are generally following the
regression line.
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